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This thesis explores divorce and judicial separation as it occurred in nineteenth-century 
Scotland, between the years 1830 and 1890, predating the phenomenon it came to be in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As Scotland’s history has frequently been 
incorporated within a general history of Great Britain, this thesis separates it from the 
widely researched accounts of marriage and marital breakdown in England to highlight the 
different approach to regulating marriage, divorce and separation under Scots law.  
Applying Scotland’s distinctive legal, demographic and economic context has provided a 
social and gender history of marriage breakdown unique to the country, and filled a 
historiographical gap for the nineteenth century.  This research will be presented through 
separate analyses of divorce for adultery, desertion—both official and unofficial, and 
marital cruelty in the civil and criminal courts.  To present individual experiences inside 
the courtroom, Court of Session divorce and separation cases are used and supplemented 
with newspaper accounts of Court of Session trials.  To provide context to the related 
discourses, Parliamentary papers and newspaper articles are used.  Lastly, to address the 
unofficial instances of marital breakdown, criminal court trials of wifebeating and poor 
relief applications from deserted wives are also analysed.  This thesis argues that despite 
comparably liberal divorce and separation laws established in the sixteenth century, legal, 
economic, social and cultural factors and discourses imposed on the accessibility of these 
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Reading Linda Gordon’s Heroes of Their Own Lives, illustrated the darker side of 
marriage;
1
 the reality that while marriage on its most superficial level symbolises loves and 
happiness, there also exists a broader spectrum, where marital conflict can be found.   In 
the twenty-first century, divorce and separation are commonplace.
2
  Gordon’s work 
inspired my research into to the history of marital breakdown before this was so.
3
  Though 
she focuses on abuse in the family, this investigation was expanded to incorporate other 
forms of marital breakdown.  As this thesis will show, domestic abuse was not considered 
justification for a full divorce, only a separation.  This raised the question of what the legal 
grounds for divorce were, and how they matched the real experiences of marital 
breakdown?  What were the ways that couples handled their failed marriages within the 
context of the law?  This thesis addresses how husbands and wives utilised the law to their 
benefit when the core of marriage and legal rights were unequal and indifferent to women 
and the impoverished, essentially restricting couples from recourse to the law. 
The focus of this thesis is on divorce and judicial separation covering the decades 1830 to 
1890 with a concentration on Scotland.  This is a history of marital breakdown in Scotland 
through the lens of nineteenth-century civil and criminal law.  From the perspective of 
social and gender history, this topic is first approached by establishing the legal and 
statistical context of divorce and separation.  The legal, economic, social and cultural 
discourses related to marital breakdown, are then compared to individual experiences 
found in the civil and criminal courts to determine how much of an influence these 
discourses had on how couples dealt with failed marriages.   
As this thesis revolves around legal remedies in the civil court, the three most common 
grounds used for filing an action of divorce or separation were chosen for in-depth studies: 
adultery, desertion and cruelty. The first and second most common grounds for divorce 
make up two thirds of this thesis: adultery and desertion (respectively).  Marital abuse 
composes the remaining one-third, as it was the most recurrently charged ground for 
judicial separation in the form of maltreatment and cruelty.  The incorporation of adultery, 
                                                          
1
 Specifically Chapter 8: ‘“The Powers of the Weak”: Wife-Beating and Battered Women’s Resistance’ in 
Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960, 
(London, 1989), pp. 250-288. 
2
 Registrar General for Scotland (Duncan Macniven), Annual Report of the Registrar General of  
Births, Deaths and Marriages for Scotland 2010, 156
th
 Edition, (National Statistics, 5 August 2011),   
< http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files2/stats/annual-review-2010/rgar2010.pdf> [accessed 31 July 2013], p. 
61.  
3




desertion and marital abuse have allowed for an encompassing look at marital breakdown, 
as it existed inside and outside the civil court.   
This thesis also works from the perspective that cruelty in the nineteenth century existed in 
many forms.  It incorporates a definition of abuse that is wider than physical violence.  
This was not the working legal definition of the 1800s; what is today considered marital 
abuse, was in fact tolerated on certain levels.  At the standard level of acceptance the use of 
physical violence was often condoned if justified as a means of correction or chastisement.  
The discourses of the Scottish judiciary and media differentiated between correction and 
cruelty.  Non-physical violence, although often complained of as more frequent, was 
invariably overlooked by its categorisation as less likely to cause injury.    
Gender and class are key elements for this study as each social construct directly shaped an 
individual’s experience of marriage.  There are times in this analysis when stereotypes 
might unintentionally appear; however, this is a result of contemporary discourses that 
made certain issues an idiosyncrasy of gender or class.  For instance, although adultery is 
committed by husbands and wives, and anecdotally thought to be committed by more 
husbands, the majority of divorce actions on the charge of adultery were filed by husbands 
against their wives.  This is arguably the result of the double standard, as well as men’s 
economic independence.
4
  Likewise, twenty-first century scholars are raising awareness of 
husbands as victims of domestic abuse, and evidence shows that some wives were also 
violent and abusive, yet every summons of judicial separation filed on the ground of 
maltreatment and cruelty was initiated by the wife.
5
  This suggests that judicial separation 
for cruelty was not a practical remedy for a husband, and therefore an abused husband may 
have preferred an alternative way to deal with a violent wife.           
 
                                                          
4
 The double standard will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  For articles on the double standard, see 
Keith Thomas, ‘The Double Standard,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April, 1959), pp. 195-
216; Ursula Vogel, ‘Whose Property?: The double standard of adultery in nineteenth-century law’, in Carol 
Smart (ed.), Regulating Womanhood: historical essays on marriage, motherhood and sexuality, (London, 
1992), pp.147-165; Ann Sumner Holmes, ‘The Double Standard in English Divorce Laws, 1857-1923’, Law 
& Social Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 601-620; Lesley Hall, ‘Hauling Down the Double 
Standard: Feminism, Social Purity and Sexual Science in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain’, Gender & 
History, Vol. 16. No. 1 (April, 2004), pp. 35-56.   
5
 For instance see Ronald E. Hall, ‘The surreptitious feminization of domestic violence: An empirical 
expose’, Social Work & Social Sciences Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2012), pp. 34-47.  Joanne Bailey addresses 
the issue of violent wives in Joanne Bailey, Unquiet Lives: Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England, 
1660-1800, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 119, 128-132.  
11 
 
Historical Gaps: Expanding on the Scottish Experience 
As a history of marital breakdown, this thesis draws on previous studies of marriage to 
reach a historical understanding of marital expectations.
6
  The transition from family-based 
economics in the early-modern period of western civilization, to industrialisation in the 
modern, is argued as a factor that contributed to changing marital relationships over the 
recent centuries.
7
  For instance, Edward Shorter, in The Making of the Modern Family, 
argued that the modern family—where affection, love and sentiment are priorities for its 
members—was a product of industrialisation and capitalism restructuring societal values, 
while Lawrence Stone, in Family, Sex and Marriage, similarly argued that romantic love 
caused couples to place the individual before the community, eventually cutting the 
possessive links between families and wider society that defined the traditional family.  
Though several historians’ theories ultimately illustrate a similar pattern of development of 
the western family, the debate has become more complex because historians disagree over 
when these developments took place, and how simply the shift occurred.  Thus, the notion 
of romantic love as a primary foundation for companionate marriage has been widely 
debated, as well as the original proposal that it was a modern development.   
Older histories of marriage argued that marriage had two forms: patriarchal, and then 
romantic love or companionate.
8
  More recent works argue that married couples 
experienced a combination of the two, rather than one at a time.  For instance, A. J. 
Hammerton’s Cruelty and Companionship examines marital cruelty in both working-class 
and middle-class marriages to show that cruely existed within a society that promoted love 
and submission regardless of socioeconomic status.
9
  Eleanor Gordon and Gwyneth Nair’s 
                                                          
6 
Key works on the history of the family: Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family, (London, 
1976); Rosemary O’Day, The Family and Relationships, 1500-1900: England, France and the United States 
of America, (Hampshire, 1994); Leonore Davidoff, Megan Doolittle, Janet Fink and Katherine Holden, The 
Family Story: Blood, Contract and Intimacy, 1830-1960, (London, 1999).  For the ideology of separate 
spheres and patriarchy in England see Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and 
Women of the English Middle Class 1780-1850, Revised Edition, (London, 2002), and Catherine Hall, White, 
Male and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and History, (Cambridge, 1995). For Scotland, see 
Eleanor Gordon and Gwyneth Nair, Public Lives: Women, Family and Society in Victorian Britain, (New 
Haven and London, 2003).  Key works on the history of marriage: Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and 
Marriage in England 1500-1800, (London, 1977); Joan Perkin, Women and Marriage in Nineteenth-Century 
England, (London, 1989); John Gillis, For Better For Worse: British Marriages 1600 to the Present, (New 
York and Oxford, 1985). 
7
 Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family, (London, 1976); Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and 
Marriage in England 1500-1800, (London, 1977). 
8 
Accordingly Shorter claimed romantic love was a product of the nineteenth century in The Making of the 
Modern Family, p. 7, while Stone claimed it was already an established practice by 1800, in The Family, Sex 
and Marriage, pp. 8-9. Rosemary O’Day argues the nuclear family already existed before industrialisation 
took effect in the nineteenth century, in Rosemary O’Day, The Family and Relationships, 1500-1900: 
England, France and the United States of America, (Hampshire, 1994), pp. 9-10. 
9
 A. J. Hammerton, Cruelty and Companionship: Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Married Life, (London, 
1992), pp. 1-5. 
12 
 
Public Lives debunks the applications of separate spheres as the best analytical tool for 
examining Victorian middle-class women’s lives in Scotland, as does Elizabeth Foyster’s 
Marital Violence, focusing on early-modern England, because, as both books argue, 
women had much more movement across the ‘spheres’ and therefore more of a presence 
and contribution to private and public life within their marriage, which contrasts with the 
idea of an overt patriarchal relationship.
10
  Importantly, these works also establish that 




Similarly, Katie Barclay argues that rather than assuming theory did not meet expectations 
in practice, patriarchy, obedience and love were seen and experienced as compatible and 
complimentary.
12
  Her book Love, Intimacy and Power, stresses that the intimacy between 
elite husbands and wives afforded women much more agency and room for negotiation 
over everyday familial and domestic matters.
13
  Joanne Bailey, in Unquiet Lives, argues 
from the perspective that marriage was an interdependent relationship for the majority of 
the population; she takes a more moderate approach than the extreme optimistic or 
pessimistic outlooks used by historians when discussing marriage in the pre-modern era.
14
 
Following the progressive understandings of the complex nature of marriage in the past put 
forward by Barclay and Bailey, my own work approaches marriage in the decades of mid-
nineteenth century Scotland as companionships based within a patriarchal society.  Wives 
were property of their husbands, but also their husbands’ moral responsibility.  Marital 
expectations put forward in the court records, as well as through public discourses, 
demonstrate that while wives were subordinate to their husbands in terms of legal and 
economic rights, happy and successful marriages were partnerships founded on love, 
kindness and support for all socioeconomic groups.  Interdependency played a larger role 
in couples’ everyday lives and their decisions on how to handle marital issues and potential 
breakdown; for instance, desertion, or remaining in abusive relationships.  When a spouse 
                                                          
10
 Gordon and Nair, Public Lives, pp. 1-7; Elizabeth Foyster, Marital Violence: An English Family History, 
1660-1857, (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 9-11.  
11
 Hammerton, Cruelty and Companionship, pp. 5-6; Gordon and Nair, Public Lives, pp. 1-7; Foyster, 
Marital Violence, pp. 9-11.  For further examples of female agency in gender history, see, Maud L. Eduards, 
‘Women’s Agency and Collective Action’, Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 17, Nos. 2/3 (1994), 
pp. 181-186; Jane Lewis, ‘Gender, the family and women’s agency in the building of “welfare states”: the 
British case’, Social History, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994), pp. 37-55; or Mounira M. Charrad, ‘Women’s agency 
across cultures: Conceptualizing strengths and boundaries’, Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 33 
(2010), pp. 517-522.  
12
 Katie Barclay, Love, Intimacy and Power: marriage and Patriarchy in Scotland, 1650-1850, (Manchester, 
2011), pp. 3-5.  
13
 Barclay, Love, Intimacy and Power, pp. 198-204.  
14
 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, pp. 8-11. 
13 
 
did seek a divorce or separation these issues were at the heart of the pursuer’s complaint.  
Furthermore, with the influence of historical studies, such as Gordon and Nair’s that seek 
to empower women of the nineteenth century, this thesis highlights the resourceful agency 
of disadvantaged wives.  Although many of these cases demonstrate the embedded gender 
inequality of the nineteenth century, it is clear that few of the wives represented in this 
study lived as submissively and dependently as encouraged by middle-class ideology.    
The other historiographical framework essential to this study is the history of marital 
breakdown.  There is notable and extensive historical research on the subject.  The 
literature has been growing since the second wave feminism emergence of gender history, 
with scholars addressing the modern phenomenon of divorce by looking at how it existed 
and developed from marital breakdown in the past.
15
  Marital breakdown has existed 
alongside matrimony long before divorce became commonplace, hence the two are not 
synonymous; divorce is a form of marital breakdown, but marital breakdown does not 
mean divorce.   
Furthermore, each country (and in America, each State) established unique civil laws for 
the dissolution of marriage.  Overall, the reasons a spouse sought a divorce or separation 
were common in most western countries.  For example, adultery was commonly viewed as 
a worse offence if committed by the wife than the husband.
16
  Desertion was associated 
with poverty, and potentially a more problematic form of marital breakdown for most 
countries as a deserted family often became a burden for the local government, requiring 
extra legislation to tackle the issue.
17
  Marital cruelty remained a complicated matter for 
most countries in the nineteenth century, as the legal definitions took time to accept that 
abuse existed in various forms besides physical assault.
18
  Additionally, the development of 
intolerance to marital violence has become the subject of historical debate.  Specifically, 
                                                          
15
 Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society, (Cambridge, 1988), p. xii; 
Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987, (Oxford, 1990), p. 2; Elaine Tyler May, Great 
Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-Victorian America, (Chicago, 1980), p. 2.  
16
Phillips, Putting Asunder, pp. 344-354; Bailey, Unquiet Lives, pp. 140-167; Stone, Road to Divorce, pp. 
179-180, 193, 243-244; Colin S. Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, (London, 1994), pp. 33-35, 41-42.   
17
 Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, pp. 73-74, 98; Leah Leneman, Alienated Affections: The Scottish Experience 
of Divorce and Separation, 1684-1830, (Edinburgh, 1998). p. 21, 329; Bailey, Unquiet Lives, pp. 170-178.  
18
 Hammerton, Cruelty and Companionship; Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social 
Policy against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present, (New York, 1987); Foyster, Marital 
Violence; Anna Clark, ‘Humanity or Justice? Wifebeating and the law in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries’, in Carol Smart (ed.) Regulating Womanhood: Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood and 
Sexuality, (London, 1992).  
14 
 
scholars question when wifebeating became socially unacceptable as a means of correction 
by husbands.
19
    
Nevertheless, it was accessibility that caused the greatest differences.  For instance, 
divorce was not accessible for the common public in England until the 1857 Matrimonial 
Causes Act.  Accounts of marital breakdown in England, therefore, emphasise the before 
and after impact of the 1857 Act.
20
  Moreover, because the Act established a double 
standard by legalising divorce for husbands on the ground of adultery, while wives had to 
prove aggravated adultery with a secondary charge of desertion, cruelty, incest, bigamy, or 
sodomy, historians have produced extensive research on the double standard in England.
21
    
This thesis has been shaped to cover this overlooked aspect of Scotland, and subsequently 
Great Britain’s, social history.  It presents Scotland’s distinctive account of divorce and 
separation in the nineteenth century.  Despite the rich vein of research into marriage 
breakdown, there is very little published on the Scottish experience.
22
  
Whereas England, France and parts of the United States underwent divorce reform in the 
nineteenth century, Scotland experienced divorce reform first in the sixteenth century and 
then not again until the twentieth.
23
  Furthermore, the divorce and judicial separation laws 
of the sixteenth century established egalitarian legislation, including a single standard for 
                                                          
19See Nancy Tomes, ‘A “Torrent of Abuse”: Crimes of Violence between Working-Class Men and Women 
in London, 1840-1875’, Journal of Social History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring, 1978), pp. 328-345; Hammerton, 
Cruelty and Companionship, p. 14; Foyster, Marital Violence, p. 251; Annmarie Hughes, ‘The “Non-
Criminal” Class: Wife-beating in Scotland (c. 1800-1949)’, Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/Crime, History & 
Societies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2010), pp. 31-54; Shani D’Cruze (ed.) Everyday Violence in Britain, 1850-1950, 
(Harlow, 2000); Shani D’Cruze, Crimes of Outrage: Sex, Violence and Victorian Working Women, (London, 
1998); Ellen Ross, ‘“Fierce Questions and Taunts”: Married Life in Working-Class London, 1870-1914’, 
Feminist Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 575-602.  
20
 For early modern accounts of marriage and marital breakdown in England see Stone, The Family, Sex and 
Marriage; Bailey, Unquiet Lives; Foyster, Marital Violence; Frances Dolan, Marriage and Violence: The 
Early Modern Legacy, (Philadelphia, 2008).  For histories that cover a longer time span see Gillis, For Better 
For Worse; Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce; L. Stone, Broken Lives: Separation and Divorce in England 
1660-1857, (Oxford, 1993); Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock.  For nineteenth-century histories see Mary Lyndon 
Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895, (Princeton, 1989); 
Hammerton, Cruelty and Companionship; Maeve E. Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law in 
Victorian England, (Columbia, 1993).  
21
 Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, pp. 56-63; Stone, Road to Divorce, pp. 368-382; Phillips, Putting Asunder, 
pp. 412-422.  See ‘Chapter I. What Kind of Contract is Marriage?: Married Women’s Property, the Sexual 
Double Standard, and the Divorce Act of 1857’, in Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law, pp. 22-48.  
22
 Rosalind Marshall, Virgins and Viragos: A History of Women in Scotland from 1080 to 1980, (London, 
1983); Gordon and Nair, Public Lives; Annmarie Hughes, Gender and Political Identities in Scotland, 1919-
1939, (Edinburgh, 2010); Barclay, Love, Intimacy and Power.  
23





  Accordingly, the history of marital breakdown in Scotland from the early 
modern to modern period was uniquely shaped by Scots law. 
Only a small minority of the Scottish married population filed for divorce or judicial 
separation per year between 1830 and 1890, but those who did left a record revealing a 
hidden history of marital discord.  These experiences of marital breakdown are viewed 
through the lens of legal remedies.  However, as court records only reveal a minor 
proportion of couples whose marriages failed, marital breakdown is further investigated 
through other historical sources outwith the civil court.  The patterns addressed illustrate 
alternative methods used to escape unhappy marriages.  This thesis specifically examines 
married heterosexual couples who were considered legal residents of Scotland, and 
therefore subject to Scots law.  
Leah Leneman set the example in her study, Alienated Affections covering 1684 to 1830, 
providing a detailed account of Scots divorce and separation law, court processes and 
procedures, the roles played by all parties involved, and the various scenarios couples 
presented to the judges.
25
  It has been criticised, nevertheless, for its descriptive overtones; 
a greater part of the book is the retelling of divorce and separation trials as examples of 
individual experiences.  Furthermore, Leneman stopped at 1830— the same year 
consistorial actions were transferred from the Commissary Courts to the Court of Session 
(CS)
26
 — meaning the divorce and separation cases she discusses were all brought to the 
Commissary Courts and judged based on moderately unchanged legislations from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth century.  Leneman’s account of Scottish marital breakdown 
established the distinctiveness of Scotland’s divorce and separation history, especially 
apart from England and Wales, and paved the way for future research, but is essentially 
restricted to the time period chosen and therefore emphasises the importance of another 
study from 1830 onwards.
27
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1830 serves well as the beginning for this study as it marks a turning point for Scots civil 
law.  Indeed, Eric Clive states this in his own work: ‘The period since 1830 has been one 
of legislative activity.’28  This started with the transfer of civil cases to the CS, whereafter, 
suing parties were restricted to this single court located in Edinburgh.
29
  The second half of 
the nineteenth century, in particular, saw many important legislative changes, which 
arguably led to the gradual increase in divorce and separations that then burgeoned in the 
twentieth century.   
There have been historical demographic studies of marriage and marriage breakdown 
written for Scotland, but they do not take into account the individual stories, gender and 
class differences so central to social history.
30
  Moreover, this research has found that 
marital desertion in Scotland is especially wanting in the historiography.  This facet of 
marital breakdown is discussed under the context of poverty, unemployment, emigration, 
marriage, and divorce, but has not featured in a study for Scotland before this thesis.
31
 
As for specific historical accounts of violence and marital breakdown in Scotland, none use 
CS cases as sources.  The High Court records of domestic homicides in late nineteenth-
century Scotland have been examined and in a separate work compared with Great Britain 
and Ireland for patterns of murder and conviction by Carolyn Conley.
32
  Her work provides 
insight into how the judiciary dealt with husbands and wives who murdered their spouses, 
however, she does not go into the contextual side of the marital breakdown.  Annmarie 
Hughes has contributed several articles, and most recently in her book, challenging the 
arguments of Martin Wiener who claimed male violence decreased by the turn of the 
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century due to aggressive masculinity becoming socially and judicially unacceptable.
33
  In 
contrast, Hughes argues that tolerance of wifebeating and gender violence was still evident 
through criminal courts’ penal sentencing of convicted wifebeaters and the continued use 
of provocation as an excuse for violence.
34
  Hughes main period of study is the interwar 
era, but she has traced the criminal legislation, the convictions rates and sentencing of 
wifebeaters by criminal courts since the mid 1800s.  Hughes’ work provides a seminal 
account of the history of wifebeating, reinforcing that Scotland has a unique and 
independent history that requires separate investigations before concurring with any found 
patterns put forward by scholars of English history.  Hughes’ work, however, does not look 
at divorce or separation.  She uses criminal court records, newspaper accounts, and oral 
histories to analyse experiences and prosecution of wifebeating.   
Class also features predominantly in Hughes’ research, but her demographics are restricted 
by the nature of prisoners persecuted in criminal court.  Other key historical accounts of 
Scotland that discuss marriage focus on specific classes of Scottish society, too, such as 
Gordon and Nair’s exploration of Victorian and Edwardian middle-class women in Public 
Lives, and more recently Barclay’s account of marriage within sixteenth to eighteenth-
century elite society in Love, Intimacy and Power.
35
  Rosalind Marshall’s Virgins and 
Viragos covers a long history of Scottish women, touching upon marriage and marriage 
breakdown and the advances for women in the modern era without specifying their 
economic status.
36
  This study does not claim to reveal the history of a particular 
socioeconomic class; however, using CS cases inadvertently unveils the ambiguous classes 
that fell between the middle and working class definitions.  Likewise, the use of criminal 




Sources and Methodology 
Part of the original contribution of this thesis is the use of Court of Session (CS) records.  
These, along with other primary sources, reveal the unique Scottish experiences and 
representations of marital breakdown.  This is further achieved through the incorporation 
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of sources from difference social levels in Scottish society; specifically the use of 
Parliamentary papers, newspapers, poor relief applications, civil court cases and criminal 
court cases.   
This thesis begins where Leneman’s Alienated Affections ended, in 1830.  The stopping 
point of 1890 was chosen to include some of the key dates for legislative changes 
associated with marriage and marriage dissolution in Scotland.  The first year of each 
decade represents the benchmark years of this study, as the data collected was from the 
years 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870 and 1880.   
The majority of the evidence comes from CS cases.  The CS, located in Edinburgh, served 
as the Supreme Civil Court that presided over any matrimonial, inheritance, trustee, 
property or financial dispute by thirteen Lord Ordinaries.  Held in the National Archives of 
Scotland in Edinburgh, the CS records are catalogued as extracted and unextracted 
processes.  Extracted records are decrees that were formally copied in order to act as a 
warrant and enforce the final judgment of the CS.
38
  In the National Archives the extracted 
cases were registered in index books organised by year, and displayed the name of the 
parties involved and the decree awarded.
39
  For this study I recorded all the extracted 
divorce and separation cases found in the benchmark years and compiled the data into two 
sets.  The first set of data lists all the decrees found in the index books for the benchmark 
years (see Table I.1, Benchmark Data).    These decrees provide the names of the litigants, 
who initiated the suit, the status and final ruling of the case, and the addresses and 
occupations of the pursuer and defender (if known).    The second set of data, which is 
smaller but contributes more detail, is a sample of the benchmark cases from the first list; 
these cases were viewed in their original legal documents, photographed and analysed as 
case studies (see Table I.1, Case Studies Data).  The legal documents that make up a CS 
action are: the summons; the condescendence (the complaint); the defenders’ answers and 
plea (if given by defender); the proof (the testimonies of witnesses); the interlocutor sheet 
(the Lord Ordinary’s rulings on the case from start to finish); the account of expenses; and 
an inventory of the documents assembled for the case. 
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Table I.1 Court of Session Source Data Sets 























































































1830 5 1 1 3   3 1  1 1 1   
1840 27 20  2 3 2 15 13 9 4   2  
1850 32 25 4  1 2 12 11 9 2 1    
1860 28 21 3 1 2 1 24 20 15 5 3  1  
1870 55 46 6 2  1 33 30 18 12 3    
1880 107 90 15 1  1 40 34 14 20 6   1 
Total 254 203 29 9 6 7 128 109 65ᵃ 44ᵃ 14 1 3 1 
 
ᵃ The totals of the Adultery column and Desertion column are a breakdown of the grounds found for 
Divorce cases, and therefore equal the total for the Divorce column 
Source: GRH, General Minute-Book of The Court of Session, Vols. 49, 50, 59, 60, 69,70, 79, 80, 
89, 90, 99, 100  
 
One advantage of using CS records as the main source for this thesis is that they provide 
the historian with the judicial discourses of the time, in particular the marital expectations 
as defined by the law.  Another is that, the parties involved in the actions comprise a wide 
class spectrum, from the landowning to the impoverished.  Furthermore, the court 
documents provide detailed accounts of peoples’ everyday lives and are an invaluable 
source for the social historian.  By recording the complaints and defences of the litigants, 
as well as third party witness testimonies, these documents have simultaneously preserved 
the stories of nineteenth-century Scottish men and women that may have otherwise been 
lost.  There are also the occasional private letters, correspondence between solicitors and 
clients, and even a photograph (known in court as a ‘likeness’). 
There are some important disadvantages to note, too.  Most significantly, divorce and 
separation trials centred on the portrayal of the defender (and the pursuer in the defences) 
in a negative light in order to get a successful decree.  It is likely, therefore, that some 
stories presented in court were self serving, exaggerated or manipulated in favour of the 
storyteller.  It is also significant that the case documents were written by a clerk, altering 
the first person account to third person, and inadvertently distorting the source.  Moreover, 
these cases reveal the worst aspects of the relationship or only one end of the spectrum; 
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happy memories are excluded in order to establish the failure of the marriage.  In terms of 
what is available in the sources, not all of the required documents are available with the 
extracted cases; for instance, some cases only had the summons, the complaint and the 
interlocutor sheet, as these were the only documents required for extracted processes to 
prove the divorce or separation trial had occurred.
40
  Lastly, as the first half of Chapter 
Two will show, couples that filed for divorce or separation were only a small minority of 
the married population, and therefore not representative of all married couples. 
Another primary source used is Parliamentary papers.  Though Parliamentary papers are 
available for the whole of the nineteenth century, census reports are restricted to 1855 and 
after.  In 1854 the Registration Act was passed in Scotland requiring all births, deaths and 
marriages to be officially registered.
41
  From 1855 onwards there is a census report 
available for each decade.  Divorce and separation figures, however, were not recorded 
with the census.  Instead that information can only be found in disparate reports written for 
Parliamentary enquiries.  Therefore, data on the number of marriages and the number of 
divorces before 1855 are incomplete.  Furthermore, where data are available, the figures 
are not always specified.  For example, the report might say the number of divorces 
without defining the grounds, or only provide the number of decrees (final ruling of the 
Lord Ordinary) granted rather than the total number of summonses (petition for the action) 
applied for and the number dismissed (cases thrown out by the Lord Ordinary without a 
decree).  Information on the number of separation summons and decrees are even harder to 
come by, therefore the quantitative analysis of this data in Chapter Two focuses on 
divorce.  Overall, the executive findings printed in the Parliamentary papers were crucial to 
establish the general trends of marital breakdown as viewed and publicised by the 
government.  
In order to write an in-depth study of marital desertion in Scotland, beyond the limited 
numbers of official desertion cases found in the CS, an additional source was used: poor 
relief applications.  It is well accepted amongst historians and contemporaries that the 
majority of marital desertions took place outside the courtroom.  In order to address the 
gap between official and unofficial desertion, Poor Law applications were collected from 
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three different parishes in Scotland: Paisley in the west, and Montrose and Forfar in the 
east.  Poor relief was available to women and their children who could prove they did not 
have the financial support of their husband or father.  These documents are another 
excellent source for studying social history, or history from below.  They provide 
demographic details, such as education, religion, age, place of birth, residence, and number 
of children.  Forfar’s applications, for instance, follow the life of the pauper until they are 
off the Poors’ Roll or deceased.  The applications reveal the discursive prejudices held 
against impoverished peoples, but also the humanity that was displayed by Inspectors of 
the Poor who granted destitute and desperate women aid.  For these reasons, poor relief 
applications are a valuable source for studying the impact of desertion on wives.  The 
disadvantage of using poor relief applications, however, is that this source restricts the 
records of unofficial desertion to abandoned wives, which only reinforces the stereotype of 
desertion as the poor man’s divorce.  These documents are also written by clerks, again 
removing the first person voice of the female applicants. 
The fourth major sources used are nineteenth-century newspapers from across Scotland.  
They enhance the findings from the CS records and the Parliamentary papers, as well as 
provide the media and public discourses on marital breakdown.  The Scotsman, a national 
paper based in Edinburgh, reported on CS divorce and separation cases—thus providing 
extra case studies, though outside the benchmark years,—as well as on the debates relating 
to legislation on marriage, divorce, separation and wifebeating held in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords of Parliament.   
Several local newspapers were also examined for my research: Glasgow Herald; 
Caledonian Mercury; Aberdeen Journal; and the Dundee Courier & Argus & Northern 
Warder.  The main source the newspapers contributed to this study are the trials and 
sentencing of wifebeaters tried in the Scottish criminal courts.  Criminal courts in Scotland 
are divided into a three layered hierarchy: at the bottom is the Justice of the Peace Court 
that deals with summary (judge only) criminal proceedings; second are the Sheriff Courts, 
which hold both solemn (judge and jury) trials and summary trials; and at the top is the 
High Court of Justiciary, the Supreme Criminal Court.  This hierarchy is important for 
understanding prosecution of wifebeaters, for instance, if a husband’s abuse was seen as a 
minor assault to be punished by a fine or short prison sentence then he would be tried 
summarily in the Justice of the Peace Court, whereas a brutal assault, often defined by the 
use of a weapon or severity of injury, would be tried in Sheriff Court or High Court in 
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order to deliver a more substantial penalty.  This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Five.     
These cases do not qualify as examples of separation, as there is no indication of what 
happened to the couple after they left the criminal courtroom.  Still, the database of 
wifebeating cases compiled through this study allows another perspective for examining 
marital abuse in Scotland.  The newspapers also provide articles, editorials and letters that 
give further glimpses into public perceptions of this issue.  The disadvantage of using 
newspapers as a source is that the authors were most likely of the middle class and 
portraying class biases.  Furthermore, a desire to attract readership may have determined 
what was written.  Lastly, as with judiciary opinions, journalists’ attitudes towards an topic 
such as marital breakdown, divorce and separation may not reflect the more common 
perceptions.  
Thesis Structure 
The main questions for this thesis are how Scotland’s legislation affected the Scottish 
experiences of marital breakdown?  Why, when divorce and separation were legal on equal 
grounds for husband and wife, were there so few actions tried by the CS?  And who did 
break out from the majority to initiate a summons, and why? 
Chapter One serves as a foundation for understanding the legal context of this thesis.  It 
outlines the history of Scots law through discussions of marriage legislation and its regular 
and irregular forms, the establishment of divorce on two grounds: adultery and desertion, 
and the law as it related to judicial separation and marital cruelty.  The final section of the 
chapter discusses the important civil and criminal legislation reform in the second half of 
the nineteenth century that related to divorce, separation and marital abuse as the century 
came to a close.  This chapter further provides the context through a comparison of Scot’s 
law to English common law (and America briefly), outlining the differences and 
similarities of post-1850 law reform.  Using primary and secondary accounts of Scots law 
texts and acts passed by Parliament, Chapter One argues that Scotland entered the 
nineteenth century as the more liberal country regarding marriage and divorce law, but was 
overshadowed by several pivotal changes to English marriage and divorce law within the 
second half of the 1800s.  When compared side by side, however, Scot’s law was equally 
active in improving married women’s rights, though both legal systems managed to do so 
without altering the traditional views of marriage as a sanctified institution.  Despite the 
liberal nature of Scottish legislation, conservative ideologies regarding married women’s 
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rights and marital expectations deterred couples from using divorce and separation as a 
common remedy.  
Chapter Two is also a background account before the main analyses in Chapters Three, 
Four and Five.  It firstly provides a general demographic context of the married population 
for Scotland in the nineteenth century.  This is followed by a discussion of the attitudes and 
discourses on specifically Scottish types of marriage and divorce.  Divorce and separation 
rates are presented in a quantitative analysis of findings from the CS records, 
Parliamentary papers and census records.  Again, the information available on Scotland is 
compared to England and Wales to demonstrate distinct patterns and trends.  The 
quantitative research conducted establishes that there was a low number of divorce and 
separations throughout the mid-nineteenth century.  The low figures persisted, despite the 
legislative changes in the second half of the century; higher figures are not recorded until 
after World War One.  Nevertheless, official marital breakdown remained a concern for 
authorities, principally due to a fear that divorce was too accessible for the poorer classes.  
Thus this chapter argues that although egalitarian legislation made divorce and separation 
accessible in theory, it was still unused by the majority of the population due to other 
economic, social and cultural factors.  The second section of Chapter Two presents the data 
collected from the CS specifically for this thesis.  Using the CS benchmark data set further 
substantiates the general trends established in the first section, and shows that there were 
gendered differences regarding which spouse filed a suit and on what ground.  More 
husbands filed for divorce on the ground of adultery than wives, while wives were more 
likely to seek divorce on the ground of desertion.  Even more evident was that wives were 
the dominant instigators for suits of judicial separation, and the most used ground 
complained of was cruelty and maltreatment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Chapter Three begins the qualitative analysis of the CS records. This chapter focuses on 
the most frequently filed ground for divorce: adultery.  Following the historiographical 
debates related to sexuality within marriage, the extracted cases are analysed and compared 
with popular discourses to demonstrate the impact on husbands’ and wives’ sexual 
behaviour, conjugal and extramarital.  The double standard and its visibility in Scots law 
and societal attitudes is a central discussion as the most pervasive and ultimately invasive 
discourse.  Patterns found in the cases collected are also presented and discussed.  This 
chapter argues that even though husbands and wives had equal access to divorce on this 
ground in theory, outside social and cultural factors caused more men to instigate actions 
than women.  Wives were not absent as pursuers, but the CS sample suggests they were 
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more likely to file for divorce on the ground of adultery if their husbands had also deserted 
or maltreated them.      
Chapter Four focuses on desertion categorised in two forms: official and unofficial.  
Actions of divorce on the ground of desertion brought to the CS represent the official 
cases.  Instances of unofficial desertion or ‘self-divorce’ found through poor law 
applications by deserted wives represent the hidden layer of this form of marital 
breakdown.  This chapter’s analytical framework establishes the breadwinner ideal and its 
impact on marriages, married women and work.  As the second ground established for 
divorce in Scotland, desertion had a much more complicated process than filing for 
adultery.  The legal documents that accompanied a divorce for desertion included a 
summons of adherence, and letters of horning before the summons for divorce could be 
filed (a summons of adherence was a suit requesting a spouse to return to their conjugal 
home, letters of horning were the required letters sent out to a person absconding from debt 
to request their return and if unanswered were followed by the symbolic act of declaring 
the absconder a rebel with three blasts to the horn).
42
  Therefore, this chapter argues that 
filing for divorce on the ground of separation was a less practical remedy for abandoned 
spouses.  In 1861 the law was changed to no longer require those preliminary steps, 
whereafter an increase in desertion divorces is noticeable.
43
  
The fourth chapter has a different outline than the others and incorporates the second vital 
source for understanding this form of marital breakdown besides the CS cases, the poor 
relief applications.  More instances of desertion are recorded through poor relief 
applications than CS trials.  Due to economic restraints, specifically limited opportunities 
for married women and the dominance of the breadwinner wage, many abandoned wives 
were forced to apply for poor relief.  However, this study found that it was because of 
desertion that women became impoverished, rather than desertion being a custom of 
marital breakdown specific to poor couples.  Merged together, this chapter presents marital 
desertion in its official and unofficial forms.  
The fifth and final chapter focuses on separation and cruelty in two parts.  Part One 
discusses the analytical framework and discursive context related to marital abuse, while 
Part Two applies those discussions to the sources and findings.  Although judicial 
separation was available on the ground of adultery and cruelty to both sexes, of the CS 
cases collected for this study, every case was initiated on the ground of maltreatment and 
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cruelty, and by the wife.  However, these only amounted to fourteen summonses of 
separation.  This number is too small for a representative analysis of marital abuse, and 
therefore the secondary source of Scottish newspapers was collected and analysed 
alongside the civil court cases.  This follows the work done by Hughes, though on a 
smaller scale, in assessing the attitudes towards wifebeaters and abused wives, as well as 
public and judicial discourses that may have been influential in determining how 
acceptable marital violence was in nineteenth-century Scotland.  To try to capture a fuller 
story of marital abuse CS records and newspaper accounts are analysed in conjunction.  
This chapter argues that although legislation may have changed implying less tolerance of 
marital abuse within the judicial system, this notion was not always applied when in 
practice.  Moreover, the nature of the legislation on marital cruelty, and the court 
procedures, limited judicial and public understanding of marital abuse as more than 
physical confrontations; as the case studies will show, abuse could be found in physical, 
verbal, sexual, and mental forms.  As a result, marital abuse continued into the twentieth 
century in Scotland, and has persisted as an issue that cannot be narrowed to a class 
problem. 
Chapter One: Legal Context of Scots Marriage, Divorce and Judicial 
Separation Law in the Nineteenth Century  
  
This chapter provides the background to Scotland’s civil legislations as a foundation for 
this thesis’ discussions of adultery, desertion and cruelty.  First addressing Scots marriage 
law and history leading into the nineteenth century, this chapter will then provide an 
account of divorce and separation law, its history, and the processes of adultery, desertion, 
and cruelty. This chapter then addresses the changes in the law and the social 
consequences.  The nineteenth century was a pivotal time in Scots law for marriage and its 
dissolution as, particularly from 1830 to 1890, several acts were passed that directly 
influenced the availability of marital dissolution for the married population.  These 
legislative reforms and amendments also highlight the progression (or lack of) related to 
matrimonial law, and more specifically the rights of married women.  Throughout this 
overview Scots law will also be juxtaposed with the marriage, divorce and separation 
legislations of other Western countries, in particular England.   
The contrasts between Scotland and England are important features of nineteenth-century 
marriage, divorce and separation laws.  Up to the mid-1800s Scotland was the more liberal 
of the two: lenient marriage regulations, the option of divorce and separation for multiple 
grounds, and, significantly, egalitarian access to divorce and separation legislations were 
only features of Scots civil law.  After 1850 Parliamentary enquiries into marriage and 
divorce laws, campaigns by women’s rights advocates, and increasingly defined Victorian 
values resulted in several progressive reforms pertaining to matrimonial rights in England.  




Scottish law subjected the three grounds central to this study—adultery, desertion and 
cruelty—to separate requirements and processes.  The terminology for these forms of 
marital breakdown was specific to the nineteenth-century legal lexicon.  Adultery was the 
carnal connection between a married person and someone who was not their spouse (the 
guilty party’s lover was labelled the paramour).  In cases of desertion, abandonment of a 
spouse for a long period of time was non-adherence.  Once four years of non-adherence 
had passed it could be legally recognised as desertion.  Cruelty, most commonly known in 
the twentieth century as domestic violence, was legally defined in nineteenth-century 
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Scotland as maltreatment, inhumane treatment, or gross cruelty.  Chastisement or 
moderate correction was the acceptable use of physical violence by a husband to discipline 
a misbehaving wife.  Outside of the civil courtroom marital violence was publicly and 
socially branded as wifebeating, despite the narrowness of the term.  
 
Overview of Scottish Marriage Law 
The relatively permissive marriage law of Scotland differed significantly from the 
marriage laws in other countries.
2
  Indeed, one of the stipulations upon the Act of Union of 
1707 preserved a separate judicial system for Scotland from the rest of Great Britain.  
Although the Acts of Union secured this division, 147 years earlier Scotland had already 
distinguished itself from its neighbours when the Reformation of the sixteenth century 
brought changes throughout Europe.
3
  The Commissary Court was established in 1563 to 
handle civil matters of marriage, divorce and separation (in 1830 this jurisdiction was 
transferred to the Court of Session based in Edinburgh).
4
  Following the Reformation 
Canon Law temporarily remained the authority relied upon for judging matters related to 
matrimony.  By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, a native Scottish idea 
of marriage had developed.
5
   
This idea of marriage stood in stark contrast to England’s.  Lord Hardwicke’s Act 
solidified England as the conservative country and Scotland as the comparably liberal 
neighbour when Parliament tightened English marriage laws in 1753.  The Act limited 
valid marriages to only those performed by an Anglican Minister in a Church of England, 
following three calls of banns or the purchase of a license, requiring residence of at least 
three weeks in the parish where the union was held, and raising the age of consent to 
twenty-one, preventing anyone younger from marrying without parental consent.
6
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Furthermore, if a couple (or dissenting clergyman) attempted to marry out with these 
regulations it was considered a crime with the penalty of transportation.
7
  The 
consequences of these strict regulations were voiced by the Act’s opponents who cited the 
vulnerability of women promised marriage through betrothal, the expenses being too much 
for poor families, and the residency restrictions displacing migrant workers, sailors and 
soldiers.
8
   
The other impact of Lord Hardwicke’s Act was the new dichotomy created between 
England and Scotland; when marriage became less accessible in England couples began 
crossing the border into Gretna Green (the closest town in Scotland) to take advantage of 
the lower age of consent, no requirement of residency, and Scotland’s multiple forms of 
irregular marriage (discussed below).
9
  Throughout the nineteenth century Members of 
Parliament repeatedly attempted to assimilate the marriage laws between the countries, but 
with little success.
10
    
The Nature of the Marriage Contract 
Coming into the nineteenth century, marriage under Scottish law was a civil contract that 
united a man and woman under terms where the woman lost her independent legal status 
and effectively became subsumed in her husband’s identity.  This contract was different 
from any other, in that it changed the legal status of the participating woman.  According 
to Patrick Fraser, Scottish advocate, it was a unique contract only existent in this unique 
form through the union of a man and a woman.
11
  It was by necessity a consensual civil 
contract delegating status to the parties involved, for example the status of legitimate 
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  Unlike any other contract, marriage cannot be dissolved on the parties’ own 
volition, but only by a judicial authority based on matters determined under Scots Law.
13
  
Another Scottish advocate, Frederick Walton, noted the consequences writing in 1893 
that, ‘it [is] not merely a civil contract, but is rather a status, the gate of which is a 
contract.  The contract once validly made, the parties must accept the incidents and 
consequences attached by the law of the man’s domicile to the status of marriage.’14   
Such consequences were deemed the legal effects of marriage.  As husband and wife, the 
spouses agreed to life-long adherence and chastity.
15
  Yet, for the woman the effects were 
more extreme:  
the husband’s legal supremacy was undoubted.  The wife’s moveable property 
became his property: the children of the marriage were, for purposes of 
guardianship, custody and access, his children: the wife’s domicile followed 
that of her husband automatically: she had hardly any contractual capacity: she 
was ‘in a manner, in a state of wardship or minority under her husband’—a 
‘peculiar and inferior condition.’16 
Throughout the nineteenth century a wife was continuously viewed as a subject rather than 
an equal under Scots law.  Still, as argued by Gordon and Nair, ‘[i]t was expected… that 
the relations between husband and wife would be based on love and mutual respect, and 
that the authority of the husband would be tempered by affection and consideration.’17  
This expectation had not changed significantly by the end of the nineteenth century.  
The impact of the marriage contract was injurious to the woman.  For Western countries, 
marriage represented the spiritual and legal bond of matrimony: a unity between a man 
and a woman.  This unity, however, did not mean equality, and in effect removed a 
woman from her individual identity placing her under the control of her husband.  This 
condition was legally known as coverture: ‘a married woman, who at common law was a 
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“feme covert,” a woman covered over by her husband’, legally, politically, and 
economically.
18
  In effect, this legal condition was most detrimental to the wife because 
she lost her identity upon marriage.
19
  This remained an issue despite the efforts by 
reformers during the nineteenth century to give married women legal standing separate 
from their husbands.
20
    
The Forms and Processes of Marriage Law  
 The Scottish marriage union could become legally valid through multiple processes: 
either a regular or an irregular marriage.  A regular marriage included a religious 
ceremony.
21
  This process required the parties to first make a proclamation of banns and 
then to be united through a religious ceremony officiated by a minister of religion with 
two witnesses present during the ceremony.
22
  The proclamation of banns was a necessary 
precursory-step meant to determine the legality of joining the involved parties.
23
  The 
purpose of the banns, ‘was to prevent marriages between persons under incapacity’.24  
Before 1834, penalties were inflicted on those married by a minister not of the established 
Scottish Church.
25
  The Marriage (Scotland) Act of 1834 decreed a removal of those 
restrictions making it lawful for a couple to be wed by a clergyman not in the established 
Church, as long as a proclamation of banns was still presented before the solemnisation.
26
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Irregular marriage in nineteenth-century Scotland was recognised in three different forms: 
marriage by declaration de praesenti, marriage by promise subsequente copula, or 
marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute.  The declaration de praesenti required a 
mutual, genuine, verbal consent of marriage between a man and woman that in effect 
stated they acknowledged themselves as husband and wife.
27
  This declaration could also 
be made in written form.
28
  
The second form of irregular marriage, promise subsequente copula, existed when a 
promise of marriage was made between a man and woman, and the woman accepted the 
promise with consensual intercourse.
29
  This sexual union, ‘[was] regarded by them as the 




The third form of irregular marriage was cohabitation with habit and repute.  This class of 
irregular marriage came with the least requirements and therefore may have been the 
easiest form of marriage to prove.  Marriage by habit and repute was sanctioned following 
that the couple openly and continuously lived together as husband and wife, to the effect 
that the neighbours, family and friends were under ‘a general belief that they are married 
persons.’32  Cohabitation had to be verified with evidence of their matrimonial habits and 
reputation; it could not be proven solely by word of mouth.
33
  Reputation included the 
parties’ social and moral standing; ‘A woman of the same social class as the man and of 
respectable character was much more likely to succeed in establishing a marriage by 
cohabitation with habit and repute than was a woman of a lower social class or easy 
virtue.’34 
Both marriage by declaration de praesenti and marriage by promise subsequente copula 
were banned by the Marriage (Scotland) Act, 1939, while marriage through cohabitation 
with habit and repute was maintained in section 5.
 35
  It was not until 2006 that marriage 
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by cohabitation was abolished.
36
  From the 1830s to the turn of the century the four 
different forms of marriage discussed above remained unchanged. While some of these 
types of marriage were more common than others, all were deemed as valid, and therefore 
as indissoluble, as the other.
37
   
  
Divorce Law in Scotland  
In nineteenth-century Scotland, two routes could legally end or alter a marriage: divorce or 
separation.  The action for complete divorce was available on two grounds: adultery or 
desertion.  Adultery, the older of the two, was established the year of the Reformation in 
1560 and had been in use since.
38
  More specifically adultery became grounds for a 
divorce a vinculo—from the bond (of marriage).39  The eligibility for a complete 
dissolution as a consequence of adultery has been attributed to religious influences.  With 
the growth of the ecclesiastical courts dealing with marital issues, sentiments relating to 
the Roman Catholic Church tradition of marriage being indissoluble conflicted with reality 
of marital breakdown as presented by the public.  In particular, the courts recognised that 
without a complete divorce separated couples may engage in more adultery or the crime of 
bigamy.
40
  As a result it was thought that divorce a vinculo would preserve the sanctity of 




Adultery as a Ground for Divorce 
Scots law was distinct from common law in that it allowed the husband and the wife the 
right to a divorce solely on the charge of adultery.
42
  This was not a right given to women 
in England or in parts of the United States.  Despite set legislations, the issue was still 
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debated in western society claiming a wife’s adultery was worse, ‘since the [husband] 
does not impose on the marriage a spurious issue while the [wife] may.’43  Hence, because 
a married woman’s affair may result in the wife becoming pregnant, while a married 
man’s affair would not have the same consequences,44 some argued only men should be 
able to receive a divorce on the grounds of adultery.
45
    
Another difference between Scotland and England was the debate over remarriage after 
divorce.  A complete divorce from the Edinburgh Court of Session (CS) decreed the 
pursuer and defender the privilege of remarriage, as if the marriage had ended naturally by 
death of a spouse.
46
  There was, however, prohibition of the adulterer or adulteress 
marrying the paramour if he or she was named in court, and if they did marry, the union 
would be declared null.
47
  In England, on the other hand, it was feared that a husband or 
wife would use infidelity as a tool for collusive divorce if allowed to remarry, and with 
that allowance the number of divorces would increase.
48
  Hence, remarriage was not 
allowed until the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.  Previous to 1857, remarriage was only 
available to elite men capable of obtaining a Parliamentary Divorce.
49
 
Desertion as a Ground for Divorce 
The second claim for divorce was desertion.  This ground was established after the 
Reformation, in the Act of 1573,
50
 but required a series of complicated steps:  
if either spouse ‘diverts from the other’s company, without a reasonable 
cause alleged or reduced before a judge, and remains in their malicious 
obstinacy by the space of four years,’ and refuses to obey privy 
admonitions to adhere, that the deserted spouse shall raise an action of 
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adherence, and, if necessary, thereafter shall apply to the minister to 
publicly admonish the deserter to adhere, and if he shall fail to comply he 





In other words, the deserted spouse was required to first file a summons of adherence and 
aliment.
52
  If the spouse did not return or respond with payment, then the pursuer was 
expected to denounce the defender as a rebel, get letters of horning and request that the 
Church ‘excommunicate the deserter’.53  Only after these actions was the pursuer able to 
apply for divorce. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the claim for a divorce based on desertion 
became easier with the 1861 Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Act.
54
  The Act updated the 
provisions of 1573 by dismissing the preliminary proceedings.
55
  One of the preliminaries 
abolished was the need to ‘prove beyond doubt that the defender remained in ‘malicious 
obstinance’.56  Still, the form of desertion that would allow a divorce was very specific.  It 
required that the desertion had to include within the four years a ‘non-adherence’ from the 
deserting party, but efforts for reconciliation by the pursing party.
57
  Courts were aware of 
the possibility that if a couple mutually desired a divorce they may consent to desertion in 
order to precede, therefore a divorce for desertion would be withheld if the court did not 
feel there had been sufficient attempts at a reconnection by the pursuer and complete 
refusal by the deserter. 
 
Judicial Separation and Marital Cruelty in Scots Law 
In the nineteenth century the only legal remedy granted by the CS for cruelty and 
maltreatment was a judicial separation.  It did not qualify as a means for divorce in 
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Scotland until the Divorce Act of 1938.
58
  The reasoning behind this distinction between 
adultery, desertion and cruelty, related to the judicial and social perception that 
maltreatment was not a breach of the marriage contract:  
Adultery and desertion appear to have been regarded as fundamental 
violations of the marriage relationship, which had so destructive an effect 
upon it as to make divorce a vinculo an appropriate remedy.  Cruelty, on 
the other hand, was thought rather to be only an abuse of the ordinary 
difficulties inherent in the state of marriage, and so there was no place for 




Scottish Courts acted under the influence of social concerns; their main goal was to keep 
together as many married couples as possible and preserve the sanctity of the marriage 
contract.  Though the courts would not allow a complete divorce, they did recognise that 
in cases of proven abuse the complaining party needed legal protection: ‘Public policy is 
strong against increasing the number of persons living as if single, and yet not free to 
marry— husbands without wives, and wives without husbands. It is only grave and 
weighty causes, therefore, that the Court will find sufficient to justify the spouses in living 
apart.’60   
 
Legal Standards and the Unacceptability of Cruelty  
Thus cruelty was grounds for divorce a mensa et thoro, (from bed and board).
61
  Divorce a 
mensa et thoro signified a judicial order to remove the condition of adherence, allowing 
separate living spaces and economic maintenance through alimony paid by the husband to 
the wife.  Furthermore, neither party could remarry as their marriage was still intact, 
preserving the marriage union.
62




To prove cruelty the CS required that the alleged acts displayed certain characteristics.  
One of these was the potential of future risk for the pursuer: ‘The ground of interference is 
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not to punish the husband for the past, it is to protect the wife for the future.’64  There was 
also a need to prove the maltreatment was cumulative: ‘It has been said that it must be 
sustained, and indicate a continued want of self-control, and must be referable to 
permanent causes so as to endanger the future safety of the wife’s person or health.’65  If 
the Court deemed the cruelty a continuing occurrence without reasonable cause, either as 
terrifying threats or physical maltreatment, then a judicial separation would be granted.   
Scots law also acknowledged other forms of cruelty within marriages.  As of 1893 spitting 
in the face of your wife was deemed a form of ‘legal cruelty’. 66  Spitting alone, however, 
would not warrant a judicial separation, but was mostly used as supportive evidence of a 
husband’s cruel behaviour.  Other forms of abuse were also recognised as oppressive and 
harmful to a wife’s wellbeing.  For example, the tyrannical actions of a husband towards 
his wife, even if not physical, were seen as attempts to break the wife’s spirit, resulting in 
ill-health, body and mind.
67
  Courts also recognised constructive cruelty, which was an act 
of violence inflicted on a third party explicitly to torment the wife.  A third party could be 
a child or a family member, such as the wife’s sister or mother.68  
 A remaining form of cruelty identified by Scots law was the communication of disease 
from one spouse to another.  The disease, whether infectious or venereal, if present in one 
spouse as a result of an adulterous affair, served as evidence of the adultery, but was also 
considered an act of legal cruelty if the infected party forced his or her spouse to have sex 
during the infection.  Cruelty was also decreed if the infected party did knowingly have 
sex with his or her spouse with the disease, but without informing the spouse.  The reason 
for deeming these actions as cruel was not because the disease was communicated, but 
rather, because such actions demonstrated neglect and misconduct towards one’s husband 
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Legal Standards and the Acceptability of Chastisement 
Unlike cruelty, the allegedly lesser physical force of chastisement was not sufficient 
grounds for judicial separation.  Although this may appear contradictory, the use of 
violence on a wife was tolerated up to a point; evidence of intervention suggests that the 




The law on chastisement was complex and appeared to contradict the law on cruelty and 
maltreatment.  As discussed above, under the femme covert notion, the legal status of a 
woman once married was bound with her husband, making her no longer an independent 
person according to the law.  Chastisement stems from an understanding that by entering a 
marriage contract she had agreed to a life-long partnership of living with and obeying her 
husband.  If a wife did not submit to his requests and perform her marital duties, the 
husband did have the authority to enforce her compliance.
71
  But the degree of acceptable 
violence lessened over time.  In 1831, for example, Boyd observed: 
 The husband by the old law might give his wife moderate correction; and 
the civil law gave him the same or larger authority; but this is, or should 
now be, put a stop to, as the wife may have the security of the peace 
against her husband, and he against the wife: indeed, among respectable 
people, when it proceeds to lifting hands, a separation is probably the best 
plan which can be adopted.
72
 
Later, in 1876 Fraser wrote: 
Where the wife violated any of her conjugal obligations, the husband is not 
entitled to use personal chastisement to compel obedience, but, at the same 
time, he has remedies equally effectual, for he may thrust her out of doors; 
and her only remedy is separate aliment and judicial separation, and, at the 




On the other hand, even more severe physical correction or chastisement was sometimes 
condoned (or at least presented as acceptable) if justified through claims of the wife’s 
wrong doing, legally known as provocation, by the defender.
74
  Therefore, despite the 
                                                          
70
 Phillips, Putting Asunder, pp. 326-338. 
71
 Phillips clams that the right of a husband to chastise his wife was partially due to the legal responsibility of 
a husband for his wife’s ‘misdeeds’; Ibid, pp. 324-325. 
72
 Boyd, ‘A Review of the Marriage Laws of Scotland and England’, pp. 22-23.  
73
 Fraser, Treatise on Husband and Wife, p. 511.  
74
 When a husband alleged his wife’s misbehaviour had caused him to use violence, this was deemed 
provocation on the part of the wife, and in turn made her the irresponsible party; Fraser, Treatise on Husband 
38 
 
legal view presented in the above quote, criminal court records and civil court records 
provide evidence of provocation being used as a defence and qualifying the defender for a 
lesser penalty, or a dismissal of the case.
75
  Writing about western society in general, 
Phillips concludes ‘that violence was to be used only as a response to a wrong committed 
by the wife, and there was also the expectation on the part of the law that it would be a last 
resort, not a first reaction.’76   
The incorporation of chastisement within the law in Western society is most commonly 
associated with the infamous contemporary trope of the ‘rule of thumb’.  The ‘rule of 
thumb’ alleged that a man could beat his wife as long as the instrument he used was no 
bigger than the width of his thumb.  It has been argued that this legal precedent allowed 
wifebeating to be excused as suitable in most western countries, inside and outside of the 
courtroom. Historians, however, debate whether the rule had legal validity.
77
  Whether or 
not the ‘rule of thumb’ was a myth or legally sound, the persistence of the phrase as a 
defences for abusive husbands demonstrated that some people accepted it as a legal 




Cruelty in England and America  
In England, by comparison, cruelty was a ground for separation under the jurisdiction of 
the church court diocese until the terms of the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act.  The 
stipulations of this Act stated that wives could only seek judicial separation for cruelty on 
the charge of aggravated adultery and cruelty, despite a similar judicial attitude towards 
wifebeating as Scotland.
79
  Though divorce was not granted, several acts were passed in 
the second half of the nineteenth century that allowed abused wives more protection in 
England without dissolving the marriage.  These will be discussed in a later section.     
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 In America, some states granted separation for cruelty, while none included cruelty as a 
ground for divorce.  Only separation or arrest were available as a means for abused 
spouses to escape their partners.  A general legal definition of cruelty in America, 
provided by Bishop, reflected a similar concern over the upkeep of the marriage contract 
as voiced by Scottish authorities:  
 
Such conduct in one of the married parties, as renders further cohabitation 
dangerous to the physical safety of the other, or create in the other such 
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm as materially to interfere with the 
discharge of marital duty.
80
   
 
This definition suggests that if the abusive behaviour of the spouse did not interfere with 
the other’s capabilities then the marriage should remain intact.  This emphasis reinforced 
the courts’ requirement that only ‘grave and weighty’ maltreatment excused a spouse from 
the marriage contract.
81
   
For all three countries, the converse of establishing laws prohibiting ‘grave and weighty’ 
violence against wives was the suggestion that minor acts of violence were tolerated.  As 
Phillips argued, ‘It was about the appropriateness of the violence, rather than the violence 
per se.’82  The result of requiring such evidence in order to grant a separation was in effect 
a backhanded permission for some husbands to be abusive.  Thus, while some couples 
were able to legally separate by charging cruelty in the nineteenth century, the majority, 
and undoubtedly greater, number of abuses never made it to the courtroom.  
Disadvantages of Judicial Separations 
Despite a law in place for separation on the ground of cruelty and maltreatment, it was still 
a difficult charge to prove, especially for women.  Looking at early modern to mid-
nineteenth century England, Foyster argued that the continued trust in clergymen, the 
professionalisation of doctors, and the establishment of a police force at the beginning of 
the 1800s, were the beginnings of professional intervention against marital violence.
83
  
Nevertheless, Foyster explains, wives remained at a disadvantage as they could not always 
rely on clergymen, doctors and police officers corroborating their claims of abuse; in 
situations where the husband controlled and held the money, it was not uncommon for 
them to bribe or threaten these professionals to keep silent.  In addition, some 
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professionals opted to withdraw themselves from the situation and allow the matter to be 
settled within the family, as they did not want to break up the marriage.
84
   
Reconciliation or marriage mending was the preference of governing authorities.  For 
instance, Foyster explained that ‘it became financially prudent for the parish to ensure that 
couples remained together.’85  In the judiciary realm, Hammerton found that ‘local 
magistrates’ courts increasingly took on a more paternalistic role, eager to intervene in an 
attempt to make the wife forgive, the husband reform and the family reunite.’86  He argued 
that the presumed decline in domestic assaults recorded in late nineteenth-century English 
courts was actually a reflection of court officials encouraging reconciliation instead of 
convicting and separating tumultuous couples.
87
    
In the CS a husband present during his separation trial had the opportunity to defend and 
deny the allegations to get an absolvitor.
88
  In her study of the Commissary Courts in 
seventeenth to early nineteenth-century Scotland, Leneman found that some of the more 
common defences from husbands were: ‘that he did not abuse her, that the incidents 
complained of were exaggerated or were part of the normal rough-and-smooth of married 
life; and besides no witnesses saw it.’89  These defences suggest some husbands expected 
their familial authority to protect them from legal punishment.
90
  The level of tolerance 
given to violent husbands, however, is debated, in particular by Wiener who argued that 
starting with Lord Ellenborough’s Act of 1803, English legislators and judiciary 
encouraged a shifting discourse condemning the use of violence by men (and women).
91
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For women in abusive marriages, the best escape was to charge the husband with adultery 
or abandonment to gain a complete divorce, which would allow them the right to remarry.  
If this was not an option, abused wives were left with few legal alternatives: seek a court 
order for alimony, or for a bed and board separation.  Even though these avenues were 
available there were further difficulties.  One complication was proving maltreatment with 
evidence; often the only useful evidence was testimony from a third party, because before 
the 1870s husbands and wives were unable to testify at their own trial.
92
  Combined, these 
legal limitations and loopholes suggest that the lawmakers and judiciary were more 
interested in maintaining marriages for the greater good of society than assisting people 
out of unhappy ones.   
 
Legislative Change in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century 
Marriage and divorce law in Scotland underwent little change from the sixteenth century 
up to the first half of the nineteenth.  In the second half of the 1800s, however, new civil 
and criminal legislation addressed the legal relationship between husband and wife.  
Gradually, the codified inequality between spouses was tempered with a series of reforms 
advancing the rights of married women. 
Most of the law reforms that advanced women’s rights are attributed to acts passed in 
England, and rightly so, as will be discussed below.  Yet Scotland also passed several 
legislations that addressed married women’s rights, if not at the same time as England, 
then often immediately afterwards.  Comparing the two countries shows that although 
Scotland was arguably more liberal (within the space of three decades) before the 1850s, it 
seemed to be less so afterwards because England rapidly advanced from a nation that did 
not allow divorce to a nation that protected married women’s rights.  
Property Reform in Civil Law 
The first notable legislation for Scottish married women was the Conjugal Rights 
(Scotland) Amendment Act of 1861.  This Act sought to improve the financial 
predicament of a deserted or maltreated wife, by allowing a wife who was deserted 
‘without reasonable cause’ the right to apply for an order of protection of her property.93  
If the order was granted by the CS or a sheriff, the woman was essentially given a decree 
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of separation, as well as some financial and legal independence, though still married.  
Section 1 of the Act stipulated that: 
A Wife deserted by her Husband may, at any Time after such Desertion, 
apply by Petition…for an Order to protect Property which she has acquired 
or may acquire by her own Industry after such Desertion, and Property 
which she has succeeded to or may succeed to or acquire Right to after 
such Desertion…94 
 
Clive suggested that a further result of this Act—besides granting a woman her rightful 
assets—was preventing deserting and abusive husbands from taking advantage of the 
contractual bonds of their wives, particularly keeping their money and property.
95
  This 
statute also changed the requirements for seeking divorce on the ground of desertion by 
stipulating that it was no longer necessary for a spouse to submit an action for adherence 
before seeking divorce for desertion, and allowed custody of children to be decided by the 
court rather than automatically giving custody rights to the father.
96
  The Conjugal Rights 
Act offered more protection from husbands than previous civil legislations, almost 
allowing wives the economic freedom of an unmarried woman.
97
  
In the two decades following the Conjugal Rights Act, further statutes were passed that 
specifically addressed the rights of married women in Scotland.
98
  The first was the 
Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act, passed in 1877, that stated a husband was no 
longer entitled under jus mariti
99
 to the independent earnings acquired by any wife married 
after the passing of this law.
100
  In 1881, only four years later, an important amendment to 
the 1877 Act added that a wife’s estate was also no longer subject to jus mariti, thereafter 
remaining under the wife’s name upon marriage, and that any woman married before the 
passing of the 1877 or 1881 Acts could reclaim her personal estate and property if 
properly done through the CS or the sheriff court.
101
  In addition, between the two Married 
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Women’s Property (Scotland) Acts, a similar statute was passed entitled the Married 
Women’s Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act.  Enacted in 1880, it allowed wives, ‘to 
take out a policy of life insurance on her own life or that of her husband, for her separate 
use, and provided that such a policy would vest in her to the exclusion of the jus mariti.’102  
Thus, jus mariti was essentially abolished by 1881.
103
 
England, likewise, passed several acts in relatively quick succession starting with the 
pivotal 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act.
104
  Before 1857 in England separations could be 
petitioned for in an ecclesiastical court on the ground of adultery and gross cruelty.  These 
separations were available for the husband and wife.  Still, if a wife sought a separation 
she was at a significant disadvantage due to her economic dependence on her husband.  
Being married, a woman had no property, political or parental rights under existing 
marriage law.  Moreover, judicial separations required that a wife prove ‘life-threatening 
cruelty’ and adultery, whereas a husband need only give sufficient evidence of adultery to 
separate from his wife and cease financial support.
105
  Elite English men had an alternative 
known as Parliamentary divorce.  The exorbitant price of asking Parliament to pass a 
private bill that would grant a divorce with the ability to remarry, restricted this form of 
marriage dissolution to only the wealthiest of male elites and few of them.
106
  With the 
enactment of the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act divorce was legalised in England, yet 
equality between the sexes was not offered as the grounds were maintained from the 
ecclesiastical courts: a wife had to prove aggravated adultery (infidelity coupled with a 
secondary charge), to obtain a complete divorce, while a husband could divorce his wife 
for a single instance of adultery.
107
  Equal grounds for the wife on the charge of adultery 
only became available for English divorce in 1923, and other grounds like desertion and 
cruelty were not added until 1937.
 108
    
Taken on its own, the 1857 Act suggests minimal headway for married women.  However, 
despite the obvious double standard related to divorce and separation laws, historians 
argue that England showed signs of progressive legislation to protect women from harm 
                                                          
102
 Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife, p. 298; Rosalind Marshall, Virgins and Viragos: A History of 
Women in Scotland from 1080 to 1980, (London, 1983), p. 279.  
103
 Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife, p. 298.  
104
 These acts include civil and criminal laws.  The civil laws are discussed here, and the criminal laws will 
be discussed in the following section.  
105
 Lawrence Stone, Broken Lives: Separation and Divorce in England 1660-1857, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 18-
22. 
106
 Ibid, p. 25.  
107
 Such as desertion, cruelty, bigamy, sodomy, incest, or another crime; Ringrose, Marriage and Divorce 
Laws, pp. 16-17, 23.  
108
 Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife, pp. 438-439.   
44 
 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century.  Wiener applies this to his analysis of 
penalising male violence (as mentioned above), but Phillips’ work suggests that legislators 
were torn between preserving marriage indissolubility or keeping women safe: ‘Rather 
than reduce the costs of divorce to make it more widely accessible, Parliament introduced 
cheaper alternative measures to help women who were deserted or brutally treated by their 
husbands.’109  The alternative measures Phillips is referring to were not passed in 
Scotland.  Instead, reforms in Scots law addressed the financial and custodial inequalities 
defined in the marriage contract.   
English Members of Parliament saw attempts to reform married women’s property rights 
since before the Divorce Act of 1857, although the first statute was not passed until 
1870.
110
  The Married Women’s Property Act of 1870, once passed however, ‘departed so 
substantially from the measure originally sought by its proponents that [the committee and 
feminists] were reluctant to accept it.’111  The law of 1870 kept married women dependent 
on their husbands as it only granted the rights to some of her property, allowing the 
husband to keep the rest in his name.  Undefeated, campaigns continued resulting first in 
the Married Women’s Property Act (1870) Amendment Act of 1874, which required a 
husband to pay any prenuptial debts he had covered through his wife’s assets.112  Within a 
decade, England passed the crucial Married Women’s Property Act of 1882, which gave 
married women legal and economic autonomy, thus rescinding the expectation that upon 
marriage a woman became one with her husband.
113
  Mary Lyndon Shanley argued that 
this was, ‘the single most important change in the legal status of women in the nineteenth 
century.’114   
Another example of the progression of married women’s rights apart from divorce reform 
was in the United States.  In America a woman’s property also became available to her 
husband through the marriage contract; however, reforms began even earlier than in 
England and Scotland.
115
  By the 1850s many states across the nation had already adopted 
a version of the Married Women’s Property Act, which first protected a married woman’s 
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property from being used to pay off her husband’s debts, then allowed her to maintain her 
own property as a separate estate, and finally enabled her to protect her independent 
earnings from coverture.
 116
   
Progress for women’s rights in marriage, however, was not sweeping across the populace.  
Despite the property reform provided by these acts, expectations of the marriage contract 
kept women ‘subordinate and dependent’ legally, politically and otherwise.117  
Independent wealth did not release married women from their marital duties.  
Furthermore, the allowance of married women to maintain ownership of property and 
finances in actuality only affected married women who had either inherited or acquired 
property and wealth (wages were also protected).  An entire populace of women without 
any financial means besides the income of their husbands was therefore excluded from this 
legal reform.  Though some wives had more economic constancy following the Married 
Women’s Property Acts, there were still significant barriers to women being able to earn 
an independent income, as acquiring a job with a sustainable income was still difficult for 
married women at the end of the nineteenth century.
118
   
Within the historiography, Sara Zeigler argues that the reform of property laws in the 
United States did not bring about major changes to the marriage contract, particularly 
coverture, and therefore did not greatly alter the subordinate position of married women in 
America.
119
  Likewise, Lucy Bland argues that even after the Married Women’s Property 
Acts of 1870 and 1882 English feminists recognised the continued disadvantages of 
coverture maintaining wives as property of their husbands, and consequently pressed on 
with their campaigns.
120
  In Scotland the Property Acts had a similar impact on Scottish 
married women.  Eleanor Gordon and Gwyneth Nair argued that before the Property Acts 
Scottish women already benefited over English from more complicated, yet more 
communal, property laws.  Still, feminists in Scotland fought for the legal establishment of 
separate property.  Though these acts eventually passed, they were advantageous to 
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women more in theory than in practice.  In reality divorce and judicial separation were still 
out of reach for the majority of wives unless they had financial or familial support.
121
  
Overall, Stone’s argument that the threat of granting married men and women equal 
property and divorce laws led to ‘prolonged and fierce debate’, and resulted in Parliament 
passing acts that did little to alter the established marriage laws, seems to have been 
applicable not only to England, but Scotland and the United States, too.
122
 
Criminal Law Reform Relating to Married Women’s Rights 
The second half of the nineteenth century also saw criminal law reform in Scotland and 
England.  Though these changes were not directly related to marriage laws, they reflected 
some effort to address the deeper problems of gender inequality within the judicial 
system.
123
  In particular, Scotland changed the requirements for evidence, which directly 
altered the ability for husbands’ and wives’ to win cases.  As of 1830 Scottish wives were 
at a further legal disadvantage in the courtroom because women were not deemed credible 
witnesses— along with young children, the insane, the poor, the infamous or those seeking 
to profit.
124
  Husbands were also unable to testify against their spouse.  Nevertheless, this 
was a greater hindrance for wives hoping to prove cruelty on the part of the husband.  The 
first Evidence (Scotland) Act, passed in 1853, began this wave of reform by declaring it 
lawful for a husband or wife of any party to be a competent or compellable witness in civil 
proceedings in Scotland.  Crucially, however, that permission did not include a case 
related to divorce or separation.
125
  The exclusion was recognised and finally addressed by 
the 1874 Evidence (Scotland) Act, which amended the 1853 Act to allow husbands and 
wives to testify in matrimonial actions.
126
 
Twenty-four years later the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 allowed wives and husbands to 
be competent (though not compellable) witnesses in the criminal courts:  
The wife or husband of a person charged with an offence under any 
enactment mentioned in the schedule to this Act may be called as a witness 
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either for the prosecution or defence and without the consent of the person 
charged.
127
   
 
Annmarie Hughes argues that the Criminal Evidence Act was important in allowing wives 
to be competent witnesses, and that previous to the Act of 1898, the requirement of more 
than one witness to convict a person deterred abused wives from successfully prosecuting 
their abusive husbands.  Despite this progress, Hughes found its impact minimal as wives 
could ‘bear witness against their husbands [but] they were not compelled to do so.’128   
Another reform of the criminal courts was the Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act of 
1862.  This statute attempted to reform the whole of the Scottish police system as well as 
the infrastructure of the country.  Deep within the clauses, in part VI, section VI—
Jurisdiction, and Recovery of Penalties, number 413, the Act lists a number of offences 
declared crimes to be dealt with after imprisonment.
129
  Hughes argues that this section of 
the Police and Improvement Act was an effort at reform that seemingly aimed to 
criminalise wifebeating and enforce harsher penalties by prosecuting violent offenders in 
higher up criminal courts: 
 assault charges were codified.  [The Act] stipulated that magistrates could 
not prosecute an assault charge where the assault was to the danger of life; 
or where a limb had been fractured; or where a knife or lethal weapon was 
used to the effusion of blood; or where the assault was aggravated by three 
previous convictions for this crime. Moreover, ‘if it appeared during the 
investigation or in the opinion of the magistrate that the crime merited a 
greater punishment at any stage of the trial, the prosecutor fiscal was to be 
informed and the defendant committed to prison until disposed according 
to law.’130 
 
This Act also demonstrated the attempt to reform punishment legislations in Scots law.  
Though it ostensibly addressed wifebeating by typifying violence used against wives, it 
targeted more severe instances of brutality.  Moreover, Hughes found evidence that after 
the passing of the Act little change was visible in the sentencing by sheriffs and 
magistrates.
131
  A smaller study of criminal court cases discussed in full in Chapter Five 
similarly found unsystematic use of this Act after 1862.  As a result, the Police and 
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Improvement (Scotland) Act may have only contributed minor relief to severely abused 
women seeking intervention.
132
   
Legal remedies against wifebeaters under criminal law were an important aspect of 
nineteenth-century law reform in relation to the rights of husbands and wives.  Although 
criminal legislation reform did not modify marriage and divorce law, it suggested a 
growing intolerance of violence against women.  This historical debate is the argument, 
discussed earlier, that violence became less acceptable in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century due to the growth of the new domestic ideal of a ‘softer patriarchy’.133  Hughes 
disputes the conjecture that the decline in criminal convictions for wifebeating in England 
at the end of the nineteenth century was equalled in Scotland.
134
  England—though 
conservative in its divorce legislation—had passed laws intended for the protection of 
single and married women, few of which were enacted in Scotland.  These were the 
alternative measures suggested by Phillips.  The Aggravated Assaults Act, for instance, 
passed in 1853 in England, was regarded as a progressive action against abusive husbands 
and fathers and a public statement that violence was not a respectable attribute or 
behaviour in Victorian England.
135
  The Act stipulated that any person convicted of an 
assault on a female or boy under fourteen years of age would be sentenced to up to six 
months imprisonment or a fine not to exceed £20.  Clark argues the Act ‘had limited effect 
because wives could not fully prosecute their husbands if they were financially dependent 
on them.  When they appeared before the magistrates’ courts, sometimes mangled and 
bloody, they still testified reluctantly.’136   
In 1878 English wives were addressed again under the amendment to the Matrimonial 
Causes Act.  Widely attributed to the campaigns of English feminist Frances Power 
Cobbe,
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If a husband shall be convicted summarily or otherwise of an aggravated 
assault… upon his wife, the Court or magistrate…may, if satisfied that the 
future safety of the wife is in peril, order that the wife shall be no longer 
bound to cohabit with her husband; and such order shall have the force and 





As well as allowing for the separation of bed, board was to be provided for the wife 
through a weekly payment determined by the court or magistrate based on the husband’s 
earnings.  Under this English Act, if there were young children from the marriage legal 
custody went to the wife based on the discretion of the court or magistrate.  An exception 
was made if the wife was guilty of adultery, then, despite charges against the husband, her 
case was examined by the High Court of Justice to determine custody and aliment.
139
  A 
further amendment to the Matrimonial Causes Act in 1884 ordered that a wife had the 
right to alimony and her own property under court decree once she filed for restitution of 
conjugal rights.  Furthermore, if the husband did not comply the wife was then allowed to 
file for separation on the charge of desertion, or divorce if he had committed adultery.
140
  
This amendment offered the financial protection many English women lacked when trying 




These acts exemplify the progressive steps of the Victorian era as more legislators and 
feminist groups pushed for women’s rights, but also reiterate the discrepancies between 
English and Scots law, despite the similar societal values.  As will be discussed in full 
detail in Chapter Five, this study of cruelty using CS records and reports of criminal court 
trials, revealed an increased awareness and reporting of marital abuse in the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  However, the low numbers of wives filing for separation on the 
ground of cruelty and the continued acceptance of provocation as cause for a more lenient 
sentencing in criminal courts suggests that the progressive legislations passed were not 
being enforced and therefore did not encourage a rejection of male violence en mass.  
Furthermore, the defences provided by husbands in this study use provocation and justify 
the mistreatment of their wives (including actions of adultery and desertion) by claiming 
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their wives had failed to meet their marital expectations.  These expectations were more 
often than not beyond achievability.  Married women were given the overwhelming 
responsibilities of wife, mother, housekeeper and household representative.  It therefore 
becomes apparent that despite new legislative reforms and emerging discourses aimed to 
protect women, these discourses were still laden with the belief that women should be the 
‘angel in the house’.142  If she did not match this ideal then she was not worth the same 
amount of protection or provision. 
 
 Conclusion   
Throughout the nineteenth century marriage was an accessible recourse for Scottish 
couples.  They had the option of a regular or irregular marriage until the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act of 1939.  Dissolution of a marriage was also comparably attainable under 
Scots law.  Still, to end a marriage in Scotland was difficult due to costly and lengthy legal 
processes, requirements of evidence, and severity of circumstances in certain cases.  Even 
with the legislative option to divorce or separate, the judiciary preferred to keep couples 
together whenever possible. Legislative reforms in the second half of the nineteenth 
century offered important improvements to married women’s’ rights through civil and 
criminal statutes, yet, these changes were arguably taken in small steps that sought to 
maintain the traditional marital relationship.  
In particular, the legislations related to wife abuse reflected the problematic nature of an 
embedded patriarchal society—where wives were legally regarded as property bound by 
the marriage contract—by leaving the gender inequality of the conjugal union intact.  
Maintenance of this hegemony was portrayed as a priority for the judicial and governing 
authorities.  It can be argued that the difficulties found in divorce and separation suits for 
women complainants, and defendants, represent the legal and social attitudes that marriage 
was not a union of equals in the nineteenth century, but rather a means of supporting the 
traditional view of male supremacy over women, even under the pretext of love and 
companionship.   
This outline of Scotland’s marriage and divorce legal history provides the context for an 
in-depth study of Scots’ experiences of official and unofficial marital breakdown.  The 
laws governing marriage—its entry and dissolution—imply a society’s value of the 
individual versus the social contract, and even sanctity of marriage.  Thus, despite the 
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comparatively liberal legislations of Scots law in theory, the reality of married women’s 
legal and economic restrictions suggests that marriage was considered more valuable than 
the felicity of the individual. 
  
Chapter Two: General Trends of Scottish Divorce and Judicial 
Separation  
 
This chapter discusses the general trends in divorce and judicial separation in nineteenth-
century Scotland, with a focus on the decades from 1830 to 1890.  Following the history of 
Scots law in Chapter One, this chapter is a secondary foundation for understanding the 
divorce and separation cases analysed in Chapters Three, Four and Five.  It charts and 
explains the low rate of divorce and separation in relation to the rising population and the 
normal rate of marriage through a quantitative analysis of available figures.  Based on the 
available data nineteenth-century trends are established and compared to similar 
information on England.  In the final section, the findings from the Court of Session (CS) 
extracted cases used for this study are examined for similar trends on a smaller scale, as 
well as any other information that was unavailable in the Parliamentary papers and census 
reports. 
As discussed in Chapter One, Scots law was comparably liberal in its marriage and divorce 
legislations.  The second half of the nineteenth century underwent several important 
legislative changes that directly altered the legal and economic privileges of husband and 
wife.  The legislative reforms addressed previously will now be analysed with the available 
figures to see if they indeed made a difference to accessibility.  From the second half of the 
1800s through the turn of the century there was a gradual increase in the number of divorce 
and separation actions.  The reasons for this gradual increase were arguably the effect of 
the legislative changes discussed previously, which granted greater access for more women 
and men towards the end of the century.  Other influences, specifically economic 
limitations, are also analysed as contributing factors to the low rates found.  
 
Population and Marriage in Scotland  
Between 1750 and the early 1800s Scotland experienced an ‘unprecedented growth’ in 
population.
1
  From 1831 to 1914 the Scottish population doubled from 2.4 million to 4.8.
2
  
This increase has not been attributed to a rise in marriage and subsequent birth rates, but 
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rather, a high rate of immigration.
3
  However, even with the noteworthy growth over the 
nineteenth century, Scotland’s population rate remained significantly lower than that of 
England.
 4 
  Indeed, the population of England more than tripled from 8.9 million in 1801 
to 29 million in 1891.
5
  
The history of marriage statistics in Scotland should be divided into two periods: before the 
Registration Act of 1854 and after.
 6
  There was no systematic gathering of demographic 
statistics until the Registration Act, making it difficult to say anything precise about 
Scottish marriage patterns in the first half of the century.
 7
  Following the Act all couples 
were required to register their marriage, whether regular or irregular.
 8
  Once registration 
                                                          
3
 Although an increased flux of immigration was a defining event in nineteenth-century Scotland, particularly 
of Irish immigrants, this thesis does not look at the Roman Catholic Irish married population.  The Catholic 
position since before the sixteenth century was that marriage was indissoluble.  As this had not changed by 
the nineteenth century, there are no Catholic couples in the Court of Session case records collected. 
4
 See M. Anderson and D. J. Morse, ‘The People’, in W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris (eds.), People and 
Society in Scotland, Vol. II, 1830-1914, (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 8 12-13.  Anderson and Morse argue Scotland 
saw a decline in crude death rates (pp.22-30), and also a decline in birth rates, which was not unique to 
Scotland, but a trend throughout Europe (p.32).  
5
 PP 1893-94 [C.7222] Vol. IV, Census of England and Wales, 1891.  General report, with summary tables 
and appendices, p. 4. 
6
 Eric M Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1982), p. 77; the Marriage 
Registration Act of 1854 required all marriages, births and deaths to be registered after 1855.  
7
 J. Stark, ‘Contribution to the Vital Statistics of Scotland’, Journal of the Statistical Society of London, Vol. 
14, No. 1 (Mar., 1851), p. 69.  Also see T. C. Smout; ‘Because of poor quality of church records and the 
complexity introduced by irregular marriage, it is virtually impossible to attempt a quantitative study of 
Scottish marriage before 1855, whether regular or irregular’; T. C. Smout, ‘Scottish Marriage, Regular and 
Irregular, 1500-1940’ in R. B. Outhwaite (ed.), Marriage and Society: Studies in the Social History of 
Marriage, (London, 1981), pp. 220-221. 
8
 Both the Registration Act of 1854 and the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1856 convicted irregularly  married 
couples in order to officially register the marriage, however, it was never illegal to have a clandestine or 
irregular marriage; Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife, p. 9, fn. 90.  For the history of irregular marriage in 
Scotland see Smout, ‘Scottish Marriage’; Leah Leneman and Rosalind Mitchison, ‘Clandestine Marriage in 
the Scottish Cities, 1660-1780’, Journal of Social History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer, 1993), pp. 845-861; 
Leah Leneman, Promises, Promises: Marriage Litigation in Scotland 1698-1830, (Edinburgh, 2003).  For a 
history of regular marriage and marriage patterns in Scotland that argues economic independence in urban 
areas allowed for people to marry younger, while lack of high-income jobs in rural areas meant people waited 
until they were financially stable before marrying, see M. Flinn (ed.) Scottish Population History, from the 
Seventeenth century to the 1930s, (Cambridge, 1977), p. 274-276.  Houston analyses the Kilmarnock Kirk 
session records focusing on the impact of proto-industrialisation on marriage choice.  Also Houston’s work 
on the eighteenth century contests the generalised notion that women in the pre-modern era married earlier 
then women of the later twentieth century; he found that age of marriage depended on economic status and 
region of the country (influenced by the main economic staple); R. A. Houston, ‘Marriage Formation and 
Domestic Industry: Occupational Endogamy in Kilmarnock, Ayrshire, 1697-1764’, Journal of Family 
History, Vol. 8, (1983), pp. 215- 229.  When compared to England, the mean age of marriage for Scottish 
women was 26-27 from the end of the eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century, a later age then women 
in England during the same period (23-27 years old); R. A. Houston, ‘The Population History of Britain and 
Ireland 1500-1750’, in M. Anderson (ed.), British Population History; From the Black Death to the Present 
Day, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 125-128. Anderson and Morse examine death rates, birth rates, changes in the 
marriage pattern, immigration and emigration in an analysis of Scotland’s population growth in the 
nineteenth century; Anderson and Morse, ‘The People’, pp. 8-45; See Woods for marriage rates in specific 
regions of Scotland, England and Wales; R. I. Woods, ‘The Population of Britain in the Nineteenth Century’, 
in M. Anderson (ed.), British Population History; From the Black Death to the Present Day, (Cambridge, 
1996), pp. 315-316. 
54 
 
became compulsory, standardised statistics became available.
9
  In 1861 the First Detailed 
Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in Scotland  
explained that, ‘19,680 Marriages were contracted and registered in Scotland during 1855, 
which gives the proportion of 654 marriages in every hundred thousand of the population.’  
The report compared these rates with England stating that, ‘[t]his is a proportion far below 
the marriage rate of England, which, on a ten years’ average, shows that 864 Marriages 
were contracted annually in every hundred thousand persons of the population.’10   Later 
census reports show that the rate of registered marriages did not drastically change from 
1851 to 1881, averaging at 693 marriages per 100,000 people (see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1  Scottish Marriages per Year in Comparison with 
Population in Scotland 
   










% of Population 














1861 3,062,294 20,896 0.681 682 
1871 3,360,018 24,019 0.7102 715 
1881 3,745,485 26,004 0.6943 694 
 
Source: Marriage percentages from PP 1884-85 [C.4218] Twenty-seventh detailed annual report of 
the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in Scotland. [Abstracts of 1881.], p. xvii.  
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Sources: PP 1890 [C.6170] Fifty-second annual report of the Registrar-General of births, deaths, 
and marriage in England. (1889.), pp. lxvi-lxvii; PP 1884-85 [C.4218] Twenty-seventh detailed 
annual report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in Scotland. [Abstracts of 
1881.], p. xvii. 
 
Graph 2.1 illustrates the difference in rate of marriage between Scotland and England and 
Wales in a population of 100,000 people.  Although there were more people marrying in 
England and Wales, both lines show similar patterns.  The graph also shows a trend of 
slow growth as a feature of Scottish, English and Welsh marriage rates over this thirty year 
period.  Still, the rate of marriage in England and Wales decreased more markedly after 
1871.  This decline in marriage rates has been noted as a feature of the Victorian era.
11
  
The Registrar Generals discussed the decline in the mid-1880s, though at the time they 
predicted numbers to have already started ascending again: ‘The number of marriages 
registered throughout Scotland during 1881 was 26004, an increase of 1499 [sic] [from] 
the previous year, and representing a marriage rate of 69.43 for every ten thousand of 
estimated population, a higher rate than it has been since 1877, though below the average 
for the ten years ending with 1880, which was 72 per ten thousand.’12 
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Perceptions and Accessibility of Divorce and Separation 
Divorce and judicial separation have been legal in Scotland since the Reformation.  
Notwithstanding their legal availability, Chapter One demonstrated that divorce and 
separation were not feasible options for married women until the second half of the 
nineteenth century when reform legislations, such as the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Act of 
1861 and the Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Acts of 1877 and 1881, provided 
economic and legal autonomy to married women.  This chapter puts forward the argument 
that access was also restricted for the majority of husbands and wives due to economic 
restraints, such as court fees and travel.  Most couples remained legally married until 
death, but, there was a small percentage who sought judicial means to end their marriage.  
The sixty year period of 1830 to 1890, however, shows how uncommon divorce and 
separation were, as well as the beginning of the increase in rates that were to swell by the 
late twentieth century.  
Although there was a concern that divorce was commonplace, divorce and judicial 
separations were rare.  Parliamentary papers written throughout the 1800s reported an 
increase in the number of divorce actions instigated (cases filed by a pursuer, but not 
necessarily awarded a decree due to dismissal or never being heard in court), yet the reality 
was a gradual rise from as low as 17 actions in 1823 to a peak of 140 in 1885.  The number 
of divorce actions given successful decrees was even less, for instance in 1823, 14 of the 
17 were successful and only 76 of the 140 in 1885.  Nevertheless, throughout the 
nineteenth century, marriage, divorce and separation were issues of worry and reform.   
Newspaper reports of Parliamentary debates demonstrate that the concerns over 
accessibility were ever present.  In 1830 the complicated nature of the Scottish courts was 
addressed with the proposal of a bill for trial by jury to be instituted in the CS.
13
  The bill 
sought to establish juries in civil cases tried in the CS as well as to pass the former duties 
of the Commissary Court onto the CS.  This debate in the House of Commons about 
Scottish court system reform simultaneously flagged the issue of divorce.  The Lord 
Advocate was reported by The Scotsman as stating: 
The duties of that court, with respect to marriage and legitimacy, were of 
so important a character as called, in his opinion, for an alteration in its 
construction… He feared that the system gave rise to much collusion 
between parties who wished to be separated… it appeared, that, in the three 
last years, the number of divorces obtained was 48; in these cases 
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appearances were entered for only nine of the defendants; so that in 39 
cases of divorce the suit was carried on by only one of the parties… Now, 
when he removed this jurisdiction to the CS, he would, in a great measure, 
put an end to this facility of obtaining, divorces.  By taking this course he 
thought that many of these cases would be stopped—that they would not be 
heard of—and thus the marriage tie would be placed in a more secure 
state… The only objection he had heard to the alteration was, that it would 
put poor people to a heavy expense in procuring divorce.  He was anxious 
that justice should be administered as strictly and as cheaply as possible; 
yet, when he came to look at the numerous actions of divorce that came 
before these commissaries, he was inclined to think that some benefit 




The Lord Advocate asserted that the comparably lax Scots law may explain ‘great’ 
numbers of divorce.  He did not suggest abolishing the divorce and separation laws, rather 
he identified them as well established and recommended making the process more costly in 
order to reduce the number of actions.  What was evident was the expectation that a reform 
of the legal courts would curtail the applications.  Though the Lord Advocate expressed 
concern that poor people should be able to afford a divorce, the underlying message 
implied his belief that the people guilty of colluding to get a divorce were the same people 
who would be excluded by a rise in price, specifically working-class couples.  The 
recommendation to increase costs suggests that the Lord Advocate believed only poorer 
couples took advantage of and undermined the system through fraud and collusion.
15
    
Over forty years later, in 1872 The Scotsman reported a debate in the House of Lords, on 
the ‘Marriage Law of Scotland’, started by Lord Chelmsford who referenced the following 
question posed by an ‘hon. gentleman’: ‘The Government were asked in 1865 whether they 
intended to do anything towards making the Marriage Law in Scotland more in accordance 
with those of civilised nations [italics added].’16  According to Lord Chelmsford, this 
inquiry prompted ‘the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the subject’, which as 
of March 1872 remained ‘untouched’.  The Lord Chancellor replied:  
The Marriage Law was certainly one of great importance, but it was 
surrounded with many difficulties…Then there was the question of 
divorce.  In Scotland persons might be divorced without any proof of 
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adultery.  The Committee had consequently to be cautious in expressing 
any opinion as to what the law should be with regard to divorce.  These 
were the reasons why the Government had not dealt with the matter as 
yet.
17
   
The Lord Chancellor then suggested Lord Chelmsford should propose a bill to reform the 
Scottish marriage law.  To which Lord Chelmsford answered: ‘a private member would 
have no chance in carrying a marriage bill this Parliament, and declined the 
responsibilities, which he thought the Government ought to undertake. [sic]’18 
Similar discourses on increasing divorce rates and the role of the lower classes in this trend 
prevailed.  In 1880 The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science held 
their twenty-fourth annual congress, where anxiety over rising divorce rates was addressed 
in a paper given by a writer signet of Edinburgh.  The paper, ‘The Increase of Divorce in 
Scotland’, explained that in the last ten years the number of divorces had risen from 35 
cases per annum to 59, and already 63 cases had been counted for 1880.
19
  Coldstream 
conducted a comparative study of 55 cases before 1874 and 55 after to find patterns that 
might explain the increase: 
One other contributing cause to the increase suggested itself, and that was 
the ready and wide circulation of the reports of such cases by a cheap press, 
thus rendering the public mind accustomed to and prepared for what should 
be regarded as a scandal and disgrace in a family’s history…The result of 
the inquiry went to show that increased drunkenness, specially among 
women, had increased divorce in Scotland, while the Legislature had also 
contributed to the increase by the passing of the Act which enabled parties 
to be witnesses in the cause.
20
   
In the debate that followed, Mr. Campbell Smith, advocate from Edinburgh, attempted to 
refute the observations of the paper, particularly that there was a cause for alarm.  The 
Scotsman reported:  
He attributed the increase in divorce not to any increase in immorality 
among the people, but to the greater faculty now afforded for taking 
advantage of the existing means of divorce… He concluded by repeating 
that in the increase of divorce cases, there was nothing to alarm us.
21
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As the official figures remained low, it seems that the matter at heart was whether Scots 
law made divorce and separation too accessible for the lower classes.  Accessibility was 
arguably the biggest variant between Scotland and England.  The two countries had distinct 
marriage and divorce legislations.  Husbands and wives residing in Scotland had equal 
access to suits of divorce on the grounds of adultery, desertion, and judicial separation for 
cruelty and maltreatment, but in England before 1857 only elite men could obtain a private 
divorce through Parliament, or a separation from bed and board.  After the 1857 
Matrimonial Causes Act, divorce in England for simple adultery was only available to the 
husband, while a wife had to prove aggravated adultery to qualify or apply for a separation.  
As part of the investigation into reforming English divorce law, the Select Committee of 
the House of Lords interviewed the Lord Advocate and an esquire of Scotland in 1844 to 
record Scottish legal practices.
22
  It was apparent from this interview that the MPs 
correlated divorce with immorality; the line of questioning seemed to be searching for 
evidence of failure within the Scottish system.  The Lord Advocate, Right Hon. Duncan 
M’Neill, answered questions that focused on the impact of allowing wives the same rights 
as husbands as well as overall accessibility of divorce:   
125. You do not consider that the number of Divorces à vinculo has 
increased in a greater proportion than the population?—No.  
126. Is your Lordship of opinion that the great facility of obtaining 
divorces in Scotland gives rise to a greater number of Divorce suits being 
instituted than otherwise would be instituted? – I should think that where a 
remedy is within reach it would be resorted to more frequently than where 
it is not within reach.  
…133. Is it your opinion that the possibility of obtaining a Divorce at no 
very great expense, and with no great delay by way of judicial proceedings, 
increases the effectual demand for the remedy by increasing the number of 
adulteries committed in Scotland?—That would be mere speculation.  I 
have no reason to suppose that it does.  I would certainly say not, with 
reference to the adultery of the wife. 
…137. Is it conceived generally that in proportion to the number of people 
in Scotland there exists a greater degree of immorality than in other 
countries?—I really cannot answer that question; my experience does not 
enable me to do so.  In the first place, I cannot speak to the degree of 
immorality, of the nature referred to, in Scotland; in the second place, still 
less can I do so in regard to other countries. 
…165. Do not you think that the facility of Divorce at the suit of the wife 
may have a tendency to produce collusive Divorces; meaning by that, 
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adultery committed by the husband for the sake of founding such a 
proceeding? – It may have.  I am not aware that it has.23 
 
J.A. Maconochie, esquire in Scotland, was also interviewed with related questions levelled 
at him by the Committee, to which he gave similar answers as the Lord Advocate.
24
  
Though the purpose of the Committee’s investigation was to determine the best divorce 
law for England, there was an embedded derision of Scottish divorce law in these 
questions.  Speculation about access to divorce and separation leading to immorality was 
not only reserved for Scotland.  In 1846 the Morning Herald published the following blurb 
titled ‘Morality in France’: ‘If statistical returns speak truth, morality in France is 
becoming every year less and less regarded.  The number of condemnations for adultery is 
increasing every month; of separations between husbands and wives the number has risen 
from 643 in 1837 to 1108 in 1844.’25   
Accessibility was regulated in Scotland and England through gender imbalances, but also 
through costs of legal fees.  This was another disparity between the two countries, as well 
as a source of contention.  Contemporaries frequently cited expenses as an issue; for 
instance an editorial on English divorce law written in 1830 angrily stated: ‘[b]ut the truth 
is, it exactly suits John Bull’s taste in legislation, first to lay down a rule which has every 
appearance of being absolute, and then either to nullify it in toto,…or to leave it as a trap 
for the poor, while a loophole is opened for the rich to make their escape through it.’26  The 
Daily News published an article in September 1853 reporting on the Select Committee’s 
findings (discussed above): 
From that report we learn, first, that it is proposed to refuse divorce to women (in England) 
altogether, except in cases of such rare atrocity as to constitute, practically, no exception at 
all; and next, that in Scotland, there were ninety-five cases of successful suit for a divorce 
in five years—the parties being almost all of the labouring classes, under favour of the 
smallness of the cost; one-third of these divorces were at the suit of the wife.  Such is the 
state of the law beyond the Tweed, while, on this side of it, the expense of a divorce rises 
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 The Lord Advocate of Scotland, Right Hon. Duncan M’Neill, now Lord Justice of Scotland, being 
questioned for the PP 1852-53 [1604] First Report of the Commissioners, p. 67. 
24
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 This blurb was re-printed in The Scotsman and reported under the English news section; ‘England. 
[Morality in France.]’, The Scotsman, 21 October 1846, pg. 4.  
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 ‘Editorial Article1—No Title’, The Scotsman, 7 April 1830, pg. 6.  
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 ‘Brutal Husbands—The Divorce Laws. (From the Daily News.)’, The Scotsman, 10 September 1853, pg. 4.  
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In Scotland an uncontested action at the CS in 1853 was reportedly between £20 and £30, 
compared to an estimated average of £700 to £800 for a Parliamentary Divorce in 
England.
28
  After 1857 divorce proceedings were still considered expensive for the average 
English person though an uncontested case could cost from £30 to £40.
29
  The difference 
after 1857 between Scotland and England was drastically reduced, but it was still more 
than a working-class couple could afford. 
Although the expenses for a trial were low compared to England, in Scotland the final sum 
was dependent on the length of the trial, the number of witnesses,
30
 and whether the 
defender answered the summons with a defence.  The cost would vary further based on the 
action and charge made by the pursuer as a divorce and a separation had different 
outcomes.  If awarded a divorce, the marriage was fully dissolved leaving the parties free 
to remarry, the innocent wife was given her terce (if the wife was the guilty party she lost 
this claim),
31
 and any further economic dependency was severed.  The only stipulation 
being that if a co-defender was named and charged as the paramour, the defender and co-
defender were not legally allowed to marry after the divorce.  In the event of a judicial 
separation the parties remained legally married, although allowed to live separately, and 
the husband was required to pay the wife aliment for as long as they lived apart.  As a 
result, it was in the interest of the defender to contest a suit of separation in order to avoid 
alimony, while suits of divorce were more often left uncontested (no appearance or defence 
provided by the defender), even when the parties had not colluded.  Accordingly, the study 
of CS cases, discussed in full below, found that out of 65 divorce cases on the ground of 
adultery, 38 actions (58 per cent) were uncontested.  In actions of divorce on the ground of 
desertion, only one defender out of 48 cases made an appearance, however, she did not 
contest the plea for divorce, but rather appeared as a witness to testify that she had left her 
husband due to his ‘unkindness’.32  Out of the 14 cases of judicial separation on the ground 
of cruelty and maltreatment, eight were contested and six were uncontested, although two 
of those six defenders were imprisoned at the time of the trial.  Leneman found in her study 
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 Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife, pp. 438-439.  Stone cites a contested separation suit from 1846 that 
cost £1,700 in England; Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987, (Oxford, 1990), p. 355.  
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 Hyacinthe Ringrose, Marriage and Divorce Laws of the World, (London, 1911), p. 23.  
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Parties sometimes had to pay to bring witnesses to Edinburgh for their trial; Leah Leneman, Alienated 
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Terce was the ‘life-rent enjoyed by a widow, or a wife who has divorced her husband, to one-third of the 
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adultery or desertion) she was no longer entitled to terce; Frederick Parker Walton, A Handbook of 
Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1893), p. 199, 200, 214. 
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 CS46/1880/1/81 Brown v Guthrie or Brown.  
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Out of the CS cases, the most expensive action was an 1870 divorce for adultery.  The suit 
was instigated by the husband, contested by the wife, and lasted one year and two months; 
the expenses declared in the final ruling were £335.9s.9d.  In contrast, the lowest cost for a 
case was £12.16s.0d.  This case was also filed by the husband on the ground of adultery, 
contested by the wife, but lasted only two months.  From the information available, the 
average cost of the CS cases shows that actions of desertion and actions of maltreatment 
were more similar in price than the average for an adultery divorce.
34
  This information, 
along with the highest and lowest fees, the cost of an action for aliment, and an action of 
adherence and aliment, are listed in Table 2.2. 
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 The separate account of expenses reported by an auditor was only available in a few of the divorce and 
separation records.  Instead, the expenses total was also sometimes listed as a final decree by the Lord 
Ordinary in the interlocutor sheet, which stated that the auditor’s report had been approved, the amount found 
by the auditor, and who was responsible for paying it.  The majority of cases where this information was 
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from the husband in order to cover her debts, are usually recorded in the interlocutor sheet, although a final 
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As shown in Table 2.2, the husband was liable for the expenses in all of the cases, even as 
the complainer who was successfully granted a divorce.  This was a repercussion of 
coverture; a husband was required to pay all and any of his wife’s debts, including legal 
fees.  Fraser in 1876 wrote that this was a condition of the marriage contract, however, 
Clive argues that this system was more complicated than Fraser outlined.
35
  What is 
evident from the CS cases, nonetheless, is that in every trial the husband was responsible 
for any fee incurred.  This condition, though beneficial for a wife without a separate estate, 
was damaging for a husband, and sometimes disputed in court.
36
  In one case Lord 
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 According to Fraser, ‘The theory of the law is, that a wife has no means; and therefore, as  a general rule, 
any justifiable litigation carried on by her must be paid for by the husband, as  a necessary.’[sic]; Patrick 
Fraser, Treatise on Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland, Second Edition, Vol. 1, (Edinburgh, 
1876),  p. 1230, for the full discussion see pp. 1230-1238.  Clive refutes Fraser’s assessment, instead saying 
that, ‘the basis of the traditional rule on expense is the husband’s liability, based on his obligation to provide 
support, to reimburse those who provide his wife with necessaries or give her credit for necessaries’; Clive, 
Law of Husband and Wife, p. 589, for the full discussion see pp. 588-593.  
36
 For example, an article in 1862 began, ‘A somewhat novel and important point in practice was decided by 
Lord Jerviswoode in this case to-day’, when Jerviswoode ruled the husband was liable for the wife’s legal 
fees after she consulted an agent, but decided not to contest her husband’s suit against her; ‘Outer House. 
Table 2.2 Cost of Trials, Court of Session Cases, 1830-1880 





Divorce Desertion Highest £79.6d. 1880 5 ms Uncontested Defender   Wife 
  Lowest £33.18s.4d. 1880 <2 ms Uncontested Defender Wife 
    Average £43           
Aliment Desertion   £15.9s.4d 1830 1 yr Uncontested Defender Wife 
Adherence  Desertion (Adherence) £25.0s.9d. 1840 1 ms Uncontested Defender Wife 
and  (Divorce) £13.2s.5d 1840 3 ms Uncontested Defender Wife 
Aliment   Total £38.3s.2d. 1840 4 ms Uncontested Defender Wife 
Divorce Adultery Highest £335.9s.9d.  1870 1 yr 2 ms Contested Pursuer   Husband 
  Lowest £12.16s.0d. 1880 4 ms Contested Pursuer   Husband 
    Average £88           
Separation Maltreatment Highest £99.17s.7d. 1830 2 yrs 8 ms Contested Defender Wife 
  Lowest £17.1s.7d. 1860 2 ms Uncontested Defender Wife 
  Average £46      
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Ardmillan revealed an aversion to this system when the wife was clearly guilty of adultery.  
He included a note following an interim order to the pursuer (the husband) to pay an 
additional £5 to his wife (the defender) for her legal fees: ‘It is not without hesitation and 
difficulty that the Lord Ordinary has awarded even this small sum to the Defender in name 
of Expenses.  He has read the Defense; and the Proof; and is satisfied that, at all events, the 
sum awarded is the largest which can with justice be allowed. [sic]’37   
Also worth noting is that in Scotland poor relief had been available for paupers to cover 
legal expenses since the fifteenth century.
38
  This legal right enabled men and women of 
the lower working class equal access to legal procedures.
39
  In this study of CS cases, only 
eleven pursuers, or 4 per cent, used the Poors’ Roll to fund their suit of divorce, separation, 
aliment, and adherence.  Still, this was an important resource considering the state of 
employment in nineteenth-century Scotland.  It has been estimated by historians of the 
early nineteenth century that working-class wage in Glasgow ranged from 18 shillings (s.) 
per week for the skilled worker to 9s. per week for the unskilled labourer.
40
  James 
Treble’s study of Glasgow’s working class from 1890 to 1914 shows wages for unskilled 
labourers between 17s. and 23s. per week, however, even workers with seemingly better 
wages only had a tenuous hold on economic stability as many industries revolved around 
seasonal demands, and unemployment was high and improperly regulated.  Thus, Treble 
wrote: ‘it is impossible to dispute that the majority of the families of unskilled workers 
must have lived at or below the poverty line if they solely depended upon the income of 
the head of the household.’41  Women’s wages in comparison were significantly less than a 
man’s. This was a result of the Victorian ideal that encouraged families to divide marital 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(Before Lord Jerviswoode.) Saturday, January 25. Divorce—Agnew v Agnew and Co-Respondent.’ The 
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Ordinary ruled the co-defender was liable for the full expenses; ‘Second Division. The Double Action for 
Divorce. Andrews v Andrews and Another’, The Scotsman, 8 February 1873, pg. 9.    
37
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38
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Husband and Wife, p. 14; Leneman, Alienated Affections, p. 15. 
39
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40
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for skilled labourers, but decreased for unskilled workers, who were the ‘majority of the labour force’ in 
Glasgow; R. A. Cage, ‘The Standard of Living Debate: Glasgow, 1800-1850’, The Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 43, No. 1 The Tasks of Economic History (Mar., 1983), p. 182.   
41
 James A. Treble, ‘The Market for Unskilled Male Labour in Glasgow, 1891-1914’, in Ian MacDougall 
(ed.), Essays in Scottish Labour History: A Tribute to W. H. Marwick, (Edinburgh, 1978), p. 129.  See also 
Treble, ‘Unemployment and Unemployment Policies in Glasgow, 1890-1905’, in Pat Thane (ed.), The 
Origins of British Social Policy, (London, 1978), pp. 147-172; and Treble, ‘The Seasonal Demand for Adult 
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expectations by gender: husbands were considered the breadwinner, and wives were meant 
to run the household and raise the children.  Therefore, if women did work, their wages 
were inadequate to support a family without a male head of the household.
42
  A national 
average of women’s wages showed women earned 42 per cent of men’s wages.  In 1893 
the lowest female wage was 4s. to 8s. per week, while in 1886 the highest female wage 
recorded was 20s. per week.
43
   
In the 1852 Divorce Commission for the Queen, it was reported that out of 95 decrees for 
divorce between 1836 and 1841, the parties involved in the cases were ‘almost all of the 
humbler classes’.44  Coldstream’s paper of 1880 also noted the economic status of divorce 
litigants: ‘As to the trade or profession of the parties, it was found that nearly all classes of 
the community—from the man of noble birth to the humblest subject—took advantage of 
the Divorce Court.’45  Likewise, historian Marshall wrote in her analysis of divorce in 
Scotland that it was the ‘humbler classes’ that most frequently sought a divorce action 
before the twentieth century.
46
 
Yet, what constituted ‘humbler’?  This description vaguely specifies the socioeconomic 
status of the divorcing parties.  Moreover, it suggests that the legal remedy of divorce or 
judicial separation was more accessible than it seems based on legal fees and average wage 
earnings.  To investigate this claim, the listed occupations of litigating parties from the CS 
benchmark cases were analysed.  Out of the 254 cases collected for the benchmark years, 
there are a total of 508 litigants.  Of the 508 people, fifty per cent had an occupation listed.  
221 of the 254 occupied litigants were husbands, or 43.5 per cent of the 508, while only 
33, or 6.5 per cent, were wives.  These numbers can be broken down further to look 
specifically at pursuers and defenders (see Table 2.3).   
Examining husbands first, the number of pursuers who listed an occupation was 105 out of 
a total of 119 male pursuers.  The largest group of occupations, or 80 per cent, fell into the 
working class.  Of the remaining pursuers, 16 per cent were of the middle class, and 4 per 
cent upper class.  From the list of occupations for male defenders, 116 out of 135, again the 
highest percentage was from the working class; 71 per cent, then 25 per cent middle class 
and 3.5 per cent upper class.  As pointed out by W. A. Armstrong and Matthew Woollard, 
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the system of classification used in the nineteenth century was heavily flawed because they 
distinguished men and women based solely on occupation rather than individual wealth or 
earnings.
 47
  It is apparent, nevertheless, that while working-class men filed the majority of 
divorce suits, a high number of them would have fallen into the upper-working class.  For 
instance, there were a high number of artisans, such as shoemakers, and small business 
owners, such as grocers, while the most common occupation listed for both male pursuers 
and defenders was engineer.  Table 2.3 shows that there is not a great discrepancy between 
the percentages of male pursuers and male defenders.  This suggests that of the male 
litigants, husbands who filed suits and husbands who were summoned overall belonged to 
the same socioeconomic classes.           
Of the occupations listed by wives, eighteen were female pursuers and fourteen were 
female defenders.  Despite the fact that the husband was required to cover his wife’s legal 
fees, a woman whose marriage broke down was often forced to earn a living.  Although it 
is obvious that there were at least four upper-class wives in the 254 cases sample, none 
listed an indicator of their status.  On the other hand, three female pursuers identified as 
middle class by listing themselves as the daughter of a merchant.  The rest of the eighteen 
female pursuers were upper and lower-working class.  Overall, the majority of wives with 
occupations fell into the working-class status.  It is also noticeable, however, that of the 
female pursuers, seven ran or owned small businesses.  Presumably, the husband had also 
been an owner or manager at some point, but by the time of the suit the wife had often 
taken over the business due to the marital breakdown.  In contrast, the most common 
occupation for a female defender was servant or employed in domestic services, such as 
washer, mender of clothes or wet nurse (eight of the fourteen).  As these women had been 
charged with adultery or desertion, it would make sense that they had taken up work to 
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 For this investigation the 1861 Census Report Vol. II, W.A. Armstrong’s work on nineteenth-century 
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support themselves independently.  Undoubtedly, a larger number of wives did indeed 
work, but did not list an occupation.
48
     
Overall, this study’s findings support the notion that it was the ‘humbler classes’ who filed 
for divorce and separation.  Yet, what does this say about economic accessibility?  There 
are two possible explanations.  Firstly, though these litigants fall into the vaguely defined 
working class, many were skilled labourers, and small business owners.  Therefore, rather 
than simply working class, these men and women would be upper-working class.  
Secondly, that working-class husbands and wives were willing to spend a large amount of 
money for a divorce and judicial separation suggests that it was not a decision taken 
lightly, and that perhaps it was out of desperation and lack of alternatives.  Thus, the 
contemporary concern over working-class couples abusing the divorce legislation was only 
partially legitimate, as many litigants were indeed from the lower class, yet the numbers, 
which will be discussed below, never indicated a threat to society.      
 
Table 2. 3 Socioeconomic Status of Litigants with Listed Occupations, Court 















Upper 4 4% 4 3.5% 0 - 0 - 
Middle 17 16% 29 25% 3 17% 0 - 
Working 84 80% 82 71% 15 83% 13 93% 
Totala 105 100% 116




 The total number of male pursuers is 119, with 119 female defenders.  The total 
number of male defenders is 135, with 135 female pursuers.  There are 508 litigants in 
total.  
b 
One male and one female defender were imprisoned at the time of the suit. 
Source: General Minute-Book of The Court of Session, Vols. 49, 50, 59, 60, 69,70, 79, 
80, 89, 90, 99, 100.  
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Lastly, accessibility was impacted by the singular location of the CS in Edinburgh.  This 
was the only court with the jurisdiction to oversee actions of divorce and judicial 
separation.  Although railways had been built connecting central and southern Scotland to 
Edinburgh by the 1840s, this was a costly way to travel mid century.
49
  Treble’s work on 
geographical mobility found that while workers with wages of 30-40s. per week could 
afford to commute for work, unskilled labourers were made immobile by costs of 
transportation.
50
  Presumably, a husband or wife in the working class could not afford 
travel to Edinburgh, let alone the unknown amount of days off work, and accommodation 
costs.  Historians of England have argued that the establishment of the only divorce court 
in London following the 1857 Act limited access for the lower classes; the same impact 
was most likely true for the CS.
51
  Furthermore, out of the CS cases, 34 per cent were 
instigated by residents of Edinburgh (Leith included), a higher percentage than any other 
town.
 52
  Glasgow was the second most common town of residence, followed by Dundee 





Discovering Trends with Parliamentary Papers and Census Reports 
Tracking Divorce and Separation Trends 
For the period before 1830 Leah Leneman’s research on divorce in Scotland reveals low 
rates with a very distinct increase by the end of the eighteenth century, however, this rise 
was relatively minor with figures remaining small.  From 1684 to 1830 she found 904 
cases, ‘’of which 757 were successful and 147 unsuccessful (either abandoned or 
dismissed); 803 were for adultery and 101 for desertion’.  Significantly, the majority took 
place at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.
54
  Parliamentary 
findings on the number of Scottish divorce actions for adultery filed in the 1820s also 
reported low figures ranging from 17 to 25 actions per year over a seven year period.
 55
   
                                                          
49
 S. G. E. Lythe and J. Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, (London, 1975), pp. 195-198. 
50
 Treble, ‘The Market for Unskilled’, pp. 130-131. 
51
 Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895, (Princeton, 
1989), pp. 41-42; Stone, Road to Divorce, p. 383.  
52
 General Minute-Book of The Court of Session, Vols. 49, 50, 59, 60, 69,70, 79, 80, 89, 90, 99, 100 
53
 PP 1882 [C.3320] Vol. 1, Ninth Decennial Census of the Population of Scotland taken 4th April 1881, with 
report.  Also see Anderson and Morse, ‘The People’, pp. 8-45.  
54
 Leneman, Alienated Affections, p. 13. 
55
 PP 1830 (577) Divorce, Scotland. Statement of the number of actions concluding for divorce on the head of 
adultery, raised in the Consistorial Court of Edinburgh, in each year from 1822 to 1829 inclusive; and of the 
result of every such action.  
69 
 
Graph 2.2 provides an overview of the general trends of divorce and separation from 1830 
to 1890.  Decrees of divorce in Scotland, although showing repeated fluctuations, 
gradually increased over these decades, but numbers never exceeded 107 decrees per year 
(the peak in 1888).  For judicial separation, the general trend shows a much smaller incline, 
with numbers remaining below 25 decrees per year (the peak was 24 in 1885).  Visible in 
the graph are breaks in the data on divorce and separation.  This is due to a lack of 
comparable official data.  Although, the data are not capable of comparison for Graph 2.2, 
they are used in a deconstructed analysis of these trends, which follows. 
 
Notes: The gaps in the lines indicate where comparable information was not available. 
From 1830-1836 the figures are decrees for divorce on the ground of adultery, and separation on 
the ground of maltreatment; PP 1852-53 [1604] First report of the commissioners appointed by Her 
Majesty to enquire into the law of divorce, and more particularly into the mode of obtaining divorces 
a vinculo matrimonii.  
From 1841-1843 the figures are ‘returns of matrimonial suits’, not specified as divorce or separation 
decrees; PP 1844 (354) Matrimonial Suits. Abstract of returns of matrimonial suits in 1840, 1841, 
1842, 1843. 
From 1855-1889 the figures are decrees of nullity and divorce; PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  
Return of the number of suits instituted year by year in Scotland. 
From 1857-1888 the figures are decrees of judicial separation; PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  
Return of the number of suits instituted year by year in Scotland. 
 
Firstly, the transfer of matrimonial suits to the CS caused some discrepancies in the 
number of cases recorded in the 1830s.  The 1837 Consistorial Courts, Scotland report 









































































to the CS after 1830.  The report on ‘All Consistorial Causes Transferred to, and Instituted 
and Decided in the CS, from 1830 to 1836’, showed 18 divorce causes transferred in 1830, 
three of which were instituted (filed) for adultery and only one of those three decided 
(given a decree).  By 1836 the number had increased to 30 cases instituted, with 15 
decided.  Over the seven years the number of adultery cases filed averaged 21.4 charges 
per year, and an average of 15 awarded a decree (see Chart 2.1).
56
  The low figure in 1830 
may be a result of cases only being counted after the Act was implemented, possibly as late 
as October.  Accordingly, the fact that there were no separation cases listed might mean no 
actions were processed until 1831.  From 1831 to 1836, the number of separation for 
maltreatment cases instigated ranged from 7 to 10 cases per year, with only 2.6 on average 
receiving a decree; an insignificant number in relation to the married population.  
Additionally, there are no returns for divorces on the ground of desertion (labelled non-































































































1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836
Chart 2.1 Return of all Consistorial Causes 
Transferred to the Court of Session, 1830-1836
Div for Adultery Sep for Maltreatment Div for Desertion
Source: Return by James Fergusson, Esq, Senior Principal Clerk of Session, of all Consistorial 
Causes Transferred to the Court of Session, 1830-1836; PP 1837 (459) Consistorial courts, 
Scotland. Return of the number of causes transferred from the consistorial courts to the Court of 
Session in 1830.
58 
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 PP 1837 (459) Consistorial courts, Scotland. Return of the number of causes transferred from the 
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But does this trend continue?  Information on separation for maltreatment is not available 
again until mid-1850.  Data on matrimonial cases brought to the CS for a decree of divorce 
are found through various Parliamentary papers as discussed earlier, yet, these data are 
inconsistent.  For instance, according to a listing of divorce decrees (grounds not specified) 
from November 1836 to November 1841 the number of decrees ranged from 10 to 23, with 
an average of 19 cases for divorce per year.
59
  A return of matrimonial suits in Scotland 
(grounds not specified) from 1840 to 1843, had a range of 37 to 47 actions, with an 
average of 42.25 suits per year.
60
  Though these data are consecutive they present very 
different figures.  As noted earlier, the type of data represented are different between the 
two reports, and may explain the difference in numbers.  The 1836-1841 report shows only 
decrees of divorce, while the 1840-1843 shows every matrimonial suit instituted to the CS.  
The higher numbers given between 1840 and 1843 are fitting as the suits are all divorce, 
separation, aliment, and declarators of marriage actions combined.  The data from these 
two reports, therefore, are not sufficiently comparable to determine an exact trend.  They 
do, nevertheless, suggest a continuation of low numbers of couples seeking legal assistance 
to divorce or separate over the first four decades of the nineteenth century.  
After 1855 consistent data exist for Scottish divorce figures, making it possible to illustrate 
the divorce and separation trends for the second half of the century.  Table 2.4 compares 
the data available after 1855 on annual marriage figures to the number of divorce and 
nullity decrees reported.  However, as the marriage figures and the divorce figures indicate 
the number of people who were married or divorced per year, not the total number of 
married or divorced people, the overall population was included as a neutral figure for 
comparison.  Table 2.4 shows that the number of divorces per year was notably 
disproportionate to the number of marriages per year.    
The overall trend in divorce rates was a gradual, fluctuating increase.  This is apparent in 
Graph 2.3 that shows divorce and nullity decrees at continuously low numbers until the 
mid-1870s, whereafter, the number of divorces began to rise, albeit, unsteadily.  When 
charted the increase seems significant.  Yet, even by 1889 the peak number was 107 
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Table 2.4 Scottish Marriage, Divorce and Population Trends 
Figures  1855 1861 1871 1881 
No. of Marriages 19,680 20,896 24,019 26,004 
No. of Divorces 11 26 19 60 
Total Population 2,978,065 3,062,294 3,360,018 3,745,485 
No. People per Every 1 Marriage 151 147 140 144 
No. People per Every 1 Divorce 270,733 117,781 176,843 62,425 
No. Marriages per Every 1 Divorce 1,789 804 1,264 433 
 
Source: Marriage data from PP 1884-85 [C.4218] Twenty-seventh detailed annual report of 
the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in Scotland. [Abstracts of 1881.]; 
Divorce data calculated from B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge, 1988) 
and PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  Return of the number of suits instituted year by 
year in Scotland. 
 
Just how low the rates of divorce in Scotland were are further evident when compared with 
England and Wales.  As stated earlier, England (with Wales combined from this point on) 
had a greater and increasing population in the nineteenth century, which directly translated 
to higher number of marriages and divorces.  For instance, in 1875 England had a 
population of 23,944,459, while Scotland only totalled to 3, 495,214, or fifteen per cent of 
its southern neighbours’ populace.  That year there were 201,212 marriages registered in 
England, and 25,921 in Scotland,
62
 or one in 119 people married in England compared to 
one in 135 people in Scotland.
63
  Once the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 passed and 
divorce became available to the general public of England, the low rates of private 
divorces and judicial separations were dwarfed by the new divorce figures reported by the 
Registrar General.
64
  England witnessed significantly higher rates of divorces than 
Scotland (see Graph 2.4).  Looking again at 1875, the number of marriage dissolutions 
recorded in England was 304, compared to 33 divorce and nullity decrees in Scotland; 
therefore, in England there was one divorce for every 662 marriages, and one divorce for 
every 785 marriages in Scotland.
65
  The larger population in England, and subsequently 
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larger married population, caused the number of decrees of dissolution to start off higher 
than the Scottish figure in 1858 and continued to rise at a higher rate.  Hence, when 
compared side by side, Scotland’s divorce figures no longer appear to have been increasing 






























Graph 2.3 Divorce and Nullity Decrees in Scotland, 
1855 to 1889
 
Source: Mitchell used the Annual Reports of the Registrar General for Scotland; Mitchell, British 






















Graph 2.4 Divorce and Nullity Decrees, Scotland, and 
Decrees of Dissolution, England and Wales, 1855-1889 
Scotland England & Wales
 
Source: Mitchell used ‘England and Wales Decrees for Dissolution, 1858-1909—Appendix III to 
Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce (S.P. 1912/13 xx); other figures for England & 
Wales—Registrar General’s Statistical Review of England & Wales and its successors’ and Annual 




While the low rates arguably reflect problems with accessibility, as mentioned earlier, the 
legislative reforms of the nineteenth century, discussed in Chapter One, also impacted the 
divorce and separation rates in Scotland.  As a result, changes in trends are visible in 
Graphs 2.3 and 2.4.  For example, in Graph 2.3 there is a decrease after 1861, followed by 
a steady incline through the 1870s and 1880s, suggesting influence from the changes in 
law.  1861 was the year the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Act passed, which granted spouses 
an easier process for divorce suits for both desertion and adultery.
66
  In the CS sample, 
thirteen pursuers in divorce cases cited the 1861 Act.  Three of the thirteen were actions for 
adultery (all from 1870); the remaining ten were on the ground of desertion (two from 
1870 and eight from 1880).   
One of the most significant increases in Graph 2.3 between 1877 and 1878 corresponds to 
the passing of the first Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act 1877.  Moreover, even 
with fluctuation in the number of divorce and nullity decrees after 1877, there is a rate of 
growth that continued into the 1890s.  The Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Act and the Married 
Women’s Property (Scotland) Act (and its later amendments) are cited as having the most 
evident effect in rising divorce rates, particularly for women—nine of the thirteen actions 
citing the Conjugal Rights Act were instigated by the wife.
67
 Contemporaries also 
highlighted the 1874 Evidence Law Amendment (Scotland) Act as a direct factor in the 
increasing divorce figures, as the Act allowed parties to testify as witnesses in their own 
action.
68
   
This thesis found that law reform of married women’s rights, including these Acts, did lead 
to better accessibility for women in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Once more 
wives could file for divorce, then the rates would naturally increase as a new portion of the 
married population finally had the opportunity and, for some, the means.
69
  It is important, 
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however, to distinguish between the campaigns of the women’s rights movement and 
increasing divorce rates.   
At the turn of the century (and after), conservative parties blamed the feminist movement 
(along with other groups considered radical) for the seemingly rising divorce rates.
70
  Later 
studies by historians, such as Roderick Phillips and Elaine Tyler May, point out that it was 
incorrect and oversimplified to label divorce reform as a central issue for feminists, as it 
was a topic of tension and disagreement for many involved in the women’s rights 
movement.
71
  Mainstream feminists primarily campaigned for women’s suffrage, not to 
liberalise the divorce law.
72
  They promoted marriage and the maintenance of traditional 
family norms;
73
  this is clear from their efforts to better the marriage contract.
74
  Scholars 
have shown instead, that the impact of the feminist movement was more indirectly 
responsible for increasing divorce rates.
 75
 
Thus, the more accurate impact of the feminist movement was law reform of married 
women’s rights, or as Gibson wrote: ‘It has been…social transformations that have helped 
create the patterns and numbers of divorce rather than reform of divorce grounds.’76  
Moreover, this indirect impact of the women’s rights movement became most visible after 
this period of study, as divorce rates did not increase substantially until after World War 
One.  In 1919 the Registrar General recorded 829 divorces, a jump from 250 in 1913.
77
 
Analysis of the Result of Actions: Successful, Dismissed or Never Tried  
The figures recorded in Graphs 2.3 and 2.4 are the number of divorce and nullity decrees 
successfully awarded by the CS; these figures, however, exclude the full number of actions 
filed with the CS that were either dismissed or never tried in court.
78
  The 1890 Divorces 
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(Scotland) report listed a return of divorce and judicial separation suits disclosing how 
many were instituted, successful, dismissed or never heard, as well as how many were filed 
at the instance of the husband or the wife.  As with earlier Parliamentary papers on divorce 
and separation figures, the numbers from the 1890 report do not correspond precisely with 
the numbers Mitchell found from the Registrar General’s annual reports.  Nevertheless, 
this report provides valuable data for determining more specific trends relating to divorce 
and separation in the second half of nineteenth-century Scotland.  For instance, when the 
1890 data of divorce suits are charted alongside the number of judicial separations filed 
from 1857 to 1888, it is evident that there was a higher rate of divorce actions than 
separation.  This difference grew considerably towards the end of the 1800s as the number 
of separations began to decrease (see Graph 2.5), perhaps because divorces became more 

















Graph 2.5 Return of No. of Suits Instituted for Judicial 
Separation and Divorce, Scotland, 1857-1888
Judicial Separation Divorce
Source: PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  Return of the number of suits instituted year by year 
in Scotland. 
 
Actions for divorce also increased at a much faster rate than those for separation.  This 
graph shows that there were very few separation suits between the 1857 and 1888 with an 
average of 17 cases per year.  This figure illustrates that the trend of separation cases had 
changed little since Leneman’s period.  She highlights that, ‘the first separation case did 
77 
 
not appear until 1714, and the total number by 1830 was only 175.’79  Furthermore, 83 
cases were tried unsuccessfully, and ‘of the 92 successful cases 64 (69 per cent) were 
contested.’80  As discussed under accessibility, the benefits of fully dissolving a marriage 
greatly outweighed a legal separation, for both the husband and the wife.  A separation 
upheld the marital bond though allowing the couple to live separately for as long as they 
chose.  This separation of bed and board stipulated that the husband provide aliment to his 
wife.  Still, it was not possible for the courts to enforce this payment, which left wives 
vulnerable to uncooperative husbands.  Thus, a husband or wife would have more reasons 
to contest a suit for separation than a suit of divorce.
81
  Moreover, as the majority of 
separation suits were filed on the ground of cruelty and maltreatment, it was likely that 
some wives dropped the charges from fear of their husbands’ retaliation.82  Chart 2.3 
illustrates this point as it shows a high average of cases never heard in court compared to 
the number instituted.   
The 1890 Divorces (Scotland) report provides another opportunity to examine the 
discrepancies between actions filed and decrees awarded.  When charted the data show two 
very distinct patterns for divorce and judicial separation: Charts 2.2 and 2.3 compare the 
averages of suits instituted, successful, dismissed or never heard in court over four year 
periods between 1857 to 1888.  Chart 2.2 illustrates that the majority of divorce suits 
brought to the CS were successful.  It also shows that more actions of divorce were never 
heard than dismissed; although the number of divorce cases instigated steadily increased, 
the number of successful, dismissed and cases never heard remained relatively constant in 
proportion suggesting a steady trend.  Chart 2.3 showing judicial separations, suggests less 
consistency over the thirty year period.  One of the most apparent differences is the low 
average of successful suits compared to the number filed.  It also suggests that on average 
more cases were never heard in court, until 1885-88.  The average number of successful 
separations was 7.5, while the average number of cases never heard was 9.  Moreover, 
more judicial separation suits over this time period were dismissed than divorce suits.     
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Chart 2.2 Averages of Divorce Suits, Scotland, 1857-
1888
Instituted Successful Dismissed Never Came to Hearing












Chart 2.3 Averages of Judicial Separation Suits, 
Scotland, 1857-1888
Instituted Successful Dismissed Never Came to Hearing
 





Gender Breakdown Analysis of Data 
Trends also differed as a result of the legal inequalities between the sexes.  Scots law had 
always permitted equal opportunity for a husband or a wife to divorce or separate.  
However, the type of action (divorce or judicial separation) and charge filed (adultery, 
desertion or cruelty) show a division when broken down by gender.
83
  The first pattern to 
note is that in the first half of the century husbands were more likely to file for divorce.
84
  
This pattern is identifiable in the ten year period from 1846/47 to 1856/57 where, 
according to the 1857 Divorce (Scotland) report, there were 174 decrees of divorce in 
Scotland.  Of the 174 actions, 99 were instigated by the husband against the wife, and 75 
were instigated by the wife against the husband (the specific causes were not stated).
85 
 
This can be simplified to a ratio of 33:25 (husband: wife).  This also shows that, although 
more pursuers were likely to be husbands, there was not a large discrepancy in the number 
of female pursuers, suggesting that accessibility was not as impaired for wives as thought.  
Data from the 1890 Divorces (Scotland) report provide the number of husbands and wives 
who filed a suit for a divorce or judicial separation between 1857 and 1888.  Looking first 
at divorce suits, it is apparent that, again, while more husbands filed for divorce, the 
number of wives remained proportionate.  Graph 2.6 illustrates the small gap between the 
number of actions of divorce filed by a wife and by a husband.  For most of the period the 
figures are close, though the number of suits sought by wives shows more of a steady 
increase than those sought by husbands.  However, from 1883 there is a reversal where the 
number of husbands filing for divorce decreased as the number of wives increased at a 
mirrored rate: 1883 and 1887 are nearly equivalent figures (47 husbands to 43 wives, and 
53 to 55, respectively).       
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Graph 2.6 Suits of Divorce at the Instance of the Husbands 
and Wives, Scotland, 1857-1888
Husbands Wives
Source: PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  Return of the number of suits instituted year by year 
in Scotland. 
 
These findings correspond to Leneman’s analysis of the early modern period; her gender 
breakdown revealed ‘the sexes to be fairly evenly matched.’86  Where specific grounds for 
the divorce are unavailable in the above data, Leneman’s evidence shows that this finding 
was true for adultery charges, yet desertion divorce suits show a higher percentage of 
wives than husbands instigating the action.  As adultery cases made up almost 90 per cent 
of the total number of divorce suits, this skewed the gender breakdown to show that more 
men filed for divorce than women.
87
  The data collected from the CS records confirms this 
disparity between charges, and will be discussed in the next section.  In the 1880s there 
was evidence of an increase in divorces sought by wives against husbands, further 
supporting the argument that the progressive legislations in Scotland from the 1860s, 70s 
and 80s brought wives greater access to legal remedies for failed marriages.    
Gender breakdown of judicial separation cases reveals a different trend according to the 
data from 1890.  As shown below in Graph 2.7, a suit for separation was almost entirely 
brought at the instance of the wife from the period 1857 to 1888.  The number of suits for 
separation filed by a husband remained consistently lower than 5 cases per year, while 
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separation suits instigated by wives continued to increase, though unsteadily, until the late 




















































































































































Graph 2.7 Suits of Judicial Separation at the Instance of 
the Husbands and Wives, Scotland, 1857-1888
Husbands Wives
Source: PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  Return of the number of suits instituted year by year 
in Scotland. 
 
Despite the lack of complete data for the 1830 to 1880 divorce and separation figures, 
where information is available, it is evident that these rates were low throughout the 
nineteenth century.  A trend of gradual increase is also evident, yet it was not until after 
1880 that numbers began rising at greater rates.  To further trace patterns of divorce and 
separation the following section will analyse findings from a sampling of the CS minutes 
books.  
 
Trends and Patterns in the Court of Session Records  
While complete data is not available for matrimonial suits in the nineteenth century, there 
are CS minute books of the extracted decrees.  Extracted decrees were decrees ‘written out 
82 
 
and bound into the volume’ for 16s. or 17s. after 1824.88  They were not required to prove 
the final judgment, and therefore, as they added an extra expense, they are only a portion 
of the decrees awarded by the CS.  In the following section, data collected from the CS 
records for the years 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880 are analysed and compared 




The six years listed above serve as benchmark years for this study, allowing further 
divorce and separation trends to surface.  From those six years, a total of 254 extracted 
decrees of divorce, separation, adherence, aliment and dismissal were collected.
90
  The 254 
decrees found in the minute books listed the parties involved, addresses of residence and 
occupations (when available).  These records created the database that was the basis for 
this section on trends and patterns.  As illustrated in the first section, the general rates of 
divorce and judicial separation over the sixty year period represented a low percentage of 
the population, until the 1870s when the number of suits began to increase at a slow rate 
through the turn of the century.  Overall, the cases found in the CS minute books 
complement the trends found through Parliamentary papers and census reports.   
1830 proved to be a year of few matrimonial decrees in the CS; the only cases found were 
three decrees of aliment and an action of separation and aliment (four in total).
91
  This 
issue mirrored the findings from the Consistorial Court records from 1837 (see Chart 2.4).  
Though no divorces were found in the 1830 General Minute-Books, it is likely that there 
were some divorce actions.  They were perhaps unlisted because couples were either 
continuing to appeal to local Commissary Courts while the newly reformed CS was 
establishing itself, or did not pay to have their cases extracted.  One case of divorce for 
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desertion from 1831, tried in 1830, was found and used as a case study and therefore 
included in the total benchmark data set.   
 
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880
Dismissed 0 2 3 1 1 1
Aliment 3 2 0 1 2 1
Adherence 0 3 1 2 0 0
Separation 1 0 3 3 6 15


















Chart 2.4 Court of Session Decrees, Benchmark 
Years, 1830-1880




Ten years later in 1840 the number of divorce decrees found had risen to twenty cases, the 
same average number reported in the 1852 return.
93
  In total there were 27 decrees found in 
the CS records: 20 for divorce, three decrees for adherence, two aliment, and two 
dismissed cases (one for divorce, and one for separation and aliment).  There were no 
decrees for judicial separation.
94
  
From the Parliamentary papers and census reports cited in the first section there were no 
matrimonial case figures available for 1850.  The CS minute-books, however, revealed 
some of the lost activity of this year.  From 1840 to 1850, there was a slight increase in the 
number of divorce cases, as well as a few separation cases.  A total of 32 matrimonial suits 
were found: 25 were for divorce, three for judicial separation, one for adherence and three 
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  Though there are no figures for a comparative analysis, the number of 
cases found in the minute-books supports the overall low rates.
96
 
1860 proved to be a year of few actions for divorce and separation.  In the minute books 
covering all CS cases from November 1860 to November 1861 there were fewer cases 
listed than previous years.  In total only 28 matrimonial decrees were collected.  The 1890 
Divorces (Scotland) report lists six suits for separation instituted, all by the wife.  Of the 
six only two were successful, with four never being heard in court.  The CS books record 
two successful suits for separation and one dismissed.
97
  Even with the slight 
discrepancies, these figures are consistent with the decline in divorce and separation rates 
in the early 1860s shown in Graph 2.3 and Charts 2.2 and 2.3.
 98
 
Congruent with the overall trend of the 1870s and the 1880s, the CS minute-books also 
reflect the beginning of the increase in divorce and separation rates even though the 
numbers found are not as high (see Graph 2.3 and Charts 2.2 and 2.3).  The total number of 
decrees found in 1870 was 55: 46 divorces, six separations, two aliment and one dismissed 
case.  The findings for 1880 were greater, totaling 107 decrees: 90 for divorce, 15 for 
separation, one for aliment, and one dismissed.  What is most evident is the increase in 
decrees for divorce: rising from 21 decrees in 1860, to 46 in 1870, and 90 in 1880.  These 
numbers show a compound annual growth rate of 7.5 per cent (see Chart 2.4).
 99
   
Though the numbers reported from the CS minute-books are lower than the figures 
represented in the first section of this chapter, the overall trend has not changed.  It is clear 
from both sources that the trend of divorce and separation in nineteenth-century Scotland 
was consistently low, even though a higher rate is evident after 1870.  It is also notable that 
from 1830 to 1880 the number of decrees for adherence and aliment remained almost 
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nonexistent, fluctuating between zero to three.
100
  The decline in actions for adherence is 
explained by the change in legislation; the 1861 Conjugal Rights Act negated the need to 
file a suit for adherence.  The low number of aliment cases cannot be as easily explained as 
there are no comparable statistics for the nineteenth century.   
Gender Breakdown in Court of Session Cases 
The CS general minute-books can also be used to determine changes in the gender division 
of charges for matrimonial suits.  In these records it is immediately noticeable that all 
aliment, adherence, and separation decrees granted were brought at the instigation of the 
wife against the husband.
101
  Conversely, in the decrees for divorce, the majority of cases 
were brought at the instance of the husband against the wife; still the difference was not 
substantial.  Out of the 202 decrees for divorce found over the six years, 114 were 
instigated by the husband and 88 by the wife (see Table 2.5).  This suggests that despite 
fewer resources for wives, there was still some accessibility to legal remedies.  As 1900 
approached it is also evident that the number of wives filing an action was rising.  This 
same trend was shown in Graphs 2.6 and 2.7. 
Though it is evident that more husbands filed for divorce than wives, and more wives filed 
for judicial separation than husbands, this can be deconstructed further to show patterns in 
the grounds for the action.  As this study works with a small sample, it would be inaccurate 
to presume these represent the bigger picture.  However, an analysis of this sample 
presents some relevant patterns.  Most noticeably, more husbands filed for divorce, yet the 
majority of male pursuers charged adultery: 70 cases compared to 16 desertion divorces.  
Divorces filed on the ground of desertion were primarily filed by the wife (31 versus 16 
husbands).  Of the female pursuers there was less discrepancy between charges: 33 filed a 
suit of divorce on the ground of adultery, 31 for desertion, and 24 unknown.  Although 
judicial separation was available on the ground of cruelty or adultery for either spouse, this 
study only found charges of cruelty.  There were, however, fifteen separation cases where 
the ground was unlisted.  A suit of adherence charged the defender with desertion, which 
more female pursuers filed for.  An action for aliment could be claimed on any ground 
where the defender had ceased to financially support the pursuer, but again, only women 
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 An action of adherence was filed against a deserting spouse to order their return to the conjugal home, or 
to provide an aliment to the pursuer.  An action of aliment requested a yearly payment from the defender in 
order to support the pursuer and their children if applicable. 
101
 Except in the instance of the 1840 case on the ground of adherence filed by the husband against his wife; 
CS46/1840/2/17 Gray v White or Gray. 
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were found as complainants.  Finally, there were only eight dismissed cases found, but 
most were actions of divorce, and the majority was filed by the wife (See Table 2.6).   
 
Table 2.5 Court of Session Decrees, Benchmark Years, 1830-1880 
Year Divorce Separation Aliment¹ Adherence¹ Dismissed Total 
 Husband Wife Husband Wife   Husband Wife  
1830 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 4 
1840 11 9 0 0 2 3² 1 1 27 
1850 16 9 0 3 0 1 1 2³ 32 
1860 13 8 0 3 1 2 1 0 28 
1870 22 24 0 6 2 0 0 1 55 
1880 52 38 0 15 1 0 0 1 107 
Total 114 88 0 28 9 6 3 5 253 
1 
All aliment and adherence cases were at the instance of the wife against the husband, and 
therefore left unlabeled on the table.  
2 
One Pursuer in an 1840 Adherence case was male; see footnote 84.  
3
 One case was assoilized in favour of the husband rather than dismissed.  
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Table 2.6 Gender Comparison by Decree and Cause, Court of Session, 
Benchmark years, 1830-1880 








































































M 70 16 28 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 118 
F 33 31 24 13 0 15 5 1 1 7 3 2 135 
Total for 
Cause 103 47 52 13 0 15 6 1 1 7 6 2 253 
Total for 
Decree 202 28 6 9 8 253 






To conclude, this analyses of divorce and separation records in Scotland reveals that 
although there was a general trend of increase after the 1870s, the statistics prove that the 
incidence of legalised divorce and separation was insignificant and, contrary to the 
pronouncements of some judges and politicians, did not signal the breakdown of the 
Scottish family.  As the population was growing, marriage rates did not show any drastic 
changes and were even seen to decline at some points, possibly contributing to the fear of 
rising divorce figures.  Though marriage rates were low in comparison to the population 
rates, divorce and judicial separation rates were not greatly increasing, and were 
disproportionate to the marrying population.  The reason for concern, therefore, appears to 
have been apprehension over the ease of accessibility for working-class families and for 
wives.   
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As this chapter has shown, the majority of litigants were from the working class.  Yet, on 
closer examination, many were skilled labourers or small business owners who would have 
constituted the upper-working class rather than the poorer population.  Moreover, many 
working-class families would have struggled to afford the overall costs of a legal petition, 
as well as the transportation to the CS in Edinburgh.  Thus, although the listed occupations 
suggest working-class couples filed the most suits, the number of actions remained 
diminutive.   
The low divorce and separation rates can also be explained by the gender inequality within 
marriage law.  Before the reform of married women’s rights in the second half of the 
century, more husbands filed for divorce than wives.  This was due to the marriage 
contract cancelling out the egalitarian rules of Scots divorce law.  After the improved 
legislations were passed the number of divorces began to increase, which corresponds to 
wives gaining independent finances, custody of their children, and changes to the evidence 
laws.  The quantitative evidence discussed above shows that the number of divorce and 
separation suits increased as wives gained better access.  
This chapter has illustrated the general patterns and trends of divorce and judicial 
separation in the sixty year period from 1830 to 1890.  Although the figures are official, 
they are far from absolute.  In reality there is a dark, unofficial picture of marital 
breakdown that remains elusive.  Central for this study is the fact that divorce and 
separation did exist in the nineteenth century of which a small portion of the Scottish 
married population used as legal intervention.  The remainder of this thesis will investigate 
the most common grounds for divorce and separation found in the CS: adultery, desertion 
and maltreatment.  For each ground, case studies from the benchmark years will be used to 
further analyse the history of marital breakdown in Scotland.  
 
Chapter Three: Divorce and Adultery 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the event of adultery as the most common grounds for a Scots 
divorce in the nineteenth century, through a study of the Court of Session (CS) cases.  
First, the chapter discusses the era’s expectations on sexuality and the related discourses.  
Then it considers the patterns that the cases on adultery suggest, including common 
adultery scenarios, gendered choices of paramour, and excuses for infidelity.  Reviewing 
the individual experiences extracted from the legal records provides an opportunity for 
insights into the failure of marriages and broader themes of Scotland’s social history of the 
nineteenth century.  Overall, this analysis of adultery divorce trials also links back to the 
theme of accessibility from Chapters One and Two, to determine how present the double 
standard was in Scotland and if it had an influence on the rates of divorce for adultery, or 
whether marriage law and marital expectations had a greater impact.  It argues that social 
factors, particularly the double standard, further contributed to the low divorce rates. 
Adultery was the most common ground for divorce, likely because it was relatively easier 
to prove (as it, at least, always involved a third person) and a more straightforward legal 
process.
1
  Unfortunately, complete figures are not available for the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  Graph 2.5 (in Chapter Two) of unspecified divorce cases (grounds 
unlisted), shows that more husbands than wives filed suits from 1857 to the 1880s.
 2
  
Although it is also obvious that the number of female pursuers was comparable, this was 
likely due to the fact that these cases included adultery and desertion divorces, and 
desertion was a charge filed more often by wives.  In the second half of the 1880s the 
number of wives filing for divorce surpassed the number of husbands.
3
   
The main source for this study is CS extracted divorce cases filed on the ground of adultery 
from the period 1830 to 1880.  A total of 254 extracted divorce and separation decrees 
were found from the benchmark years of the study.  103 of the 254 decrees were suits of 
divorce on the ground of adultery.  Out of the 254 decrees, 128 cases were collected for 
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 To prove adultery the pursuer only needed one witness for each alleged extramarital sexual act, and one 
proven act was enough to qualify for a divorce; Patrick Fraser, The Treatise on Husband and Wife according 
to the Law of Scotland, Vol. 2, (Edinburgh, 1876), pp. 1160-1161.  
2 
PP 1890 (162) Divorces (Scotland).  Return of the number of suits instituted year by year in Scotland. 
3
 This emerging trend corresponds to the passing of the 1881 Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act;  




qualitative analysis.  From the 128 cases, a sample of 65 adultery cases was used for 
analysis and discussion in this chapter.
4
  As the year 1830 did not have any adultery cases 
available, this sample only contains cases from the years 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870 and 1880 
(see Table 3.1). 








































1830 5 0 - - - - - 
1840 27 12 9 3 9 7 2 
1850 32 14 10 4 9 7 2 
1860 28 15 11 4 15 11 4 
1870 55 21 13 8 18 11 7 
1880 107 41 27 14 14 13 1 
Total 254 103 70 33 65 49 16 
 
Based on the low number of female pursuers from the CS sample it seems that there was a 
disconnect between the judiciary and government’s expectations of marriage and chastity 
and that of society’s.5  From the larger sample collected 70 decrees, or 68 per cent, were 
filed by male pursuers, and 33, or 32 per cent, female.  In the smaller CS sample study, 16 
of the 65 adultery divorce cases were instigated by wives.  Of those 16, eight also cited a 
secondary charge of maltreatment, and two claimed their husbands had deserted them and 
committed bigamy.    
Due to data limitations and social influences, it is fair to assume that adultery occurred 
more often than reflected in the sample collected.  No figures show the true number of 
spouses who had an extramarital affair.  Additionally, adultery did not necessarily lead to 
marital breakdown.  Studies of marriage and marital breakdown suggest that families 
                                                          
4
  The cases used for this sample were chosen based on the wealth of information available, such as the 
defender’s answers and pleas, the pursuer’s (and sometimes defender’s) proof, or other material evidence.  
Extracted decrees only required the summons and interlocutor sheet documents to prove the action took 
place.  Therefore, some of the records, especially from 1880, only had these two documents, and were 
excluded from the case studies.  
5 
An extra-marital affair threatened the carefully constructed norm of monogamous and conjugal sexuality;
 
Leonore Davidoff, Megan Doolittle, Janet Fink and Katherine Holden, The Family Story: Blood, Contract 
and Intimacy, 1830-1960, (London, 1999), p. 247.  
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covered up scandals such as infidelity to avoid shame.
 6
  Even when separation or divorce 
was an option, spouses sometimes decided to keep the affair a secret rather than publicise 
their marital problems.  Wives especially are thought to have not uncommonly chosen to 
overlook a husband’s adultery as long as he continued to provide for her and her family.7  
Considering the vulnerable position of a married woman—who was legally bound to her 
husband—it was sometimes a greater risk to file for divorce or separation than a benefit.8  
Husbands, on the other hand, were in a more advantageous position if they decided to file 
for divorce as they were legally entitled to custody of the children and to keep their wealth 
or earnings if the wife was found guilty.  Moreover, to stay married to an adulterous wife 
meant the risk of an illegitimate child gaining the legal protections of the marriage was 
much higher.  The law presumed a woman’s child to be her husband’s and thus entitled to 
part of the family inheritance as well as basic protection and provision, unless the child 
was proven to be illegitimate.
9
 
Thus, before the 1860s in Scotland, although the law stipulated egalitarian grounds for 
adultery, the rest of the marriage law did not provide sufficient support for a married 
woman to get a divorce (except the ability to remarry).  With the divorce a wife would 
receive a terce as if her husband was dead (this amount was dependent on his wealth),
10
 but 
she would not be entitled to monetary support besides having her legal fees covered, or a 
right to custody of her children.  Legislation reform in the second half of the 1800s 
bettered the rights of wives, but in waves. Specifically, the Conjugal Rights Act of 1861, 
allowed a wife to request custody of her children during a divorce or separation trial, as 
well as protect her earnings from her husband if he deserted her.  The Married Women’s 
Property (Scotland) Acts of 1878 and 1881 gave full protection of a wife’s wages and her 
property from her husband by abolishing jus mariti.
 11
  Notably, however, this greater 
protection for women’s rights did not immediately lead to a clear increase in wife-initiated 
                                                          
6
 Ibid, pp. 245-246.  
7
 Joanne Bailey, Unquiet Lives: Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England, 1660-1800, (Cambridge, 
2003), pp. 144-145; Colin S. Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, (London, 1994), pp. 76-77.   
8
 Schultz’s argument supports this idea, finding that, ‘the court records indicate that economic independence 
was not an important factor in encouraging divorce’; instead wives were more likely to file for divorce in 
order to protect their children and themselves when their husbands had already abandoned them; Martin 
Schultz, ‘Divorce Patterns in Nineteenth-Century New England’, Journal of Family History, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(1990), pp. 105-115, p. 109. 
9 
Frederick Parker Walton, A Handbook of Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 
1893), p. 73; Eric M. Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, Second Edition, (Edinburgh, 1982), 
p. 564; David M. Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, Volume VI; The Nineteenth Century, (Edinburgh, 
2001), pp. 670-676.  
10 
Walton, A Handbook, pp. 199-200. 
11 The Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Acts of 1877 and 1881 were significant as they granted married 
women protection of their wages and property from their husbands in the event of a problematic marriage, 
and subsequently a chance to be monetarily independent and stable after a divorce. 
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divorce proceedings on grounds of adultery or otherwise.  Thus, this chapter argues that 
outside factors, such as the double standard, contributed to the low number of wives 
divorcing their husbands on the ground of adultery.  Husbands, in turn, were more likely to 
divorce an adulterous wife, as legislation, financial arrangements, and societal expectations 
made it beneficial for them to do so.    
 
Marital Expectations, the Double Standard and Competing Discourses of Sexuality  
According to Scots divorce law, extramarital sex was the definitive grounds for dissolving 
a marriage.  Historians think that this resulted from the belief that conjugality was the 
foundation of social morality and stability.
12
  Ideas of morality and immorality revolved 
around sex.  Before marriage, chastity was encouraged and sex outside of marriage, or 
fornication, was deemed immoral.  Within marriage, however, sex was acceptable (and 
expected) as it was then an act of intimacy between a husband and wife that resulted in the 
procreation of a family.
13
    
Although the perception of sexuality within nineteenth-century society is tied to the notion 
of the Victorian era being an age of restraint, piety, and morality, the reality of sexuality 
and sexual behaviour of the day to day person was much more complex.
14
  The importance 
of upholding an image meant that sex was a taboo subject amongst the respectable classes, 
resulting in little documented public discourse.
15
  What historians have found instead are 
competing discourses from authoritative and political groups.  Official ideas of acceptable 
or unacceptable sexual behaviour were created by legal, religious and medical discourses.  
These were then met, in the second half of the nineteenth century, with reformed and 
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 Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, p. 58; Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western 
Society, (Cambridge, 1988), p. xi.  
13
 This was also evident through other aspects of marriage law.  For instance, impotence qualified as a ground 
for nullification of a marriage, while at the other end of the spectrum, according to Hume, a husband could 
not be guilty of raping his wife unless he helped another person commit the rape; Frederick Parker Walton, A 
Handbook of Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1893), pp. 2-7, 283; Joan 
Perkin, Women and Marriage in Nineteenth-Century England, (London, 1989), p. 236. 
14
 Jeffrey Weeks, Sex Politics and Society: The regulations of sexuality since 1800, (London, 1981), p. 19.  
For a discussion of alternative and hidden sexuality in history, see Anna Clark, ‘Twilight Moments’, Journal 
of the History of Sexuality, Vol. 14, No. 1/2, Special Issue: Studying the History of Sexuality: Theory, 
Methods, Praxis (Jan. – Apr., 2005), pp. 139-160.  
15
 Davidoff et al, The Family Story, p. 127; Clark, ‘Twilight Moments’, p. 152.  
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sometimes radical reinterpretations.  Amongst these competing discourses, however, 
marriage remained the archetype for acceptable sexual activity.
16
  
The confining of sexual activity within marriage is visible in the terminology used to 
describe it.  Legally marriage unites a man and woman ‘as husband and wife’.  
Furthermore, when the couple was pregnant it was referred to as being ‘in the family way’, 
or having children was living ‘in family’.  In actions of divorce for adultery these phrases 
served as euphemisms for sex; a standard summons stated that in consequence of their 
marriage the pursuer and defender had ‘openly cohabited together as husband and wife, 
owned and acknowledged each other as husband and wife were holden and reputed as 
married persons.’17  Thus, when the defender had committed adultery, particularly if 
cohabitating with the paramour at the time of the action, he or she was described as 
forming that same bond with the paramour; for instance, Jane Scott was accused of ‘living 
openly with [the co-defender] as his wife’,18 and Margaret McAllister or Mitchell ‘openly 
cohabited with the said James Orr, and lived with him at bed and board, the same as if she 
had been his lawfully married wife.’19  
One of the mainstream discourses that complicates ideas of appropriate sexual behaviour is 
the notion of the double standard.  According to Keith Thomas, the double standard, ‘is the 
view that unchastity, in the sense of sexual relations before marriage or outside marriage, is 
for a man, if an offense, none the less a mild and pardonable one but for a woman a matter 
of the utmost gravity.’20  Although not mentioned in this definition, the double standard 
also existed within marriage.  The most obvious example of this can be seen in English 
divorce law.  Unlike Scots law, English common law easily lent itself to examples of the 
double standard enshrined in legislation, particularly the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 
and the Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s.
21
  While most scholars of English divorce 
law agree the double standard was a dominant feature of the civil law, there tends to be a 
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 Lynn Abrams, ‘Whores, Whore-Chasers, and Swine: The Regulation of Sexuality and the Restoration of 
Order in the Nineteenth Century German Divorce Court’, Journal of Family History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 
1996), p. 268.  
17
 CS46/1870/12/3 McQueen or Morrison v McQueen.  
18
 CS46/1860/7/36 Caldwell v Scott or Caldwell.  
19
 CS46/1840/3/161 Mitchell v His Wife [McAllister or Mitchell].  
20
 Keith Thomas, ‘The Double Standard,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April, 1959), pp. 
195-216, p. 195.  
21
 Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, pp. 76-77; Ann Sumner Holmes, ‘The Double Standard in English Divorce 
Laws, 1857-1923,’ Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 601-620; Ursula Vogel, ‘Whose 
Property?: The double standard of adultery in nineteenth-century law’, in Carol Smart (ed.), Regulating 
Womanhood: historical essays on marriage, motherhood and sexuality, (London, 1992), pp.146-165.  Joanne 
Bailey’s discussion of adultery questions the influence of the double standard as asserted by historians by 
examining the stereotypes associated with this discourse; Joanne Bailey, Unquiet Lives: Marriage and 
Marriage Breakdown in England, 1660-1800, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 140-167.  
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debate over the extent that it existed in society and practice.  Colin Gibson and Laura 
Gowing argue the double standard had a significant impact on societal expectations as the 
law defined acceptable marital behaviour differently for husbands and wives.
22
  Rosemary 
O’Day and Joanne Bailey, on the other hand, propose that the double standard did not 
impact practice as rigidly as supposed, as evidence of a single standard was found in each 
of their studies.
23
  Indeed, Christianity promoted a single standard, and labelled infidelity 
as a sin for both the husband and the wife.
24
   
But how present was the double standard in Scotland, and did it exist to the same degree?
25
  
This study found that the double standard did indeed exist within the social, cultural and 
legal discourses of nineteenth-century Scotland, despite its absence within divorce law. 
Unlike other jurisdictions, the Scottish legal system viewed infidelity as equally 
unacceptable for husband or wife.  This alienation of affections was eligible for a full 
dissolution of the marriage through divorce, or a separation of bed and board.  In other 
jurisdictions where the divorce law was not as liberal, adultery was usually the first, and 
sometimes only, ground for divorce; Connecticut, for instance, allowed divorce for 
adultery (and desertion for three years) since 1667, while Washington D.C. and New York 
in the nineteenth century only allowed divorce on the ground of adultery.
26
  Germany 
followed the French civil code from 1814 to 1900 that allowed divorce on four grounds 
including infidelity, but ‘was notorious for its unequal stance on adultery.’27   
Scotland’s single standard rule for adultery was not without opposition.  MPs in particular 
struggled with this legal laxity, as discussed in Chapter Two under issues of accessibility.  
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 Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock, pp. 58-59, 63, 76-77; Laura Gowing, Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and 
Sex in Early Modern London, (Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011), [accessed 02 December 13], pp. 
3-4, 180, 194.  
23
 Rosemary O’Day, The Family and Relationships, 1500-1900: England, France and the United States of 
America, (Hampshire, 1994), p. 157; Bailey, Unquiet Lives, pp. 140-145. 
24
 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, p. 143.  
25
 The fact that the Contagious Diseases Acts were not passed in Scotland can be misleading in regards to the 
discourse on prostitution in Scotland.  Mahood and Littlewood argue that it was not a lack of concern for 
prostitution or fallen women that kept the Contagious Diseases Acts out of Scotland, rather it was the 
Scottish preference for localised authorities’ regulations instead of policies from their southern neighbours.  
Glasgow in particular formed their own system of institutional reform for these women, referred to as the 
Glasgow system: police arrests, Lock Hospital and the Magdalene Institution. It was in this system of 
regulating women’s behaviour through the use of gendered institutions that the double standard existed in 
Glasgow.  Again women were the target of punishment and reform rather than the male clients who used 
them; Barbara Littlewood and Linda Mahood, ‘Prostitutes, Magdalenes and Wayward Girls: Dangerous 
Sexualities of Working Class Women in Victorian Scotland,’ Gender & History, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Summer 
1991), pp. 160-164. 
26
 Schultz, ‘Divorce Patterns in Nineteenth-Century New England’, pp. 101-115, p. 104; Elaine Tyler May, 
Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-Victorian America, (Chicago, 1980), p. 4.    
27
 Lynn Abrams, ‘Whores, Whore-Chasers, and Swine’, pp. 268-269. For a full discussion of the French civil 
code as well as English divorce law, see Vogel, ‘Whose Property?’, pp.147-165.  
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For instance, it was a point of interest in the 1853 Commissioners report to the Queen on 
divorce law.  This was evident through series of questions put to the Lord Advocate of 
Scotland by the Select Committee, such as:  
 
138. Has any inconvenience been found to result from giving the wife an 
equal remedy with the husband in obtaining a Divorce à vinculo?—I am 
not aware of any inconvenience. 
139.  Can you state what proportion of instances there are of Divorces à 
vinculo, at the suit of the wife?—No, I cannot state the proportion. 
140. Are they frequent?—I would say they are about as numerous as the 
others.  I am merely guessing.  Those that have been most litigated on the 




Despite the Lord Advocate’s dismissal of the suggestion that allowing wives to divorce 
was an ‘inconvenience’, the Committee recommended restricted access for English wives.  
In fact, English MPs were never persuaded to enforce a single standard until 1923.
29
  The 
pivotal 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act captured the essence of the double standard in 
English legislation by limiting simple adultery as a charge only available to husbands 
against their wives, whereas the wife had to prove adultery plus an aggravation such as 




Statutes other than the divorce law impacted on married people’s rights in Scotland and 
reflect this double standard.  The most relevant example to this discussion of adultery is the 
entitlement of a husband to claim damages.  The civil action of damages in general could 
be instigated by any person, male or female, to seek pecuniary compensation for a loss or 
personal injuries caused by the defender.
31
  This could, and often was, applied by a 
husband against a man for the seduction of his wife.  The summons for this charge read as 
follows: ‘the defender wrongfully alienated the affections of the said --- ---- from the 
pursuer, and wrongfully seduced her from her marriage vows and engagements’.32  This 
action could be filed with a summons for divorce on the ground of adultery against the 
wife with the paramour named as the co-defender.  It could also be filed separately, 
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 The Lord Advocate of Scotland, Right Hon. Duncan M’Neill, later Lord Justice of Scotland; PP 1852-53 
[1604] First report of the commissioners appointed by Her Majesty to enquire into the law of divorce, and 
more particularly into the mode of obtaining divorces a vinculo matrimonii, p. 65. 
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 Holmes, ‘The Double Standard’, pp. 601-603 
30
 Holmes, ‘The Double Standard’, p. 602, fn. 2.  
31
 David M. Walker, The Scottish Legal System: An Introduction to the Study of Scots Law, third edition, 
revised, (Edinburgh, 1969), p. 393. 
32
 Harvard University—Harvard law School Library/ Bell, Alexander, plaintiff.  Report of train in the action 
of damages for Crim. Con: poor Alexander Bell, teacher, Dundee, versus William Murray. [Edinburgh?:s.n.], 
1834,  p. 1.  
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without any action against her, whereby the husband chose to uphold the marital union, but 
filed a suit against the other man to prove he was the paramour and request monetary 
compensation.
33
  This legal option was not available to wives whose husbands had 
committed the same breach.  In fact this pecuniary remedy was never introduced for wives, 
and was only abolished for husbands recently in the Divorce (Scotland) Act of 1976.
34
     
Suits for criminal conversation, which first appear in the early nineteenth century, also 
reflect the double standard for men and women engaging in adultery.
35
  The husband of a 
wife who committed adultery could file a suit of criminal conversation (also written as 
crim. con.) against his wife’s paramour, if his identity was known, for the loss of his wife’s 
affections and society.
36
  In January 1818 The Scotsman reported the Scottish jury’s first 
criminal conversation case, which ‘created a good deal of interest,’ as it told the story of a 
poor private soldier whose wife took a position in the service of a wealthy writer in 
Edinburgh while her husband was away with his regiment.  Her employer allegedly 
seduced the private’s wife and: 
not satisfied with thus deeply hurting [the husband] in the nicest feelings, 
[the employer] added another injury; the [soldier’s] wife having been 
denied to him, he went one day to the [employer’s] house to demand access 
to her, when the [employer] came out, and, after knocking [the husband] 
down the stairs, added still a third injury, by writing a most false and 
calumnious letter to the [husband’s] commanding officer.  
After a fifteen hour trial the jury awarded a successful verdict for the pursuer and damages 
of £30.
37
  Public attention was again cited in the March 1818 article of the second criminal 
conversation case to be tried in front of a Scottish jury.  This case was kept private due to 
the nature of the evidence, only revealing that the requested damages were for £10,000 
against a surgeon of Hamilton for the seduction and ‘adulterous connection’ with the wife 
of the pursuer, General of Carnbroe, Lanark County.  The charge was denied and the jury 
ruled not proven: ‘The verdict of the Jury was hailed by a crowded Court with the greatest 
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applause.  There were no less than 150 witnesses in attendance for the defense [sic].’38  
Although a suit of divorce by a husband against his wife suggests an element of pride, a 
suit of damages for criminal conversation suggests a desire to restore a husband’s 
reputation amongst men.  
Outside of the law, the double standard influenced the more pervasive discourses from 
medical, conservative, feminist and radical groups.  This notion that gender should 
determine whether sexual activity was appropriate was not without opposition.  Indeed, it 
was the double standard that angered and inspired reformers.  Weeks argues that, ‘it was 
during the nineteenth century that the debate about sexuality exploded… Sexuality became 
a major social issue in Victorian social and political practice.’39 
Christianity, one of the oldest and most established discourses, labelled adultery as a sin 
for both the husband and the wife.
40
  In earlier centuries this sin was considered a capital 
offense in Scotland, meaning an adulterous spouse could be punished by death, although 
very few if any executions took place.
41
  Remnants of this notion exist in the conditions of 
a divorce that stated the pursuing party was allowed to remarry as though their spouse were 
‘naturally dead’.42  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Scottish Reformers pushed to 
equalise the disgrace of infidelity for both husbands and wives by encouraging a ‘single 
standard’.43  This was put into practice in Kirk sessions that publicly denounced men and 
women for fornication, the birth of illegitimate children, infidelity, and other immoral 
behaviour.
44
  This system of regulation was thought to be most effective in pre-industrial 
Scotland, although historians debate the reasons for the Church’s loss of dominance in the 
1800s.
45
  Despite the decline in Church attendance, in Scotland religion remained an 
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important facet of peoples’ lives.46  The upkeep of religious teachings about sex was 
particularly evident in middle-class ideas of courtship and marriage, and especially 
amongst women.
47
  Influential religious values rejected the societal leniency given to 
sexually promiscuous men and preferred for sex to be restricted to the marital union as a 
conjugal right.
48
  Often associated with middle-class ideals and centred on the teachings of 
Evangelical Christianity, this discourse on sexuality in marriage was also found in some 
working-class families’ marital expectations.49  In brief, the official stance of morally 
conservative groups rejected the double standard, as they believed sex was an expectation 
of marriage to be kept between husbands and wives.
50
 
Increasingly, historians have debated that sexuality in the Victorian era was repressed and 
ruled by the double standard.
51
  Early scholarship argued that male sexuality was linked to 
theories of biological instincts.  Medical texts used terms such as natural, biological and 
habitual to describe men’s relationship with sex.  The ideal man would marry and contain 
his natural sexual desires within the marriage bed.
52
  In contrast, women were viewed as 
frigid when it came to sex: it was perceived that women did not enjoy it and even feared 
it.
53
  Some medical texts encouraged this notion claiming that women were uninterested 
and sometimes apprehensive of sex, only participating in order to fulfil their maternal 
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needs to procreate—this followed another medical discourse that believed women were 




 The pervasiveness of the double standard was also evident in the campaigns against it in 
the second half of the century.  First, the rise of feminist discourses attempted to challenge 
the double standard by confronting the issues and repercussions regarding male sexuality 
as innate and uncontrollable.
56
  Feminists took a more radical stance campaigning that in 
reality the marriage contract did not encourage mutual affection and respect of sex.  
Instead, they argued, it effectively turned a wife into a prostitute as she was legally the 
property of her husband and subject to his sexual desires.
57
  Furthermore, the ownership of 
a wife’s body by her husband meant rape did not legally exist within the institution of 
marriage.
58
  Wives also suffered from unwanted pregnancies when duty bound to have sex 
with their husbands, putting their lives at risk with each pregnancy and childbirth.
59
  The 
use of prostitutes as substitutes for ‘respecting’ wives’ dignity and status was also a 
product of the double standard and furthered the divide between respectable married 
women and sex.
60
  Despite the radical aspects of their campaign, mainstream feminist 
groups rejected more extreme feminists who promoted free love outside of marriage, and 
marriage was still considered the ideal relationship.
61
  
Second, Social Purity was a reform movement that attempted to restore morality by 
returning sex to the marriage bed.
62
  It coincided with feminism and in many ways their 
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  Social Purists were particularly concerned with respectability 
and took an interventionist approach towards working-class women, who they believed 
were more likely to engage in sex and lose their femininity by letting go of modesty.
64
  
The last movement to mention was Sexology.  Sexology arguably began as a radical 
alternative to the limited sexual liberty given to women and even men by promoting 
women’s equal passion for sex and natural sexuality. 65  Medical theories of sexuality have 
also been found to have influenced this movement.
66
  Sexologists (like medical authorities) 
asserted that men had dominant sexual urges that could not be controlled because they 
were biological.
67
  These ideas placed men in power during the act of sex and relegated 
women as the submissive partner.  This, in consequence, reinforced the traditional gender 
roles of sexuality that feminists were attempting to break.
68
   
The double standard was present in legislation, such as actions for damages or criminal 
conversation, Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, the writings of medical 
men, and the campaigns of the feminists, social purists and sexologists, whether it was 
being supported or disputed.
69
  Seemingly, these social and political discourses could have 
appeared in a divorce trial as a reflection of popular beliefs, even if the CS in theory 
enforced a single standard.  As the remaining sections will show, evidence of the double 
standard is available through the higher number of male pursuers in the collected sample of 
CS cases.  To put this into context, out of the three grounds for divorce and separation, 
adultery was the only ground where more husbands than wives instigated the action—suits 
charging desertion and cruelty had a higher number of female pursuers.  However, the 
individual trials themselves suggest that this legal theory of a single standard was upheld in 
practice once in the courtroom, as the overwhelming majority of the sample was successful 
suits.   
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Found Patterns of Adultery in Court of Session Sample Study 
Using the 65 divorce case sample filed on the ground of adultery, as well as divorce trials 
reported in Scottish newspapers, patterns specific to nineteenth-century experiences of 
adultery have emerged.  They reflect that the double standard persisted, despite the legal 
equality.  This section will discuss the patterns of adultery through three different 
subsections: the most common scenarios, the paramour, and the excuses for infidelity.   
A few caveats on the substance of the cases: as the law required just one proven act of 
extramarital sex between the defender and the paramour for a divorce decree, the instances 
cited in the complaint likely represent those that could be successfully proven, rather than 
the full sexual history of the defender.  Additionally, only one dismissed case was found in 
this sample, meaning that this study is based on successful decrees of divorce for 
adultery.
70
  Likewise, the 1890 Divorces (Scotland) report, discussed in Chapter Two, 
showed a low percentage of divorce actions dismissed.
 71
  
The fact that over half of the wives who did file an adultery divorce suit cited a secondary 
fault on the part of the husband (desertion or cruelty), suggests that, for a wife, adultery on 
its own was not as much of a push factor to break up a marriage.  Cohabiting adultery, on 
the other hand, was a more common complaint from female pursuers, as it often meant the 
husband had ceased to financially support his wife leaving no reason for her to uphold the 
marriage (12 out of the 16 male defenders were accused of living in an adulterous 
cohabiting relationship).  That more husbands filed for divorce suggests they were less 
tolerant of extramarital affairs.  Furthermore, more husbands filed for divorce when their 
wife had a short-term affair or one-night encounter.  Some husbands also accused their 
wives of becoming prostitutes; this could indicate a general attitude towards women who 
had left their husband and had sex with other men, although it was possible that these 
women had turned to prostitution after separating from their husbands.
72
  The rise in 
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female pursuers in the later 1880s (after the sample), further supports this argument, as 
married women were obtaining more economic and legal rights by the turn of the century, 
and therefore less dependent on their husbands.  
Patterns of Adultery: ‘Standard’ Adultery 
The most ‘standard’ form of adultery, where a married person has extramarital sex while 
still living with their spouse, was one of the less frequently cited forms.  Out of the 65 
cases studied, 27 pursuers complained of a spouse’s affair while still residing under the 
same roof as husband and wife.  Six of the pursuers were wives, and 21 were husbands.  
Only eight defenders from the 27 cases, however, had affairs that did not develop into a 
long-term relationship.  Although one-time encounters were seemingly uncommon within 
the CS divorce cases, this was not necessarily representative.  Rather, this may indicate 
acceptable and unacceptable infidelity.   
Wives less commonly pursued divorce for a one-time or short-term affair unless the 
husband’s financial support was already lost.  Female pursuers therefore appear under-
represented likely because a one-time affair was not reason enough to divorce.  Even 
though religious and legal discourses enforced a single standard, society encouraged wives 
to be more tolerant of their husbands’ indiscretions, if not directly, then through the 
dependency and subordination of wives. Thus, of the 16 female pursuers, twelve charged 
their husbands with living in an adulterous cohabiting relationship.  Even in the four cases 
claiming a husband had one-time (or short-term) affairs, the wife was no longer living with 
or supported by him.  This most likely prompted the action as maintaining the marriage 
would not have benefited her, whereas dissolution of the marriage would have allowed her 
the freedom to sever all ties with her husband and remarry.  
In contrast, husbands often accused wives of brief sexual affairs, which corresponds to the 
idea that adultery was less acceptable if committed by the wife.  This may have been true 
for a few reasons.  First, the competing discourses about sexuality, discussed above, 
arguably impacted upon private family decisions about marital breakdown.  Besides 
monetary concerns, an openly sexual wife may have been a cause of anxiety for some 
husbands.
73
  More conservative discourses expected married women to be uninterested in 
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sex beyond procreation and the conjugal duties of a wife.  Hence, a sexually aggressive or 
promiscuous wife brought shame on a family concerned with upholding a respectable 
reputation.
74
  Secondly, some husbands may have also been concerned with being a 
cuckold, as it insinuated they failed as a husband.  According to Gillis, ‘[i]n the sixteenth 
century, “cuckold” was the worst a man could be called and the cause of most of the 
defamation suits brought by men to the Church courts.’75  Bailey suggests otherwise, 
arguing that in the early modern era, ‘it was becoming less common for husbands in this 
situation to be seen as failing sexually’ and blame was shifted to the third party.76  The 
double standard and the insult of being cuckolded are not unrelated as they both appear to 
reflect insecurity over masculinity.   
This connection is illustrated in an 1880 case of divorce and damages, where the husband 
laid full blame on the wife yet attempted to maintain his friendship with the paramour, a 
former friend.  The pursuer William Ramsay filed the suit against his wife Ann Armit or 
Ramsay and John Weir, accusing them of having carnal connection on multiple occasions.  
As this case was brought to court in 1880, the husband and wife were both able to testify.  
John Weir and William Ramsay were friends who would get together with their wives and 
visit one another’s homes.  One night, suspicious of John’s relationship with Ann, William 
returned home early to find John and Ann in the dark and pressed up against the bed.  
William broke into the locked house and threw the pair out.  From William’s responses to 
his wife’s affair, it was evident that he directed his anger towards her more so than John. 
For instance, the next day he went to John’s home to tell John’s wife what he had seen and 
prevented.  Mrs. Weir testified that, ‘[Ramsay] then set his teeth, and called his wife a 
whore.  He turned to my husband and said, “Johnny, you and I have always been friendly, 
and I hope we will remain so.  Mind you, Johnny, I have no ill-will to you.” 77  Ann 
admitted to forming an adulterous relationship with John, although John continued to deny 
it throughout the trial.  William’s testimony demonstrated evidence of the double standard, 
as well as concern over male honour and reputation. 
In two other instances, William alludes to the importance of reputation as a cause for 
divorcing his wife.  The first example is from William’s testimony.  He had been asked 
about a time when Ann and John were seen walking alone together:  
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(Q) Did you ever ask your wife about this walk?   
(A)Yes. I asked why she went along with Weir.  At last she ‘owned’ that 
she had never gone away to set the girl home a bit, but that at the door 
Weir asked her to go a walk, and that is why she had gone.  I told her I had 
a good mind to leave her, as I would not live with any woman who would 
leave a ball-room with a man in such a suspicious way. [sic]
78
       
 
The second example reveals William’s reaction to Ann’s betrayal, which was to 
immediately separate and then divorce her.  In his testimony he insinuates that this was not 
an easy decision; ‘I had to break up my business after I put her away.  She had conducted it 
for me.  It was increasing and paying very well.  I was always kind to my wife.’79  It seems 
that William voiced a choice of male honour over the wealth and comfort he had with his 
wife, yet, likely felt more betrayal and hurt then he expressed in court. 
The relationship between William, Ann and John illustrates adultery as the direct cause of 
marital breakdown.  It also shows the double standard affecting the attitude of a husband 
towards his wife as reflected in William calling Ann a whore while offering friendship to 
John despite the fact that both were caught.  The Lord Ordinary, however, declared both 
defenders guilty by awarding William a divorce, but a payment of £100 in damages from 
John rather than the £500 requested in the summons.   
Thirdly, the case studies also show that a wife’s infidelity would be less tolerated, or 
subject to the double standard, for the fear of illegitimate children. Of the 65 cases 
examined, 23 pursuers complained their spouse had at least one illegitimate child.  Fifteen 
of the 23 were female defenders, and eight of the 23 were male.  Though there were more 
adulterous wives with illegitimate children, only five of those fifteen women ended up in a 
cohabiting relationship with their paramour.  All of these women were separated from their 
husbands, but they did not end up (at least according to the case documents) living with the 
father of their child—it was possible that the paramour withdrew his affections and 
deserted her.
 
  In contrast, the number of adulterous husbands who ended up in cohabiting 
relationships with their paramour after having an illegitimate child was seven out of eight.  
Again this may reflect the vulnerable position of mothers with illegitimate children; if a 
man was willing to live in family with a woman and her children she would have most 
likely accepted this arrangement. 
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Male anxiety over adulterous wives is attributed to the issue of inheritance.
80
  From the 
mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century the shift from wealth in the form of land to 
capital meant that, ‘[a]dultery by the wife now created a potentially wider and more 
threatening horizon of both legitimate and spurious family claimants.’81  However, 
examples of illegitimacy from the nineteenth century outline inheritance as an issue for 
families with wealth to pass on.
82
  For the working-class or impoverished family 
illegitimacy was seen as an extra mouth to feed or a potential burden on the local parish.
 83
  
Furthermore, illegitimacy was perceived as ‘a sign of social and moral disintegration’ by 
‘moralizers’.84    
Patterns of Adultery: Separation for Work 
The absence of a spouse and subsequent infidelity was a common pattern found in this 
study.  In the CS sample 49 of the 65 cases were instigated by the husband.  18 per cent of 
the 49 husbands alleged that their wives slept with other men while they were working 
away from home.  As seasonal occupations and migrating work was not uncommon for 
working-class men, it was not unusual to find a husband away from home for long periods 
of time.  Suits against husbands for adultery committed while working away from home 
were rarer as, among other things, there was no one keeping tabs on their behaviour.  
Wives, on the other hand, were not given the same privacy.  It was more difficult to hide 
an adulterous affair committed by a wife as she was often under the watchful eye of 
neighbours and family.
85
  If the woman became pregnant the community would 
immediately suspect adultery aware of the husband’s absence.   
Such was the case for Margaret Paterson or Macallan, who was subject to local gossip and 
disapproval in the absence of her husband.  Margaret, a domestic servant before her 
marriage, and her husband William, an engineer, moved from Campsie where they married 
in July 1863 to Dumbarton.  They lived in Dumbarton together as man and wife with two 
children until May 1866 when William’s employers Messers Denny and Company sent 
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him to work for the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigator Company’s steam ship 
‘Avoca’ as an engineer on a voyage to Bombay, India for three years.  While William was 
away Margaret took in two male lodgers.  In the summer of 1868 she became noticeably 
pregnant and gave birth to an illegitimate child in October 1868, the father being one of the 
lodgers, a married man named Thomas McLean.  Most of the proof against her came from 
neighbours and members of the Dumbarton community.  Mrs. Mary Vallance, a mid-wife 
and a neighbour also living on High Street, Dumbarton stated: ‘[i]n the summer of 1868, I 
observed that she was in the family way; it was quite visible to be seen.  I thought it was 
not nice to see her in that way, when her husband was absent.  I knew that he had been 
away from home for more than a year; and that drew my attention to her condition more 
than it would otherwise have been.  I did not speak about it to the neighbours at the time; 
but I mentioned to a party that I thought there was something wrong with her, and I was 
not pleased about it.’86 Another neighbour Mrs. Baxter or Fleming included in her 
testimony that the pregnancy of Margaret Macallan was well known and attributed to bad 
behaviour: ‘[t]hat was very much spoken about among the neighbours, because it was 
known that her husband was away.  I heard Mrs. McPhail speak about it.  During the 
pursuer’s absence, I have seen Mrs. Macallan carrying articles to the pawn.  She became of 
dissipated habits.’87 Mrs. Ann Barry, a woman who lived below Margaret on High Street, 
stated: ‘[w]hile I was living there, Mrs. Macalan was delivered of child.  That was quite 
well known among the neighbours.  I had previously noticed that she was in the family 
way.  The fact of her having a child caused a good deal of talk, in consequence of her 
husband being abroad.’  And Mrs. McPhail or Lavery ended her deposition by stating, ‘[i]t 
was the talk among the neighbours.’88  A local doctor in Dumbarton also testified on behalf 
of the husband, stating in his deposition that he saw Margaret in the summer of 1868 and 
observed she was ‘in the family way’.  He then told Mrs. Vallance to keep a watch on Mrs. 
Macallan, and in the beginning of November, after the child was born, ‘mentioned the 
matter’ to Mr. Mackay the Superintendent of the Burgh Police of Dumbarton.  Mr. Mackay 
(another witness), following a report that Mrs. Macallan might have ‘made away with the 
child’, went to Mrs. Macallan’s home looking for the child, but instead found her across 
the street in the home of Thomas McLean with his wife who had since moved to 
Dumbarton.  For an unexplained reason, Mrs. Macallan had moved into the McLean’s 
home and had given birth there, assisted by the unaware Mrs. McLean.  The child 
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remained in the McLean’s home after Mrs. Macallan moved back across the street, and 
died aged six months. 
There were notable similarities between the nine cases of adultery during separation for 
work.  Firstly, all the couples were working class.  Secondly, all the couples had only been 
married a short time before the husband went away, and in most instances the length of 
time apart was longer than the length of time they cohabitated.  For instance, Archibald 
White and his wife Helen McLean married in July 1847 and lived together until May 1848 
where after her husband left for thirteen months to work as a ship steward.
89
  Thomas 
Needham and his wife Agnes Reid were only married two and a half months before 
Thomas was called away to join a ship in the Royal Navy as an engineer in December 
1877, he remained away for two years.
90
  Thirdly, in all the marriages where the husband 
left within two years of their marital union the couple had no legitimate children.  Only 
two couples who lived together for three years before their separation had children.  Lastly, 
in all the cases but two, the defender had given birth to at least one illegitimate child.  It 
was the pregnancy and birth that proved the adultery and led to an immediate separation 
once the husband returned from his employment.  Matthew Marshall wrote in his 
complaint against his wife Margaret Patterson, that upon discovering his wife had given 
birth to an illegitimate child while he was working in Argentina, ‘the present action has 
been rendered necessary.’91  
This form of adultery was also more likely to be a one-time encounter or a brief affair 
rather than develop into a cohabiting relationship.  For example, Elizabeth Cairncross, wife 
of James Webster, gave birth to an illegitimate son while her husband was away at sea.  
Witnesses for the pursuer, neighbours in Broughty Ferry, stated they thought the father of 
the child was a tide waiter or preventive man, and one stated that Elizabeth, ‘often said she 
was sorry for having fallen into the mistake.’92   There was one case where an affair did 
develop into a cohabiting relationship.  Annie Inglis or Brewster had an affair with a man 
while her husband was in British Burma.  The Brewsters lived in Madras for three years 
stationed with Colonel Brewster’s regiment, until he and the regiment were ordered to 
Burma.  Annie returned to Scotland alone out of concern for her health.  Within six months 
she moved to London, all the while keeping correspondence with Brewster until September 
1868.  In October Annie secretly returned to Madras to live with John Dawson Mayne, a 
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Nineteenth-century occupations and economic situations created numerous circumstances 
that physically separated husband and wife for prolonged periods of time and left both 
parties vulnerable to extramarital exploits.  Maritime occupations put a particularly heavy 
strain on married couples: firstly, husbands who worked on board ships were repeatedly 
called away from home for extended periods (sometimes over a year), and secondly, it was 
a potentially dangerous business where the ship and men could be lost at sea.  In one 
maritime community Lisa Norling found that, ‘[t]o sustain their relationships over such 
long separates both [mariners and their wives] were forced to rely on the prescribed ideals 
of what a wife and husband were supposed to be.’94  The application of these ideals, 
however, only worked to sooth the anguish of separation whilst living apart; rarely could 
the reality of married life measure up.  Mariners in general were more likely to be 
unfaithful as seaman had a ‘collective reputation for infidelity.’95  This sexually 
promiscuous behaviour of sailors when docked was also evident in Scottish cases.  For 
instance, Leneman and Mitchison found that soldiers and sailors made up a high 
percentage of illegitimate children’s fathers.96  Sailors seduced married women as well, as 
was reported in three cases from the CS records, one from 1840 and two from 1880.
97
  
Another case printed in The Scotsman reported a wife had run away with a sailor who 
bought her presents, ‘and [reportedly] said it was a good thing that somebody thought 
something of her.’98    
Patterns of Adultery: Prostitution 
Another pattern of adultery, and an example of one-night encounters, was prostitution.  
Only three of the sixteen cases instigated by the wife claimed their husbands committed 
infidelity with a prostitute.  On the other hand, seven out of 49 cases filed by the husband, 
or fourteen per cent, alleged their wives had committed adultery in the form of prostitution.   
                                                          
93
CS46/1870/11/37 Brewster v Inglis or Brewster.  
94
 Lisa Norling, ‘”How Frought with Sorrow and Heartpangs”: Mariner’s Wives and the Ideology of 
Domesticity in New England, 1790-1880’, The New England Quarterly, Vo. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), p.435 
95
 Norling, ”How Frought”, p. 436.  
96
 Soldiers and sailors made up a high percentage of illegitimate fathers; Leah Leneman and  Rosalind 
Mitchison, Sin and the City: Sexuality and Social Control in Urban Scotland 1660-1780, (Edinburgh, 1998),  
p.89. 
97
 CS46/1840/7/64 Nicol v McBeth; CS/46/1880/12/61 Littlejohn v Brown or Littlejohn; CS46/1880/3/118 
Dempsey Jr. v Innes or Dempsy. 
98
 ‘Outer House. Divorce—Robert Arnott v Margaret Balfour or Arnott’, The Scotsman, Dec 2, 1878, p. 3.  
109 
 
Prostitution, perhaps more obviously than the other scenarios of adultery, reflects how the 
double standard existed in practice.
99
  In particular, more husbands visited prostitutes than 
the number reported to the CS.
100
   Nevertheless, because the majority of adultery divorce 
cases were filed by husbands against their wives, there are more examples of wives 
accused of prostitution than husbands using prostitutes.  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
women who had sex outside of marriage faced greater criticism and stigmatisation than 
men.  This applied to the labelling of women as prostitutes.  Littlewood and Mahood found 
that ‘the manner in which reformers used the term “prostitute” was highly variable and 
vague’.101  A surgeon from the Lock Hospital is quoted by them as saying that the women 
at the hospital ‘were all “prostitutes of one kind or another, that is to say they were women 
consorting with more than one man.”’102    
According to Judith Walkowitz’s in-depth studies of prostitution,103 only a minority of 
prostitutes fell into the stereotype of abandoned or widowed women seeking to support 
their children.
104
  While there are some similarities between Walkowitz’s findings on 
prostitutes in London, the wives accused of prostitution from the CS cases do not fit the 
overall trend.  Most notably, the wives were not young, single girls who lacked other 
options.  If a married woman did in fact turn to prostitution it would have been for different 
reasons than her ‘fallen’ sisters, although, the underlying cause was the lack of 
opportunities for any women to earn a self-supporting and sustainable income.  One reason 
according to the CS cases was alcohol.  Four husbands claimed their wives infidelity 
followed her taking up intemperate and dissipated habits.  In consequence of that 
disreputable behaviour the couple separated, and after the separation the wife began her 
adulterous escapades.  Daniel Nicol, shoemaker in Kirkgate Leith, stated in his complaint 
that his wife Christian McBeth or Nicol: 
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estranged herself from his house and society, and has deserted her infant 
children and has addicted herself to vicious and dissolute habits… 
frequently absent from the Complainers House in Kirkgate Leith during the 
whole night, and was sometimes so absent for four or five nights in one 
week; and when thus absent walked the street at untimeous hours under 
night as a common prostitute, and had adulterous intercourse with other 
men, and returned to the Complainers House in the morning, generally in a 
state of beastly intoxication.
105
   
 
Some wives may have been pushed towards this lifestyle due to drink, an unhappy 
marriage, separation from their husband and a need to self-support.
106
   Mary Innes or 
Dempsey, who answered her husband’s summons of divorce charging her with living in a 
brothel as a prostitute and then entering the workhouse pregnant with an illegitimate child 
and syphilis, denied infidelity claiming that she left him due to ‘illusage and misconduct’.  
She denied that she lived in a brothel, and claimed that she had feigned pregnancy in order 
to get admittance to Glasgow’s workhouse, Town’s Hospital.  Once admitted she was 
found to have contracted syphilis—more proof of her immorality according to her husband 
and his lawyers—however Mary stated she had contracted the venereal disease from her 
husband while they still were still living together.  Although the Lord Ordinary granted the 
divorce in favour of her husband, Mary’s story of pretending to be pregnant to enter 
Town’s Hospital evokes images of desperation.107   
The case of Henry Seton, a riding master in Edinburgh, and his wife Ann Elliot also 
suggests a more complicated marital breakdown than put forward in Henry’s complaint.  
He accused his wife Ann of committing adultery with at least three men only three months 
after their wedding.  Witnesses testifying on his behalf labelled her a prostitute, working in 
brothels and socialising with other prostitutes.  However, it was revealed by Mrs. Mary 
Bell, a reputed brothel owner, that Henry had met Ann at Mrs. Bell’s house:  
I know Mr. Seton very well.  I would scarcely ever let him into my house.  
The girls used to go up to Mr. Seton’s School every day.  I remember of 
him visiting Mrs. Seton in my house before her marriage to him.  The first 
time she saw him was at the school.  He never stayed all night with her in 
my house that I remember of.  I cannot remember of their ever being in bed 
together in my house before their marriage, as he never had any money.  I 
do not think that he was more than twice or thrice in my house asking for 
her before the marriage.
108
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Even though Seton attempted to remove Elliot from a life of prostitution by marrying her, 
she quickly returned.  But, another witness disclosed that Ann may have gone back to 
prostitution because Henry had deserted her: she stated, ‘[Ann] told me that [Henry] had 
left her, and that as soon as he came back she was going to be divorced from him.’109   
Yet, other wives, appeared less innocent.  Such as Clementina Currie, wife of James 
Fleming, who deserted him after less than a month of marriage.  She was caught months 
later having sex with a local man named Bowman for money in a public field of Brechin.  
Clementina provided no defences, leaving witness testimonies to explain the charges.  For 
instance, one witness stated: 
[Witness] took [Bowman] by the privy parts and said it was a shame for 
him to have connection with any mans wife who had a wife of his own, 
Some of the rest of them asked [Bowman] for money calling it Bull 
Money… [Clementina] damned Bowman for some money which she said 




Patterns of Adultery: Adulterous Cohabiting Relationships 
While the scenarios listed above probably occurred more frequently than reflected in the 
CS sample, undoubtedly, the most common pattern of adultery found in the CS cases was 
cohabiting relationships.  Of the 65 cases filed by husbands and wives, 33 of the defenders 
ended up in a cohabiting relationship with their paramour.  In some cases they were short 
term relationships, but the majority were long term.  Sixteen cases were filed by the wife 
on the ground of adultery, eleven of which claimed their husbands were living in a 
cohabiting relationship.  22 of the 49 cases where the husband was the pursuer claimed the 
wife was living in a cohabiting relationship.   
The number of adulterous couples who ended up living together demonstrates an overall 
interdependency of men and women, and particularly husbands and wives.  Phillips points 
out in relation to eighteenth-century western civilization that, ‘[t]he economic 
interdependence or dependence of husbands and wives, the difficulties involved with 
making a living outside marriage, the presence of children—these and other variables 
could effectively lock husbands and wives into marriage.’111  Using remarriage rates of 
widows and widowers Phillips argues, ‘[t]he need to restore the family economy quickly 
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can be discerned in the hasty remarriages that were characteristic of traditional western 
society.’112  Although Phillips is not writing about adulterous cohabitation, seemingly a 
husband or wife separated from their spouse would seek another partner to restore that 
interdependent relationship, whether for love or economic stability.  
Under this context then, what appeared to be an episode of adultery may have in reality 
been a case of a deserted spouse needing to re-establish a home with economic benefits in 
order to avoid destitution, the workhouse or even prostitution.  For instance, David Scott, a 
grocer in Dundee, claimed his wife was intemperate causing him to separate from her.  
Scott moved to France leaving his wife with his brother and an aliment to support her.  
Even after he left, David claims his wife continued her bad habits, left the home of his 
brother and began an adulterous cohabiting relationship with a man named John Anderson.  
Mary Ann Miller or Scott denied the charges of adultery stating in her defences that her 
husband deserted her when he moved to France and only sent aliment at the beginning of 
his absence.  When the money stopped she took a job with Anderson, a wright and 
widower in Stobwell, as a washer and mender of clothes for Anderson and his son.
113
  The 
pattern of Maria Merritt or Davis also serves as an example of a separated wife’s reliance 
on adulterous cohabitation.  Her husband William Davis, weaver in Hawick, claimed that 
his English wife left their home in Dumfries, Scotland, voicing her desire to return to 
England.  Since leaving, she had supposedly lived in three adulterous cohabiting 
relationships with unknown men.  A witness for the pursuer, testified Maria had returned to 
Trowbridge and had a child with a John Taylor who then died.  After his death she moved 
in with a man named James Eve posing as his wife until his death around 1873.  At the 
time of the trial she was reportedly living with another man named Watts, and her fourteen 
year old son from Taylor, again posing as his wife.  Another witness from Trowbridge 
claimed he had only learned a fortnight before his testimony at the trial that Maria and 
Watts were not married.
114
   
Husbands also demonstrated a dependence on conjugal unions for daily survival.  In 
England, Frost found that, ‘working-class men without wives had to either break up the 
home, sending their children away, or take on a housekeeper, who frequently became a de 
facto wife.’115  A blatant example of this dependency can be seen in the letter to the Lord 
Ordinary written by Hugh Crawfurd Gunning, defender in a divorce case.  His defence for 
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leaving his wife and living with another woman as stated in the letter was his need for a 
‘partner capable of conducting whatever little means and support I required’.116  Mary 
Paterson or Coutts’ husband John replaced her, after Mary left him due to maltreatment, 
with a woman who posed as his ‘housekeeper or companion’ while living in an adulterous 
cohabiting relationship with him in Aberdeen.
117
  James Littlejohn blamed his wife’s bad 
habits as the cause of their separation and her subsequent adultery, and that in consequence 
he was ‘obliged to break up his household, and go into lodgings, his children being 
boarded out by him.’118 
Though the interdependence discussed by Phillips may have originated with the family 
economy of the eighteenth century, men and women continuously relied on cohabiting 
relationships despite the nineteenth-century’s economic shifts that separated work from 
home, especially for men.  John Gillis argues that this need for a female partner was still an 
issue after the turn of the century.
119
  Working-class wages, seasonal demands and lack of 
full time work for married women meant working-class men and women were more reliant 
on one another for survival.  If a marriage failed a second, and safer option than bigamy, 
was adulterous cohabitation.
120
  The testimony of neighbours in the divorce case of 
William Mitchell against his wife Margaret revealed that Margaret had since her separation 
from her husband been living together with a married man whose wife had left him eight or 
nine years prior.  He was a shoemaker and Margaret unemployed.  Without a husband to 




Adulterous cohabiting relationships were also a product of affection and companionship.  
It would be wrong to assume adulterous couples did not build homes together out of love.  
However, based on the CS divorce cases there does appear to be a class difference between 
those who cohabited out of love and those who cohabited out of necessity.  While the cases 
discussed above were mostly working-class men and women, examples of adulterous 
cohabitating couples who ran away together involve parties with more wealth.  For 
instance, Henry Douglas McMurdo an esquire and collector of customs in Glasgow 
charged his wife with adultery and desertion claiming she ran away with a stranger she met 
when they moved to Toronto, Canada.  McMurdo’s wife Jane, the daughter of an esquire 
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and writer to the signet in Edinburgh, used the opportunity of her husband being away on 
business to abandon him and runaway with an Englishman she met at the British Lodging 
and Coffee House where she and McMurdo were staying.  During the absences of her 
husband for work Jane, according to witnesses, had developed ‘a great intimacy’ with 
Francis Walker.  Though no occupation was given for Walker, the adulterous couple ran 
away together in 1833 and over four years later witnesses in Canada testified they were 
still living together as husband and wife.
122
  Thomas Edward Gordon, Captain in Her 
Majesty’s 14th Regiment of Dragoons also lost his wife to another man as the result of a 
hidden affair.  While attending a ball in Bridge of Allan, Stirlingshire, Agnes Hunter or 
Gordon disappeared from the sight of her husband, mother and friends.  It was discovered 
by morning that Agnes had fled with her lover, a Captain in Her Majesty’s 71st Regiment 
of the Line (Highlanders), from the ball to begin a life of adulterous cohabitation.  After 
hiding out in guest houses in Scotland, they supposedly moved to Hanover Square in 
London taking an apartment with ‘two drawing rooms, on the first floor, and bedroom and 
dressing room on the second floor.’123  
Bigamy  
Bigamy does not fit as neatly in this context as it was in fact a criminal offense and 
grounds for declaring the second marriage null.
124
  Yet, for the spouse from the first 
marriage it was grounds for divorce as proof of bigamy implied adultery and desertion.  
Bigamy is the act of entering into a second marriage contract when a first and valid 
marriage had already taken place and the first spouse was still living.
125
  Police statistics on 
criminal offenses illustrate that it was not a commonly reported crime in nineteenth-
century Scotland: from 1874 to 1876 the average number of bigamy offenses known to the 
police was 11, and by 1910 that number had only risen to 27.
126
    In the CS cases only four 
charged the defender with entering into a bigamous marriage, one from 1840 and three 
from1850. 
Like the majority of the cases, the four couples that mentioned bigamy in their complaint 
were all part of the working class.
 127
  From the four, two pursuers were female and two 
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were male.  Only one defender, a wife, had given birth to an illegitimate child as a result of 
her adultery.
128
  All four couples had been separated before the adultery and subsequent 
bigamy took place.  Three of the four cases were uncontested.  Of the defenders who did 
not answer to their summons: one husband was thought to be living outside of Scotland; 
the wife who had an illegitimate child and married her paramour the same month gave no 
response; and the third husband, William Crerar, was imprisoned in Perth.  He was arrested 
two years after his bigamous marriage, absconded when out on bail, apprehended after two 
years of hiding, and as of 1849 was sitting in prison during the divorce proceedings.
129
   
The Lord Ordinary granted a divorce for all four complainers.  Though it is not completely 
clear, it seems likely that all four pursuers found out about their spouses’ second life 
through the bigamous marriage union.  As the couples were all living separately the 
pursuers may have remained unaware of the adultery if they had not been notified of the 
second marriage.  For instance, Margaret Moodie or Crerar’s complaint suggests she 
learned about William remarrying through his arrest on the charge of bigamy.
130
  John 
Dickson may have been informed that his wife remarried by their daughter who was forced 
to participate in her mother’s wedding ceremony.131    
Bigamy was one of the only criminal offenses directly tied to marriage, and thus was an 
arrestable offense.  Concerning Scotland, Boyd argues there were fewer cases of bigamy 
(along with seduction and divorce for adultery) in Scottish courts than English due to the 
‘absence of irregular marriage in English law.’132  Equally criminal in England, Ginger 
Frost found that though underreported the number of bigamous marriages recorded were 
substantial considering the law.  For example, in the 1850s she found an average of 85 
bigamous marriages per year, and 103 in the 1890s.
133
  It was possible that the fluidity of 
Scottish marriage also lent itself to avoiding charges of bigamous relationships as people 
could argue over the definition of marriage, although it could also be argued that irregular 
marriage made bigamy more likely in Scotland.
134
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Studies of bigamy, in particular Frost’s Living in Sin, found some patterns that are 
unavailable through the CS analysis.  Using bigamy criminal cases Frost found there was a 
high rate of conviction; however the juries were more likely to convict male defendants 
(though men were over-represented), and convicted women received lighter sentences.  
Still, the punishments in general were ‘mild’ according to Frost, and they were getting 
more so towards the end of the century.
135
  A look through nineteenth-century Scottish 
newspapers revealed more reports of English bigamy trials than native.  The few cases 
found tried in Scottish criminal courts show a range of imprisonment terms, from a one 
year sentence in 1844, to a husband and wife both being charged in 1872, where the 
husband received a three month term and the wife was given six months.
136
  The longest 
sentence was eighteen months given to a repeat offender.
137
  It appears that the judges did 
not have a set length of imprisonment for bigamists; when it was seen fit they offered 
leniency, such as in an 1880 trial where the husband charged with bigamy pled guilty but 
stated for his defence that he and his first wife had been living separately for five years.  




The Adulterous Spouse and the Paramour  
Another pattern discernible through the adultery cases is the nature of the relationship 
between the adulterous spouse and the lover, legally called the paramour.  Other studies of 
adultery suggest that wives were more likely to take a lover of the same social class, 
whereas husbands would often have an affair with a social inferior.  This was not a set rule, 
however, and there were many variations.
139
  In this study the majority of paramours were 
social equals, although the men and women chosen as lovers ranged from stranger to 
employee to servant to neighbour.   
The Prostitute 
 As shown in the discussion on prostitution, one potential partner to a husband’s extra-
marital affairs were prostitutes.  Presumably these women were of the same or lower status 
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as the husband.  Of the sixteen cases filed by wives, three charged their husbands with 
hiring prostitutes.  Only one of these three men, however, committed adultery with 
prostitutes and no other women according to the evidence: Robert Shrivall waited until his 
wife was away in London to visit the house of Mrs. Melville in Edinburgh commonly 
known as a house of bad fame.
140
  The other two husbands slept with several women, some 
of whom were prostitutes.  Due to the need to only prove one incident of adultery to 
request a divorce, it is impossible to know how many times these men visited brothels.  
Furthermore, the low number of husbands accused of hiring prostitutes is unrepresentative 
of the true number, but more likely reflects the tolerance of society (and wives) to men and 
husbands engaging in extramarital sex.     
The Stranger 
 Female defenders were most commonly accused of having an adulterous relationship with 
men who would appear to have been strangers to the pursuer. These were men the wives 
met through separate activities from their husbands.  Though not much information is 
available on how the defender and paramour met, one pattern cited by several husbands 
was that the wife met her paramour due to her ‘dissipated’ or ‘intemperate’ habits.  For 
example William Brodie, a searcher of public records in Edinburgh, complained of his 
wife that, ‘after [their] separation the defender’s habits of dissipation continued, and she 
had carnal and adulterous connection, intercourse and dealings with several men other than 
the pursuer’.141  These wives, labelled as drunkards and neglectful of their marital duties, 
were damaging their reputation, and their families’.  On the other hand, wives who may 
have considered themselves more respectable were more likely to begin adulterous 
relationships with someone known to the family. 
 
The Friend 
Thus the second most common paramour for the wife (though not as frequent as strangers) 
was a friend of the family.  This person also tended to be a social equal.  John Weir and 
Ramsay, for instance, were friends who dined at each other’s homes with their wives.142  
William Wilson claimed the man his wife ran away with had been an intimate friend of 
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  Alexander Macalister, Esquire of Torrisdale, was a friend of Keith and 
Mary Macalister, Esquire of Glenbarr, and may have even been a cousin of Keith.
144
  This 
closeness allowed Alexander and Mary to sleep in each other’s’ homes without suspicion 
until Mary left Glenbarr and moved into Torrisdale to live in ‘open and notour adultery’.145   
The Servant 
The next most common paramour was a servant to the family, and most markedly a social 
inferior.  Both husbands and wives were accused of committing adultery with a servant: 
four husbands and three wives.  Historical assessments of female servants placed them as 
one of the most at risk groups for sexual exploitation, as they were predominantly single 
girls deprived of parental or communal supervision.
146
  Their minimal wages and lack of 
trade or skill increased their vulnerability if impregnated and dismissed from service.
147
  
Studies of illegitimacy show high numbers of servants as mothers in England and 
Scotland.
148
  However, the majority of the fornication that resulted in pregnancy for these 
girls was with a male servant or with men of the same social class.
 149
  The records indicate 
that it was far rarer for a servant to develop a sexual relationship with their master or 
mistress than presumed.
150
  Still, this did not diminish the susceptible position servants 
were in if employed by a sexually aggressive master or mistress.  
As found in the CS records, masters did sometimes engage sexually with their female 
servants.  This was a particularly problematic situation as the master was in a position of 
power and authority; it was probable that some female servants were forced into having 
sexual relations.
151
  The testimony of other domestic servants in the home of the 
Davidsons, for instance, painted a picture of an abusive husband whose wife was scared of 
him, and who forced inappropriate intimacy with one of his young female servants.
152
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Then again, as Bailey points out, not all servants ‘were victims.’153  There was the 
possibility of mutual affection developing between master and servant.  Stone and Gillis’ 
argue that servants mostly formed intimate relationships with men of their own class.
154
  
Frost likewise asserts that there was an issue for masters who attempted affectionate 
relationships with poor servant girls; whether that was disapproval from the man’s family, 
or the chance that the girl was using the man as a means to better her own situation.
155
  
Whether or not a servant willingly participated in adulterous connections with a married 
master or mistress, the chances of being placed in such a predicament would have been 
increased by any marital problems between the master and mistress, particularly troubles 
with conjugal relations.
156
  This appears to have been the case for Agnes Callander and her 
husband William Boyd.  Her suit for divorce complained, ‘the defender treated the pursuer 
with great indignity and cruelty.  He frequently struck her and ordered her to leave his 
house’, which she eventually did.  After Agnes left William began a cohabiting 
relationship with his servant Alison McBryde.  From 1854 to the trial in 1869 William and 
Alison had lived together and had three illegitimate children.
157
 
In contrast to masters who impregnated their servants, Stone suggested it was slightly 
easier for a manservant to have relations with his mistress because she could ‘presumably’ 
pass an illegitimate child off as legitimate.
158
  Except that would have required the master 
and mistress to have an active married sex life, which the cases found did not exhibit.  Of 
the wives who allegedly became intimate with male servants, their relationships appeared 
to have grown into a companionship if not love.  Thomas Cassels, a farmer and contractor 
in Galahill, stated in his complaint that his wife Jane Boreland had been impregnated by 
Robert Templeton, one time a servant to the Cassels, and that ‘she has admitted and 
declared to various persons at sundry times and places that the said Robert Templeton and 
no other is the father of said child, and that she is resolved to live with and follow the 
fortunes of the said Robert Templeton wherever he may go.’159  William Hardie’s wife 
Mary Scott also left the home of her husband, only to be quickly followed by their 
manservant William Martin.  Mary was already pregnant by Martin, and at the time of the 
trial she had had two children with him and was living in family ‘furth of Scotland’.160  
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For upper-working class or middle-class couples, their homes were also gathering points 
for employees of the pursuer or defender.  Apprentices and employees were also 
sometimes members of the household, and therefore regularly in the company of their 
employer’s family.161  Apprentices, or employees, living with their employer were more 
common in the early modern centuries in Britain.
162
  By the nineteenth century live-in 
employment was mainly present in rural areas, particularly farms.  Stone argues that the 
newly developing desire for privacy was evident in the division of employers and 
employees in the eighteenth century.
163
  One contributing factor to this separation may 
have indeed been the potential for infidelity living in such close quarters.
164
   
Of the 65 cases, three wives and one husband allegedly had sexual relations with people in 
their employment other than servants.  Mary Rice, wife of Robert Hamilton, shoemaker in 
Catrine, after seventeen years of marriage ran away with James Nimms, also a shoemaker, 
to Glasgow where they began a cohabiting relationship in 1840.  James had for about three 
and a half years prior been living in Robert’s shop, which was in the Hamiltons’ house,  as 
one of his apprentices.  Statements from witnesses, another apprentice who stayed with 
Robert and residents of Catrine, testified that Mary and James had been ‘on too familiar a 
footing with each other’ for two years prior to moving to Glasgow.165  James moved to 
Glasgow first to become a shoemaker there and Mary followed him shortly afterwards.  
Robert, upon learning of his wife’s cohabitation with James, went to Glasgow to see for 
himself, taking the other apprentice Robert McClure with him.  They found James and 
Mary living together in a one room, one bed apartment on Ladywell Street.  There Robert 
asked and established in front of witnesses that James and Mary were living together in 
adultery to which they willingly admitted.
166
   
However, the division of work and home was not always enough to prevent infidelity.  
Margaret Bell or Hunter took advantage of Adam Dickson, a porter or servant to her 
husband’s merchant business in Leith, who would go to the Hunters’ family home on 
business.  When her husband was away from the house Margaret used the chance to 
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become intimate with Adam.
167
  In another case, Mrs. Walker was able to prove that her 




The Lodger and Co-Worker 
Lodgers were often part of the nineteenth-century household make-up, and another 
potential source of an adulterous relationship.  Davidoff et al argued that the landlord/lady 
and lodger relationship was one of a few archetypes of the nineteenth century in England 
and due to that reality marriages suffered; ‘[t]he “legitimate” household head might be 
provoked into jealousy, and a saying of the period claimed that three evils most commonly 
broke up marriages: selfishness, greed and lodgers.’169   Such was the case for William 
McAllan’s marriage to Margaret Paterson.  It ended when Margaret became pregnant with 
an illegitimate child while William was away at sea.  The father was allegedly one of the 
men who lodged with Margaret after her husband left for his work.
170
  Thomas M’Queen 
and his wife let rooms to lodgers in Greenock for fifteen years, until 1877 when his wife 
and one of their lodgers ran off to Grimsby.
171
   
Lodgers and servants continued to live in a large proportion of nineteenth-century 
households.  Taking lodgers was a form of employment acceptable for married women as 
it allowed them to stay at home and keep the house and children.
172
  It was difficult for 
women, let alone wives, to find adequate employment, but unemployment could be 
devastating for working-class families.
173
  Some wives needed to earn a second income.
174
  
Those wives who were employed out of the home sometimes developed an adulterous 
relationship with a co-worker.  James Forrest, a labourer who worked away from home 
from Monday to Saturday evenings, stated in his complaint that his wife Elizabeth 
Alexander, ‘having in consequence no sufficient household duties to engage herself in, the 
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defender worked during the said period at out door work.’175  It was at her work that she 
met and bonded with Patrick Donnelly, a miner or sinker in the same employment.  





Lastly, another potential paramour for both husbands and wives, but more likely amongst 
working-class couples, was the neighbour.  This relationship was also more likely to 
develop in a town or city than in rural or agricultural areas.  Close living conditions, tight 
communities, and supportive neighbours allowed intimacies to occur.
177
  For instance, 
Walter Reid suspected his wife of ‘carrying on a criminal intercourse’ with an artist 
lithographer who lived on the same street in Paris as Walter and his wife.  Walter forbade 
his wife from seeing Jules Cremer, but this resulted in her abandonment and moving in 
with Jules.
178
   
 
Excuses for Adultery: Insight into Scottish lives 
Just as adulterous relationships are complicated and difficult to explain for twenty-first 
century couples, men and women in the nineteenth century had various excuses for having 
affairs.  From the CS adultery divorce sample a few patterns emerge.  Of the 65 cases, only 
twenty (five of whom were male defenders) provided defences, and sixteen of those twenty 
defenders denied the charges.
179
  Overall, divorce cases were less likely to be contested, 
presumably because neither party wished to remain in the relationship.
180
  On the other 
hand, if a male co-defender was named in the suit he would usually deny the charges in 
order to avoid paying damages and expenses.  For instance, David Croley, fancy stationer 
and dressing-case maker of Glasgow, filed for divorce charging his wife Catherine 
Roberts, governess in Glasgow, and William Geddes Borron, a glass and bottle 
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manufacturer in Ardrossan, with having an affair, and asked for damages of £2000, and 
expenses of £300.  Catherine did not answer his summons and made no appearance. 
William did reply, however, and  he admitted to carnal connection with Catherine, but 
claimed David was not entitled to damages because he had shown indifference and cruelty 
to Catherine, driving her to unofficially separate from him in March 1865, whereafter 
William and Catherine met through her work as a governess.  The Lord Ordinary ruled in 
favour of David, ordering William to pay £100 in damages and cover the expenses of 
£115.6s.8d. for all parties in the suit.
181
 
The excuses presented in court for adultery, while not capable of justifying their infidelity, 
provide a unique insight into the home life of nineteenth-century Scotland.  Insights come 
from not only the parties to the action but also from third party witnesses testifying for the 
pursuer, which were sometimes biased.  Still, the testimony from friends, family, officials 
(such as police and reverends who performed the marriage ceremony), and the landlords 
and landladies who let out rooms, illuminated the small details that contributed to the 
marital breakdown.  The defence testimony of the defender, though helpful for the accused, 
was more often than not absent from the case records.   
Three general excuses have emerged as factors in the formation of the adulterous 
relationships: separation of husband and wife; love; and failed expectations.
182
  Physical 
separation occurred for two reasons: either due to migration for employment or an 
unofficial separation owing to ill treatment or bad habits.  It was the leading reason 
attributed to infidelity.  Husbands and wives claimed that while living apart their spouse 
‘alienated his/her affections’.  Dissipated habits, such as intemperance, led to unofficial, 
but sometimes mutual, separations.  As discussed earlier, the formation of an adulterous 
cohabiting relationship by separated spouses was sometimes a necessity in consequence of 
losing their spouses financial support.  Agnes Johnstone or Dickson was accused of ‘carnal 
adulterous conversation intercourse and dealings’ with William Mason, a baker in Duke 
Street Glasgow, whom she lived with at the time of the trial.  In her defences she claimed 
her husband John Dickson, a wright in Cousland, Midlothian, had treated her ‘with great 
barbarity’, was addicted to drink, and would abuse her to the point that she left their home.  
She did not deny living with William, but explained that she worked for him: ‘in order to 
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be removed from the scene where she had endured so much suffering, [Agnes] removed to 
Glasgow.  She was offered a situation and accepted it.’183 
The second most commonly cited reason for adultery was love. Though this was difficult 
to determine and not provable for all the cases, there were clear examples of affairs that 
grew out of a desire for a companionate relationship or an uncontrollable love.  For 
instance, a witness for Robert Hamilton against his wife Mary Rice testified that once after 
being caught in a room alone with James Nimms, Rice told the witness that ‘they were 
doing no harm that day, but were merely leaning upon each other as persons who had a 
regard or affection towards one another; that she said she had been in Nimms’ company a 
hundred times and never would deny that she loved him dearly.’184  In the trial against 
Agnes M’Gee Sinclair or Mackay and John Stewart, hostler (horse keeper), a love letter 
written by John was presented as proof of their adulterous relationship.  Roderick Mackay, 
hotelkeeper of the Commercial Hotel in Biggar, Lanark County, and husband of Agnes had 
discovered their relationship after finding the letter in February 1880.  In the letter John 
repeatedly declared his love for Agnes and his plan to steal her away: ‘If I hadent’ loved 
you, I would not run after you... As soon as I can get work and some money to take us 
from this part of the country, I will let you see wither I am making a fool of you or not, But 
you might see that I love you my dear [sic].’185  John had worked at the Commercial Hotel 
for Roderick and his wife.  Although Roderick had fired John in November 1879, Agnes 
continued to secretly meet him and eventually left Biggar in February 1880 to be closer to 
John in Edinburgh. Roderick filed for divorce a few months after.
186
  
Love was not always the goal; sometimes mere companionship led to an affair.  Witnesses 
in the trial of James Webster against his wife Elizabeth Cairncross or Webster explained 
Elizabeth did not like being on her own.  Two female friends took turns staying with her 
while her husband was away, though after eight months of separation she became pregnant 
with an illegitimate child.
187
  A friend of Jane Boreland or Cassels who testified at the 
divorce trial instituted by Thomas Cassels against Jane, stated that Jane spoke to her of her 
marriage and affair: ‘She said that her own husband was often out at night, and that 
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Templeton used to keep her company by the fire, and that she then commenced keeping 
company with Templeton in his own bedroom.’188   
The third most apparent reason for the affair was failed expectations of the marriage.  This 
is a very general categorisation, but covers the large number of issues that caused a 
marriage to be unhappy.  The legal expectations for a husband and wife were chastity and 
adherence.  The more pervasive social expectations—mostly associated with the middle 
class, but also found in working-class discourses—was the division of familial roles by 
gender.  Wives were the carers, domestic managers, educators, and representative model 
for the family.  Husbands were providers, protectors, and legal and political representative 
for the family.
189
  As husbands and wives had different expectations, how they met these 
often served to define their masculinity and femininity.  Statements from adultery cases 
demonstrate that these expectations were present within common marriages.  For instance, 
Barbara Grant Orrock or Grierson stated that she ‘has been kept by [her husband] in a state 
of discomfort and penury from the date of said marriage’, and that they had separated due 
to his abuse towards her.  Her husband William Grierson charged her with adultery after 
their separation, which he stated was due to her conduct being ‘loose, irregular and 
unbecoming that of a wife’.190  Both parties cited failure to meet the basic marital 
expectations of provision from the husband and obedience and morality from the wife.  In 
another case, the pursuer Matthew Marshall, an engine fitter from Parkhead, Glasgow, 
described what he believed to be the expectations of a husband.  As a witness in his own 
trial Matthew explained: ‘I cannot say why she left me.  She got discontented in her home.  
I had done nothing to make her discontented so far as I am aware.  I was never a day away 
from my work, and I always brought home my wages.  I made about 26/ a week.’191  
Matthew accused his wife Margaret of violently lashing out at him one night, then leaving 
their home.  After their separation Margaret had given birth to an illegitimate child while 
Matthew was working overseas.       
The parties involved in these divorce trials did not always say that they were unhappy in 
their marriage, but described the bad behaviour of their spouse, which often led to an 
unofficial separation.  Descriptions of intemperance, neglect, dissipated habits indicated a 
bad wife or husband.  Intemperance in particular was frequently mentioned.
192
  For 
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instance, in his defence John Gordon Davidson, esquire of Hebbaty, Aberdeenshire, 
claimed his wife was at fault for ruining their marriage: 
 The defender treated the pursuer with kindness and affection; but 
explained, that for many years the defender has suffered great annoyance 
and discomfort at the hands of the pursuer, who had become addicted to 
habits of intemperance.  More particularly after going to [H]ebbaty she was 
frequently in the habit of drinking to such excess as to become intoxicated; 
she became most slovenly in her habits; she associated much with her 
servants; and was almost constantly in the kitchen.  She further indulged in 
most foul, offensive, and insulting language towards the defender and the 
servants.  She also neglected and abused her children, and kept them in a 
state of filth; she also on several occasions surreptitiously carried off the 




Margaret McGibbon or Davidson had filed for divorce on the ground of adultery and 
secondary charge of maltreatment, which she explains was the reason she had left Hebbaty 
to ‘take refuge’ with her father.  Though Davidson was answering the summons sent by 
Margaret, his defence and proof only hurt his case.  The Lord Ordinary found Davidson 
guilty of infidelity and granted Margaret the divorce.  In another case a friend of Reid, 
whose wife left him in Paris for the lithographer Cremer, testified on his behalf that: 
 a little box arrived for the pursuer from the defender—the pursuer opened 
the little box and it contained a broken ring which the pursuer said proved 
to him the defender his wife had left him for ever, as she had said to him 
when they had had differences, that when she returned  that ring to him 
broken he might know every thing was finished between them—the 
difference I allude to had arisen out of the defender dispositions to be too 
extravagant in her expenditure for dress, but the particulars of their 




Sometimes failed marital expectations turned into a general dislike or disrespect for their 
spouse.  Margaret Hunter, for instance, was once overheard by a servant telling her 
husband, ‘that she did not care for him, and that she liked Miller better than him.’195  Julia 
Grant or Ketchen filed for divorce for adultery and a secondary charge of cruelty against 
her husband James Ketchen.  In his answer he claimed his wife abused him, ‘calling him 
offensive names, and using insulting language, stating that she loathed and detested him, 
and repeatedly suggested to him to consort with other women, as she would never be 
satisfied until she obtained herself divorced, in order that she might marry another [sic].’196  
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James tried to use his wife’s condonation of his adultery as collusion and therefore reason 
to dismiss the charges.  Julia was awarded the divorce.  Another example was found in the 
divorce trial of William Hardie against his wife Mary Scott.  Witnesses testified that Mary 
had so much dislike for her husband that she did not even sleep in the same house as him, 
preferring to stay in the farm house of Barelaw Mill with the children and the servants 
rather than the Barelaw Castle where William stayed.  In the farm house Mary began an 
adulterous relationship with a male servant, William Martin.  When she left her husband, 
Mary explained to a neighbour and friend that ‘she could not get on with the pursuer at all 
and she thought it better to leave him.’197  It was also revealed in the testimony that there 
was a substantial age difference of over forty years between William Hardie and Mary.
198
 
The age difference, issues with money, scolding from William Hardie, and a desire to work 
by Mary caused the two to disagree and seemingly the marital breakdown had begun long 
before Mary moved away.
199
     
  
Conclusion 
Divorcing couples represent a minority of the Scottish married population, yet the detailed 
narratives of divorce court records capture some of the individual experiences of adultery 
that led to marital breakdown.  Although divorce was legally available on equal grounds 
for husbands and wives and religious discourse faulted both men and women for licentious 
behaviour, society at large viewed adultery by the wife as a greater and often unforgivable 
offence.  The 65 cases studied support this finding: adultery divorces instigated by the wife 
were only sixteen of the 65 cases (24 per cent).  Moreover, half of the sixteen wives who 
charged adultery also cited maltreatment and desertion, suggesting wives withheld from 
filing for divorce on the ground of adultery when this was the only offence committed.  
Husbands, on the other hand, were more likely to file for divorce if they had an adulterous 
wife, in this sample.  The reasons are attributable to the double standard and better access 
to economic resources: anxiety over pride and honour, fear of passing their wealth down to 
an illegitimate child, and the means to pay the legal fees.  Similarly, the double standard 
notion that accepted men as incapable of controlling their sexual desires could exonerate 
men’s role as paramour as well as allow extra-marital sex to be frequently overlooked by 
families.   
                                                          
197
 CS46/1850/7/67 Hardie v Scott or Hardie.  
198
 Bailey found that wives commonly used age difference as a reason for adultery in her time period; Bailey, 
Unquiet Lives, p. 155.  
199
 CS46/1850/7/67 Hardie v Scott or Hardie. 
128 
 
These adultery cases also revealed patterns about the paramour and the excuses given for 
infidelity.  Given that men and women had different daily activities, the paramour for 
husbands and wives differed as the people they interacted with would differ, for example 
husbands were more likely to have extramarital sex with a stranger, whereas a wife was 
more likely to commit adultery with a lodger.  As for excuses for infidelity, the most 
frequent explanation given was the fact that the couple lived apart, often for work, as well 
as due to unofficial separations initiated by the spouses.     
In short, adultery, though the most common cause for divorce, did not always end a 
marriage.  Although this cannot be misconstrued as acceptance of extramarital affairs, 
there was the possibility that wives would tolerate their husbands’ indiscretions as long as 
he continued to provide for her and their children.  If a husband adhered to and supported 
his family, but was guilty of infidelity, a divorce would sometimes mean a change for the 
worse for a married woman.   
  
 
Chapter Four: Divorce and Desertion      
  
 
 ‘An able-bodied, but somewhat improvident person, having deserted his 
wife and family, they were left in circumstances of such helplessness and 
destitution, as to require aid from the poors’ funds of the burgh.’1 
        
Desertion without divorce was perhaps the most common way to end a marriage, but it was 
also the most hidden form of marital breakdown.  The majority of wives and husbands 
abandoned by a spouse did not file for divorce, despite it being one of the two grounds for 
full dissolution of a marriage since 1573.  The extent of desertion (particularly of wives), 
therefore, was most evident in applications for poor relief, which, as illustrated in the 
above quote, was often a necessity.  The sources analysed in this chapter show two sides to 
the nature of desertion; the Court of Session (CS) records serve as the official cases, and 
Poor Law records reveal the unofficial instances.  Both sides are analysed to demonstrate 
this complex form of marital breakdown and the impact desertion had on abandoned 
spouses.  This study of official and unofficial desertion reveals that more female pursuers 
filed for divorce on this ground than male, yet, these litigants were a minority compared to 
the amount of deserted wives who applied for poor relief.  As desertion often led to 
poverty for wives, especially mothers, going on the Poors’ Roll was logistically a better 
remedy as it provided immediate financial aid without needing to wait the required four 
years to file for divorce. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the historiographical debates related to marital 
desertion.  The rest of the chapter is divided into two sections: official desertion, and 
unofficial desertion.  In the first section desertion is examined using divorce actions filed 
on the ground of desertion.  The sample taken from the CS is presented in tables and 
broken into subsections discussing prominent patterns.  The second section on unofficial 
desertion uses poor relief applications as the primary source.  The section begins with an 
overview of Scottish Poor Law and then examines case studies of three Scottish parishes.  
These records are also tabulated and discussed to show similarities and differences 
between the official and unofficial cases. 
 
There are relatively few historical studies of marital desertion in Scotland.
2
  This may be 
due to the elusiveness of deserting spouses.  Most instances of desertion were not reported, 
                                                          
1
 ‘Desertion of Families’, Caledonian Mercury, 3 December 1838.  
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and if they were, often little was known of the deserting spouse’s whereabouts.  Still, 
micro-studies have provided evidence of marital desertion through a few different sources.  
For Scotland, Leah Leneman used consistorial actions from 1684 to 1830.  Out of 904 
cases she collected, 101 were filed on the ground of desertion; 26 or 26.3 per cent were 
filed by the husband, 74 or 73.7 per cent were filed by the wife.  Her main findings 
conclude, first, that more wives filed for a divorce for desertion than husbands; second, 
that the increase in divorce suits for adultery was ‘matched’ by actions on the ground of 
desertion; third, that most desertions took place after less than one year of marriage; and 
fourth, that most pursuers filed after four to ten years of being abandoned.  Her last finding 
in particular reflects the impact of judicial regulations on family circumstances, as it was 
required to prove at least four years of wilful and malicious desertion by a spouse in order 
to file for a divorce.
3
 
To explain the higher rate of desertion certain economic and societal circumstances have 
been proposed as influential factors.  Poverty in particular has been linked to the high rates 
of desertion in the nineteenth century.  Lawrence Stone’s extensive work on marriage, 
divorce and the family in England only briefly addressed desertion, but associated it with 
the poorest families as they could not afford a legal divorce.
4
  He also linked it as the 
easiest solution for poor husbands; ‘for the poor, the simplest was just to abandon his 
family, to walk out of the house one day and never come back.  Desertion was one of three 
alternatives to divorce for the poor in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; bigamy 
and wife-sale as the other two.’5  Roderick Phillips discusses the correlation between 
desertion and poverty as a means as well as a reason for abandonment.  He argues that a 
man in complete destitution had ‘an absence of material constraints’ that enabled him to 
leave the human relationships he might have had.
6
  This has been supported by evidence 
showing that desertion rates fluctuated with seasonal employment.
7
  Still, husbands of the 
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 For Scotland see Leah Leneman, Alienated Affections: the Scottish experience of divorce and separation, 
1684-1830, (Edinburgh, 1998).  For England, America and Australia see Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: 
a history of divorce in western society, (Cambridge, 1988); Olive Anderson, ‘Emigration and Marriage 
Break-up in Mid-Victorian England’, The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 50, No.1 (February, 
1997), pp. 104-109; Beverly Schwartzberg, ‘“Lots of them did that”: Desertion, Bigamy, and Marital Fluidity 
in Late-Nineteenth Century America’, Journal of Social History, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Spring 2004), pp. 573-600; 
Christina Twomey, ‘“Without Natural Protectors”: Responses to wife desertion in gold-rush Victoria’, 
Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 27, No. 108, (1997), pp. 22-46. 
3
 Leah Leneman, Alienated Affections, pp. 13, 16, 21-24. 
4
 This was seemingly due to the English Common Law not allowing divorce for desertion until the 1857 Act 
where after wives could only use desertion as an aggravated ground for divorce along with adultery.   
5
 Lawrence Stone, Broken Lives: Separation and Divorce in England 1660-1857, (Oxford, 1993), p. 18; and 
Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, (London, 1977), pp. 141-143. 
6
 Phillips, Putting Asunder, p. 371. 
7
 Phillips references D.D. M. Snell, Annals of the Labouring Poor (Cambridge, 1985), p. 361; Phillips, 
Putting Asunder, p. 371, footnote 26. Bailey also discusses the connection between economic downturns and 
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middling rank found to have deserted their wives were vulnerable to seasonal 
unemployment, underemployment, and many other uncontrollable issues that may prevent 
a man from working.
8
  Joanne Bailey, although also finding evidence of poverty 
contributing to desertion, wrote that her study, ‘shows that abandonment was not just a 
habit of the lowest social ranks.  We need to adjust our preconceptions that it was only men 
without property who deserted their families because they were less encumbered by 
property and financial obligations.’9    
Employment also had a large impact on marital breakdown as many men (and women) 
travelled or lived away from home for work.  As a result some married couples spent long 
periods apart.  The 1871 census report showed an awareness of this situation: 
 In a commercial country like Scotland, it was to be expected that, on the 
night when the census was taken, a very considerable number of the 
husbands would be absent from their wives… Many of the husbands are in 
the Army, Navy, Merchant Shipping or fisheries, or are engaged in 




Absence did not indicate desertion.  What this report illustrated was the extent of husbands 
and wives who were forced to live separately due to employment opportunities.  Thus, on 
the night of April 3
rd
 1871, the Census record showed that 6.3 per cent of husbands were 
absent from their wives, or 8.5 per cent of wives reported their husbands absent.
11
  There 
was, however, a direct link between husbands leaving in search of employment and 
families being abandoned.  Husbands could (and did) use the opportunity to migrate or 
emigrate for employment to desert their family.  For instance the application for poor relief 
from Robert Calderwood’s wife stated her husband was an 84 year old travelling salesman, 
who for the past several years had rarely lived at their home and only supported her 
occasionally by paying rent.
12
  If this case illustrates anything, it is that desertion could be 
complicated; although Robert may have paid rent sometimes, he had reneged on all other 
responsibilities of a husband.   
                                                                                                                                                                                
rising desertion rates at the end of the eighteenth century in England; Joanne Bailey, Unquiet Lives: 
Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England, 1660-1800, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 174-178. 
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 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, pp. 173-174.  
9
 Bailey, Unquiet Lives, p. 173.  
10
 PP 1873 [C.841] Vol. II, Eighth Decennial Census of the Population of Scotland taken 3d April 1871, with 
report, p. xxvi. 
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 PP 1873 [C.841] Vol. II, Eighth Decennial Census, p. xxvi. 
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 Paisley Poor Relief Records, 1840, Vol. 11/1, Statement 304. 
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This aspect of nineteenth-century marriage reflects the ideology of the husband as the 
breadwinner and the wife as the dependent.
13
  The notion that men should be the main 
provider for families was prevalent in the nineteenth century following the new economic 
trends of the industrial revolution.  Historians from the twentieth century have identified 
the inadequacy of this economic structure and the damage it caused to working-class 
families.
14
  They have also determined that this notion was mainly present within wealthy 
middle-class culture rather than the majority of the population.
15
   Yet it still seemed to 
impact the general population when it came to public images.  For instance Anna Clark 
argues that this ideal was applied by trade unionists in order to gain the respectable 
working-class vote in the 1830s and 40s:  
Instead, trade unionists cleverly exploited the contradictions between 
bourgeois morality and theories of political economy.  They drew upon 
domesticity to demand the breadwinner wage for themselves, claiming that 
they needed higher wages and the legislative exclusion of women and 




This societal and economic pressure placed on men was particularly detrimental to an 
unskilled labourer, men employed seasonally, and men whose occupations were depleting 
with new technology and women entering the workforce.  
Men deserting their families on the premise of seeking employment was an issue around 
the world as well as for Scotland.  A study of Victoria, the Australian colony, for example, 
highlighted that contemporaries recognised the correlation between desertion and 
migration.
17
  A lack of jobs meant men struggled to provide for their families and 
consequently migrated.  And, like men who emigrated, some husbands never returned.  
Twomey argued that the rhetoric surrounding this social observation reflected the middle-
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class notion of domesticity and the societal pressure on men to be breadwinners cultivated 
in western societies.
18
    
Thus the connection between emigration and desertion has also been argued as having a 
correlation to marital breakdown.  This was outlined by Olive Anderson through her 
evaluation of deserted wives in England, and also highlighted by Alan Horstman in his 
study of Victorian Divorce.
19
  The literature on other western countries suggests that some 
men who emigrated in search of employment were also the same men who deserted their 
families.  In some instances the initial plan to move may have involved the family 
following once work was obtained, but often the family was never sent the funds needed to 
travel.  Scotland had a high rate of emigration: in the 1850s and 1860s 300,000 Scots 
emigrated.
20
  As a result it is likely that of the large numbers of men (and some women) 
who emigrated a proportion were abandoning their families.    
Enlistment in the services has been analysed in some studies of desertion as another means 
of abandoning a family.
21
  It allowed a man to relocate, often in far off countries, with pay 
and board.  Besides relocation, enlistment also gave men an opportunity to fake their death, 
and with that feigned independence some men married again and started a new family.  For 
France, Phillips wrote that, ‘the connection between absence or desertion and military 
service is, in fact, a strong one, and we should expect it to be so particularly in times of 
war’, finding that enlistment was used as a means ‘of escaping an unsatisfactory 
marriage.’22  
This form of desertion existed in Scotland as well.  As indicated previously by the 1871 
census, enlistment in the army was a means of employment for husbands who may have 
been idle, or looking for adventure and change.  Charles M’Gregor enlisted in August of 
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 Twomey, ‘Without Natural Protectors’, p. 25. 
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1840 after being out of work since February due to his ‘bad habits’, leaving behind his 
wife of four years and two children.
23
  Enlistment however did not always mean 
abandonment.  Ann Carr travelled to Canada with her enlisted husband while he served 
time in the army, and even returned with him to Scotland.  It was not enlistment that ended 
their marriage, but his intemperance and abuse.
24
  
Discourses in the Scottish media suggest that the major concerns about desertion centred 
on men failing to fulfil their role as family breadwinner and provider.  This related to the 
wider public issue of parishes supporting deserted women and children when there was no 
one else to do this (this will be discussed in the unofficial desertion section). These 
expectations for husbands and fathers were evident in newspaper reports of desertion.  For 
example, the Caledonian Mercury article ‘Desertion of Families’ included a note stating 
that the maintenance of family was the natural obligation of a husband and father.  It was 
believed that prosecution of deserters would be a ‘great measure’ to ‘relieve the 
community from an oppressive burden, and prevent worthless individuals from acting in 
violation of an imperious natural obligation.’25   
The history of deserting wives has received even less attention.  Bailey explains that the 
discourse related to deserting spouses tended to be gender specific.  Moreover, desertion 
did not always amount to marital breakdown.  In Bailey’s study this was evident from 
parishes’ efforts to reunite abandoned spouses without punishment, advertisements in local 
newspapers, warrants for arrest and summons of adherence.
26
  In Scotland the preference 
for reconciling married couples was also visible through similar methods of tracking.  
Husbands used local newspapers to report to the public that their wife had absconded, and 
to alert store owners that if she attempted to use his name for store credit it was without 
permission.  By cutting of her access to money a deserting wife may have been forced to 
return, or find another source of monetary support.
27
  Deserting wives may have equally 
received less attention from contemporary authorities, as her absence from a family home 
would not necessarily create the same vacuum of poverty as would a husband’s; 28 a 
deserted husband could only apply for poor relief in Scotland if he was ill, aged or 
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disabled, where as a deserted wife, especially if a mother, could use her desertion and 




Official Desertion in Court of Session Divorce Records 
In this section official dissolutions of marriage will be examined through CS divorce for 
desertion cases.  Of the 253 extracted decrees collected, 121 cases were used for qualitative 
analysis.  48 cases of the 121 were filed on the ground of desertion or non-adherence and 
examined for this study.  32 of the 48 cases, or 67 per cent, were filed by the wife against 
her husband, leaving sixteen cases instigated by a deserted husband, or 33 per cent.  
Desertion cases were relatively few but increased between 1870 and 1880.  There were two 
cases from 1830, four in 1840, two again in 1850, five in 1860, twelve in 1870 and twenty 
by 1880.  
Below, the evidence from these case records is divided by instigator to determine, firstly, 
the length of the marriage before desertion; secondly, the interval between when the 
pursuer was deserted and when they filed the action; and thirdly, the length of time the 
action took from start to finish.
30
   
 
Table 4.1 Length of Marriage Up to Desertion, Court of Session Cases 
 
Husband as Instigator             16* [100%] 
Under 1 yr              7 [43.75 %] 
1-5 yrs               3 [18.75%] 
6-10 yrs               3 [18.75%] 
Over 10 yrs              1 [6.25%] 
 
*Two cases did not have this information available 
Wife as Instigator   32 [100%] 
Under 1 yr    7 [21.8%] 
1-5 yrs    14 [40%] 
6-10 yrs                                6 [18.75%] 
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Table 4.2 Interval between Desertion and Action, Court of Session Cases 
 
Husband as Instigator  16 [100%] 
Less than 4 yrs*  1 [6.25%] 
4+ years                 5 [31.25%] 
5-10 yrs                 5 [31.25%] 
11-15 yrs                4 [25%] 
Over 16 yrs  1 [6.25%] 
 
*Action of Adherence 
 
Wife as Instigator  32 [100%] 
4+ yrs   3 [9%] 
5-10 yrs                 20 [62.5%] 
11-15 yrs  5 [15.6%] 




Table 4.3 Length of Action, Court of Session Cases 
 
Husband and Wife as Instigator   48 [100%] 
<1 month           15 
1 month                       11 
<2 months    4 
2 months           3 
< 3 months           2 
3 months           4 
4-9 months           8 




The data compiled in Table 4.1 shows that the majority of marriages where the husband 
was the instigator of the divorce, or where the wife deserted, were less than one year in 
length before the desertion.  In the cases where the wife was the instigator, or the husband 
deserted, the majority of marriages were between one and five years long.  The information 
provided in Table 4.2 reiterates the divorce legislation that required the desertion to have 
been maintained for a minimum of four years before a divorce was allowed.  Furthermore, 
the fact that many couples took longer than the required four years to file for divorce was 
likely caused by the need to raise and save money to pay for the action fees, time needed to 
find the deserting spouse in order to send a summons,
31
 or years of waiting in hopes that 
the spouse would return or get in contact.  Thus, the findings for Table 4.3 showing a 
majority of cases were processed and decerned
32
 in less than a month or one month would 
have been a benefit to many couples, as the shorter the length of the action, the less 
expensive the fees.   
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Desertion and Children    
Another feature of desertion provided by CS cases is the prominence of children.  In cases 
instigated by the wife, 22 out of 32 had at least one child alive.  Of the actions filed by 
husbands, on the other hand, the majority of the couples did not have children from their 
marriage.  Only three of the sixteen wives who left their husbands also abandoned children.   
 
Table 4.4 Presence of Children in Court of Session Divorce Cases 
 
Cases Where Wife Deserted     16 
No Children of Marriage          11 
No Children Alive           2 
1 Child            0 
2 Children           2 
More than 2 Children          1 
 
Cases Where Husband Deserted  32 
 No Children of Marriage                  8 
 No Children Alive                   2 
 1 Child                    9 
 2 Children                   9 
 More than 2 Children                  4* 
 
*One wife had 5 children from a previous marriage but no 
children from current 
 
  
These findings support the notion that women were more likely to remain in an unhappy 
marriage when children were present.
33
  Without children unhappy wives had less of a 
commitment to upholding the marriage.  Of the three cases where the husband was the 
pursuer and had children, two are instances of the wife absconding with her children.  Both 
cases have a few other similarities: divorce decrees were awarded in 1880 for each case; 
both had two children from the marriage; and both cases hint at maltreatment by the 
husband.  Most significantly, the catalyst of the desertion, based on the pursuers’ 
summonses, appears to have been due to the wife’s family intervening and bringing their 
daughter back home.  According to both husbands’ complaints it was the interference of 
the wife’s family that caused the breakdown of the marriage.  Arguably the support of the 
wife’s family was a contributing factor in the wife’s ability to leave and take her children 
with her.  Neither wife was described as employed.  Ann Guthrie had been married to 
James Brown for only three years before she feigned a brief visit to her parents, in reality 
deserting her husband and taking their children to her parents’ home in Abernethy, 
Perthshire.
34
  Ann Calder’s marriage to Thomas Brown had lasted eight years until she 
abandoned his home selling off his furniture and moving back to her father’s home in 
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  Calder was able to keep her children at her parents’ home with 
her, but Guthrie was forced to return with her children to her husband after he filed for a 
custody warrant.  Guthrie only remained one night with James Brown after returning the 
children, running back to her parents’ home the next day.   
The third instance of a wife leaving her husband when they had children together is one 
where she left her children behind.  John Boax, an engineer, was married to Elizabeth 
Johnstone for 26 years, she having borne six children, five who survived childhood.  This 
case from 1870 had little detail besides the complaint stating that the wife left her husband 
and for four years refused to return to him.  The lack of details in Boax v Johnstone or 
Boax is not uncommon within the CS extracted divorce records.
36
  According to Scottish 
Law in order to obtain a divorce on the ground of desertion the desertion had to be ‘wilful 
and malicious’, and unwarranted and unjust without cause or reason.  More often, 
however, the documents only reveal the type and means of desertion perpetrated by the 
defender.  For example the summons submitted by Susan O’Rourke in 1850 was 
commonly found in other desertion cases, both male and female.  Edward O’Rourke, who 
deserted his family, was accused of,  
shaking off all fear of God, and forgetting his matrimonial vows and 
engagements, upon or about the fifteenth day of July in the said year 1843, 
fled from the Kingdom and unnaturally and undutifully deserted the 
Pursuer, his spouse, her company and society, and has withheld and 
withdrawn himself from her from that time.  That the Pursuer was not 
apprised of the intentions of the Defender, as he had no cause of complaint 
against her, and not only left her in a state of complete destitution, but 
never in any way contributed towards her support, leaving her a burden 




The Reasons for Desertion as Found in Court of Session Cases  
Earlier in this chapter poverty, employment, and enlistment were discussed as commonly 
attributed causes of desertion by historians and contemporaries.  This study has 
demonstrated further reasons, as well as the above three.  Where it is available in the CS 
cases, the cause of the desertion falls neatly into categories: adultery or bigamy; 
maltreatment; alcohol usage and other ‘bad habits’; money problems; and family 
intervention or interference.  Of the 48 cases only two showed the desertion to have been 
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caused by an adulterous relationship.  If the defender had left the pursuer for an adulterous 
partner, the pursuer more often than not filed for divorce on the ground of adultery (as 
discussed in Chapter Three).  In the cases of Smith or Simpson v Simpson, and Reid v 
Gibson or Reid, however, both pursuers pled for a divorce on the ground of desertion even 
though they could have charged adultery.  It is unclear why these parties opted to do so, 
however, it illustrates further the complexity of marital breakdown when forced to fit 
within the confines of the judicial system.
38
  In 1870 Christina Smith filed for divorce 
against her husband James Simpson claiming he had left for work on the Monday and 
never returned to her parents’ home in Gifford where they were living.  James’ brother 
filled in the story of James’ disappearance when he testified.  He claimed that before James 
and Christina were married in 1863, James had been in a cohabitating relationship in New 
York with a woman named Emma Weymouth, whom he had four children with.  Eighteen 
months before marrying Christina, James had returned to Scotland leaving Emma and the 
children in New York, allegedly avoiding prosecution for deserting the Army.  At the time 
of James’ disappearance from Christina’s home, Emma had returned from New York in 
search of James.  Emma persuaded James to return to New York with her and they quickly 
arranged a plan to run away.  With the help of his brother, James and Emma stayed in 
Edinburgh for two weeks before sailing to America.  The pursuer’s parents also testified, 
describing the non-adherence of their son-in-law as ‘wilful and improper desertion.’39  It 
was possible that Christina and her agents could not prove James had committed adultery 
after leaving with Emma, and therefore charged desertion in order to win the divorce suit. 
The desertion of James Reid by his wife Helen Gibson according to James followed, ‘in 
consequence of some words which we had about a letter which I found she had received 
from a soldier named J. Troup Murray, 2
nd
 Dragoons, Hamilton.  I did not consent to her 
leaving me.’40  James also stated that Helen, when she left his home, went to live with 
Murray, and he had never seen or heard from her since.  They had only been married five 
months, but he had waited nine years to file for divorce.
41
  
In 1870 John Watt filed for divorce against his wife, who had deserted him ‘without any 
cause or reason’.  John, however, had since Harriet Fitten or Watt left, entered into a 
bigamous marriage.  His complaint stated that, ‘seven years after [Harriet’s] wilful 
desertion [John] during the whole of this period never having heard from her and being 
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ignorant of his responsibilities, contracted a second marriage.’42  Two years after his 
second marriage he was arrested for bigamy and sentenced to eighteen months 
imprisonment.  At his trial his first wife, Harriet, appeared against him as a witness for the 
Crown.  On that encounter Harriet reportedly told him she wanted nothing more to do with 
him.  Though Harriet made an appearance in 1859 at his bigamy trial, she did not respond 
to the summons of divorce against herself in 1870.  John’s plea of ignorance to civil law, 
though possibly a lie, could equally be an indicator of what was common knowledge.  
After being abandoned by his wife for at least five years, he believed he was entitled to 
remarry.  This is also illustrative of a man who respected the institution of marriage enough 
to enter into it a second time.  As discussed earlier, remarriage rates could signify the value 
attached to the ceremony and state of matrimony even after leaving a failed marriage.
43
       
The most frequently cited reason for desertion was maltreatment and alcohol abuse 
coupled with ‘bad habits.’  Often, more than one of these behaviours was mentioned in the 
same complaint.  Cruelty in marriage is the subject of a separate chapter; therefore this 
section will only briefly discuss maltreatment in context of desertion.  Nine cases 
specifically cited maltreatment, alcohol abuse or bad habits.  Seven of those cases were 
instigated by the wife, while the remaining two were instigated by the husband.  In these 
two remaining cases the maltreatment was revealed in the testimony of witnesses. In the 
case of James Brown against his wife Ann Guthrie, James admitted to losing about £300 
his wife brought to the marriage when his cattle-dealer business failed, but claimed 
‘[d]own to that time I had always been on perfectly good terms with my wife, and even 
after that, there was no difference between us to my knowledge.’  Ann, who provided a 
defence, admitted that she had left her husband because they often quarrelled.  When asked 
‘What about?’, she replied, ‘[h]is unkindness to me.  The loss of my money also led to 
disputes between us.  When I went away on the visit to Abernethy…, I did not say whether 
I would return or not, but I told pursuer often before that, and shortly before that, that I 
would go.’44 
Where available, letters between the husband and wife serve as material evidence of wives’ 
defiance and determination to leave an abusive marriage, even if it meant desertion.  As it 
has already been established, these parties who filed for divorce were the minority, yet they 
reveal a portion of the female population who empowered themselves by taking action to 
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better their situation.  Ann White went to a solicitor for professional advice in 1839 after 
two years in her abusive marriage, though she had already taken the initiative to leave her 
husband over a year earlier.  Writer to the Signet, Henry John Burn of Edinburgh testified:  
that the Deponent [Henry] first knew the said parties in the spring or 
summer of 1839 and he so knew them from his having been applied for 
professionally by the Defender Mrs. Gray, to advise her as to how she 
would act as to her pecuniary interests, she Mrs. Gray having, in 
consequence of a quarrel with her husband, separated herself from him.  
Depones that the Deponent, on several occasions, advised the Defender 
Mrs. Gray to endeavor to get matters made up between herself and her 
husband, and to return to her husband’s house and live with him.  Depones 
that, on all these occasions, the Defender Mrs. Gray always stated that it 
was her decided determination never again to live with the pursuer, and 
said repeatedly that from the usage she received from him she never would 
enter his house again. [sic]
45
   
Ann White faced repeated recommendations to reconcile, even from her own friends, 
suggesting the social pressures and popular perception of failed marriages.  Ann Calder 
and Marion Walton discussed earlier, demonstrated similar resolution as Ann White.  In 
these cases the two women were represented through letters they wrote to their husbands, 
which were presented as evidence against them in Court.  After already living with her 
parents for almost three years and repeated requests by her husband to return, Calder wrote 
to him in 1875 to say, ‘As for a house for me you need not put yourself to any trouble for I 
will not come.’46  Walton left her husband under the pretence of a visit to her parents.  The 
day after she left she wrote a letter to her husband saying that she would not be returning.  
The letter was used in the pursuer’s complaint as evidence of her desertion:  
A visit from you will be quite unavailing as you will not be permitted to 
enter the house. You may perhaps think fit to take some action in order to 
compel me to return. But I have to inform you that I will never return 
except at an order from the Law Courts of England in which your conduct 
as well as mine will be thoroughly ventilated. Any communication you 
choose to make after this must be made to J. G. Millican Esq. Solicitor, 
Alston.  Should you attempt to annoy me I will at once apply for an 
injunction from the magistrate to restrain you.
47
 
The major difference between White, Calder and Walton was the familial support Calder 
and Walton received.  White, possibly with no family to rely on, went to a childhood 
friend’s home and remained with her and her husband as long as she was able to before 
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finding employment as a domestic servant and then became untraceable.  Her 
determination to escape her marriage comes across powerfully in the case documents.   
Another reason for desertion cited by wives was economic failure.  The cult of domesticity 
existed as an ideal, but in practice it was difficult for wives to achieve.  A major reason for 
this disparity was the challenge for husbands to successfully serve as the breadwinner, 
which was the foundation needed to allow wives to stay at home.  Horrell and Humphries 
found that, ‘In only a few occupations were men earning enough to buy their families’ 
sustenance and to provide the roof over their heads; for most households the earnings of 
women and children were essential and not becoming noticeably less so over time’48  
Without the stability of a regular wage from husbands, wives could not afford to perform 
as a middle-class housewife.  Some wives from the CS cases demonstrate that this failure 
to provide was indeed a breach of marital expectations, and a catalyst for their desertion.  
For instance, when Ann Guthrie’s husband started and failed in a business as a cattle-
dealer and dairyman with the £300 she brought into their marriage, their relationship began 
to fall apart.
49
  Jane Soutar’s marriage allegedly broke down when her husband, a baker, 
opened his own bakery in the same building as their home.  The business failed and the 
combination of living in the same premises led Jane to give birth to their only son 
prematurely.  Shortly after that creditors took possession of their home, furniture and 
everything else.  Jane was forced to move with her child back into her parents’ home, but 
her husband did not move with her.  She had limited communication with him and mostly 
heard of his movements from contacts.  By 1876 the last information she heard of him was 
he had set sail on the ‘Scottish Knight’ to Townswell Queensland, and whilst on board the 
ship he had entered into a second and bigamous marriage with another woman.  The 
Soutars had been married ten months before he deserted her, yet she waited twelve years to 
file an action against him.
50
 
Janet Thomson married James Straiton in March of 1860.  He was a grocer and merchant 
in Glasgow.  Janet followed James when he moved shop and house and lived in ignorance 
of James financial troubles.  It was not until James disappeared on August 25
th
 1861 
leaving only a note behind for Janet that she learned he was badly in debt, having 
worsened it through gambling.  James let Janet know he was sailing to Australia and even 
sent her money, promising to return home as soon as he raised some more.  That was the 
last she heard of him.  In 1868 she found out he had changed his name and was constantly 
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  Of these marriages each wife suffered from their husbands’ failure at business, 
which in turn left them impoverished.  While Ann Guthrie took the initiative to leave her 
husband, Jane Soutar and Janet Thomson were deserted; their husbands’ fled overseas to 
escape debt and to restart their lives, as well as families.  Running away from debt also 
meant absconding from the burden of supporting a wife and children.   
In the case of wives who deserted their husbands, family pressures appear to have played a 
part in prompting them to leave. This pattern seems to have been predominantly a feature 
of cases where the wife deserted her husband.  Several husbands who filed for divorce on 
the charge of desertion blamed their wives’ family for her abandonment.  The most striking 
example of this was in the case of Marion Walton (discussed earlier) who had shown 
strength and defiance against her husband in her letter to him.  This defiance may have 
only been possible with the help of family intervention.  Her husband William Burns had 
argued that it was the fault of her family that she left him after only five months of 
marriage: 
 A few days after [Marion’s] departure [William] accidentally found a 
document titled on the outside “Instructions when required but only 
available for any Friday”… From this document… it appears that 
[Marion’s] departure from [William’s] house had been carefully planned 
for her by her father and was to be studiously concealed from her 
husband.
52
   
William Wallace and Agnes Tait of the Isle of Cumbrae had an even shorter union.  The 
two married in secret without the consent of Agnes’ father.  She then returned to her 
father’s home right after the ceremony intending to keep their marriage secret and reveal it 
at the right time.  Their plan was ruined by the Reverend that married them who, unaware 
of the secrecy involved, announced their wedding in the newspaper.  Agnes’ father 
immediately forbade her from returning to William. Shortly after William received a letter 
from Agnes saying she would not live with him.  After repeated efforts by William to 
contact Agnes he received a firm letter of discouragement: ‘As I understand you have been 
in Edinburgh several times lately… I must have a written promise from you that this time 
you will cease trying to find me.’53  Though it is unclear if Agnes truly desired the 
separation, it is clear that her father had a great influence over her relationship.   
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Means of Desertion 
Once a spouse had resolved to leave the marriage, there were five common means to do so: 
move back with one’s parents or family; emigration; employment; enlistment; or cohabit 
with a new partner.  Gender differences were evident when determining the means of 
desertion used.  In the case of deserting wives, family support was more than just a form of 
influence; it enabled a wife to leave her unhappy marriage.  The majority of the available 
desertion divorce cases reveal that when a wife left her husband she went directly to her 
parents’ home.  Equally, when a wife was deserted she would, if possible, go back to her 
family.  Fathers who testified on behalf of their daughters did not hesitate to state they had 
become the sole provider for her and her children.  John Willcott, father of Isabella 
Willcott or Whyte who moved in with him after her husband deserted her, testified: ‘She 
has continued to live with me ever since... There has been no letters come to her from him, 
and he has contributed nothing towards her support or that of her children.  I have 
supported them entirely, and educated them, and everything.’54  
Desertion patterns of husbands further reflect a gender divide showing some male specific 
patterns.  First, as discussed earlier, husband were more likely to desert their families 
through emigration overseas.  This study of Scottish divorce cases has demonstrated that 
among deserting husbands a large proportion of them used emigration as a means to leave 
their family behind in Scotland.  There were some wives who emigrated, but the 
indisputable majority were male.  This can be seen in Poor Relief statements as well, 
which will be discussed in the next section.  The divorce case records highlight in great 
detail the stories of desertion through travel.  24 out of the 48 CS cases stated that the 
deserting spouse had gone overseas.  Often these cases were not straight forward instances 
of abandonment.  For example, some husbands left to look for work and did continue 
communication with their spouse in Scotland sometimes for several years, others with just 
one letter.  Some wives received money for their maintenance, though only for a short 
time.  Mary Meek, for instance, received occasional sums of money from her husband for 
up to two years after he had gone to work as an engineer on board a steamship to Monte 
Video, Uruguay.
55
  Jane Dryborough’s husband sent her and their three children £230 in 
total and kept in correspondence over the first few years after he left for Australia before 
breaking contact.
56
  Others claimed they had no contribution directly or indirectly from 
their husbands, such as Mary Ann Thomson whose husband wrote to her in April 1875 
                                                          
54
 CS46/1870/12/36 Willcott or Whyte v Whyte. 
55
 CS46/1880/8/64 Meek or Allan v Allan. 
56
 CS46/1870/7/74 Dryborough or Binnie v Binnie. 
145 
 
from London to say he intended to go to Cape of Good Hope, South Africa.  By the time of 
the trial in 1880, Mary Ann had received nothing for herself or her children for over four 
years.
57
   
As discussed earlier, employment was not only a reason but also a means of desertion for 
husbands.  When unhappy with their current situation some husbands left claiming they 
were going to look for work and then ceased all communication with their family while 
away.
58
  Isabella Willcott, daughter of John Willcott and wife of Lawrence Whyte, filed for 
divorce in 1870 complaining her husband had deserted her after he was unemployed for 
four months.  They had one child together and she was pregnant with her second child 
when he sold all their belongings, brought the family to Isabella’s parents’ home and went 
off in search of work.  Isabella stated in her complaint it was believed he went abroad, yet 
no one could confirm his whereabouts.  She had not heard from him since March 1858.
59
  
Mary Steven, wife of John Mill, experienced abandonment twice when John first deserted 
her and their two sons in May 1873.  He left hoping to find better employment in London, 
leaving behind a job working for the North British Railway Company in Edinburgh.  He 
then returned in August 1873 for his mother’s funeral where he met with Mary but quickly 
left again.  A month later he sent her a message asking for their eldest son to be sent to 
him, which she believed to be preparation for the whole family joining him in London.  
Instead she never heard from John again.  In March 1874 she was informed by her bother-
in-law’s wife that John and her oldest son had gone to New Zealand.  Mary had by 1880 
still found no trace of her son or her husband.
60
 
Another commonly associated trope of husband desertion was enlistment.  In the CS 
sample, however, only three cases emerged where the wife claimed her husband deserted 
after enlisting with a regiment.  It is also noticeable that the action of enlisting appears 
more of a means to escape the marriage rather than a cause.  Alexander White, a baker, left 
his family in Edinburgh on the pretence of looking for work, and found employment as a 
baker for the Commissariot Bakeries at Kadikoi in the Crimea.  Though he had not enlisted 
(his wife believed he did), he was employed by this branch of the army.  White took 
advantage of the overseas opportunity provided by the army’s presence in Crimea to 
abandon his family in Scotland.
61
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The last means for desertion, cohabiting with another person, allowed the deserter to form 
a new relationship, which may have been the cause of the desertion in the first place.  As 
mentioned earlier, only a few cases charged adultery along with desertion, however, it was 
likely that many absconding husbands and wives formed cohabiting relationships out of 
necessity.
62
   
The Characters of Husbands and Wives and Working to Support the Family  
The CS divorce cases can provide insights into the kind of behaviour that was deemed to 
be appropriate for husbands and wife.  It should be remembered that it was in the pursuer’s 
best interest to omit any bad behaviour on their part.  Though it is impossible to determine 
how much of the descriptions were accurate or exaggerated, they are useful examples of 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour as expected by the Scottish judicial system.  Thus, 
even though the husband was undoubtedly expected to be the financial provider according 
to social norms, the value of a hardworking woman is also evident.  In defence of an 
abandoned wife, the woman was sometimes described as industrious or of good habits.  
Alternatively, if the wife was reputed to be of bad habits, neglectful, or a drunk, this was 
stated as a way to discredit her character in court, or refuse her relief from the Poors’ Roll.  
Still this was not accepted as an excuse for desertion.  
Conversely, witness statements (where available) illustrate working wives being described 
as having positive characteristics in contrast to their feckless husbands.  In the case of 
Helen Boyd against her husband James Thomas Cockburn two witnesses for the pursuer 
made such a contrast when the first stated, ‘I cannot say whether or not the defender was a 
good workman; but I know that he was not industrious—he was rather lazy.  I knew that 
pursuer had to work for her own maintenance after her marriage’.  The second testified 
that, ‘[t]he pursuer was a well behaved, industrious person during the time I knew her; I 
never saw anyone more so. I had a very high opinion of her conduct.’63  The pursuer’s 
credibility was reinforced by the fact that neither witness was a family member. 
There was, however, a distinction made between an industrious woman working to support 
her family and the wife who left her husband and family for employment.  The former was 
acceptable in a circumstance such as Mrs Cockburn, the latter was not.  Working women 
became more common during industrialisation, although as explained by Eleanor Gordon, 
of the women who worked in factories (for instance), ‘43 per cent of the female labour 
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force were under eighteen, and the largest single category of worker was young girls 
between thirteen and fourteen years of age.’64  Though there were an increasing number of 
women working in factories, few were married.  Besides factories women largely worked 
in domestic service, agriculture and clothing.
65
  Of the 48 desertion cases found in the CS 
extracted cases eight cases mentioned the wife as employed in a separate trade from her 
husband.  Five of those eight were filed by the wife.  The remaining three cases 
demonstrate wives using employment as a means to escape their marriage.  For example, 
Robert Liddle caught his wife packing up her belongings and attempting to catch a train 
when he returned home early from work:  
The pursuer asked the defender for an explanation of her conduct when she 
informed him that she had taken a situation as a wet nurse.  This was the 
first intimation the pursuer had of any intention on her part to leave him or 
take a situation and he believes that she intended to keep him in ignorance 
until she got away.  The pursuer objected to her leaving him and urged her 
to remain at home but she left in defiance of his remonstrances taking her 
child along with her.
66
   
Robert Lawson Peebles of Colinsburgh, Fife, gave a similar account of his wife’s 
desertion, claiming that he had no idea she intended to leave him, but returned home to 
find all of her belongings gone.  He afterwards learned she had moved to Glasgow to 
become a domestic servant.
67
  Robina Bell McKenzie or Borthwick, wife of James Robert 
Borthwick, left her husband’s home in Madras to join her sister in her milliner business 
also in Madras, then moved on to Calcutta to work as a milliner for Messieurs Francis 
Harrison Hathaway and Company Drapers and Outfitters.  She eventually completely 
disappeared, even her family did not know where she was.   Allegedly she travelled to 
Australia with a man she met in Calcutta.
68
  Each husband claimed that their wives 
deceptively found employment as a means of escaping their marriage, and ignorance of 
their wife’s dissatisfaction.   
Women who found their marriage had broken down due to desertion were put in dire 
circumstances compared to deserted husbands.
69
  Though women acting as the 
breadwinner were more common than the ideal of the male breadwinner would suggest, in 
most situations women’s work was under-paid compared to men’s wages, sometimes less 
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than half the earnings.
70
  Furthermore, married women were in some industries paid less 
than single woman due to the shorter hours they worked.
71
  Thus a deserted woman, who 
often had dependents, would struggle even with employment to support a family solely on 
her income.
72
  Some women were able to manage, at least temporarily.  Dolina MacKay, 
deserted wife of Angus Campbell, claimed after her husband absconded in 1862 she spent 
the next eight years moving about Edinburgh parish supporting herself and child entirely 
through needlework, sewing and service before filing for divorce in 1870.
73
  Both Janet 
Thomson or Straiton of Duke Street, Glasgow and Catherine Reid Aitken or Scott of 
Dumbarton Road, Glasgow, began dairy businesses after their husbands deserted them.
74
  
Though these women were able to become breadwinners, the fact that they filed for 
divorce, even after several years of desertion, implies their need to become fully separated 
from their husbands in order to establish complete independence and comfort, as well as to 
legally remarry.    
Many women, however, were forced to apply for poor relief in order to supplement their 
wages or due to an inability to work.  In an action for aliment against her husband 
Alexander Smart who had deserted her, Ann Arnot’s application for poor relief to the 
parish of Brechin was included with the case documents.  It detailed that she was employed 
as a weaver but only earned three shillings per week, far too little to support herself, two 
children and an elderly mother whom she cared for.  She was further assisted by two 
shillings per week from her eleven year old son’s job as a mill-spinner and one shilling per 
week from the Kirk Session of Brechin to support her mother.  Still, Ann’s family of four 
struggled on six shillings per week.
75
  As her husband had deserted her over four years ago 
she had no other means of support besides applying to poor relief, and it was only with the 
poor relief that she was able to instigate a legal suit against her husband.  In the next 
section the prevalence of deserted wives in the applications for poor relief will attest to the 
dependence of women on men as a result of the breadwinner ideology and further 
exemplify the prominence of desertion outwith the courtroom.  
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Unofficial Desertion in Poor Relief Records 
The official records of desertion found in the CS provide greater insight into examining 
one of the more over-looked forms of marital breakdown.  Yet, in reality, very few 
deserted spouses went through the judicial process to fully dissolve their marriage.  The 
cases found in the CS mask the high level of ‘unofficial’ separation or self-divorce.  Thus 
this section will present and analyse the more common form of marital breakdown: 
desertion without divorce. 
Poor relief applications are an important source that highlights marital breakdown due to 
desertion.  Wendy Gordon’s study of poor relief in Paisley found that, ’women were 
disproportionately vulnerable to poverty, and poor women were disproportionately without 
spouses, whether because unmarried, widowed, or abandoned.’76  Each parish kept record 
books of every pauper who applied for poor relief, which included deserted wives.  
Samples of applications from three parishes, Paisley, Forfar and Montrose, were collected 
and compiled into databases for analysis and a comparison with the CS desertion cases.   
The Old and New Poor Relief Legislation in Regards to Deserted Wives 
The old Scottish Poor Law until 1845 had relied on the generosity of local wealth 
(landowners especially) and charitable donations to fund the resources for each parish to 
support their poor and infirm.
77
  Following the Disruption of 1843—where members of the 
Established Church of Scotland split away to form the Free Church—the rapid increase in 
population and employment changes due to industrialisation, the old system of donations 
proved incapable of supporting Scotland’s paupers.78  In 1845 the New Scottish Poor Law 
was passed following the demands for reform in the 1840s, one of the biggest changes 
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being the shift from charitable donations as the main source of funds to compulsory 
assessments of property.
 79
   
The paupers that most concerned Poor Law officials were the aged, the young, the infirm, 
the impotent and the disabled.  However, officials were well aware how easily people 
could fall into destitution even if healthy and able.  Over the centuries since the Scottish 
Poor Law was established in the sixteenth century, applicants presented various 
predicaments that pushed them into poverty.  Applicants claiming poverty did not always 
fit the qualifications listed above, and instead were classed as able-bodied.  Technically, 
able-bodied paupers had always been excluded from Scottish Poor Law.
80
  The 1845 Act 
made sure to officially sanction it; in the New Poor Law under section 68 it stated that 
Poor Law officials had the right to refuse relief to able-bodied applicants.  It did not 
prohibit able-bodied persons from applying, but stipulated that such paupers could not 
demand relief when unemployed.
81
   
The problem of responsibility for paupers was reoccurring for policy makers.  There was 
an underlying principle that ran through the old and new Scotch Poor Law that legally 
bound family relations with the maintenance of one another.  In the instance of a person 
becoming impoverished, their first resource for relief would be their family.
82
  In the event 
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that a pauper had no relations to support them, poor relief was substituted.  This 
expectation that relations would take care of their own applied expressly to the 
maintenance of women, who were the responsibility of their parents or husband.  Hence, 
widows with young children were recognised since the sixteenth century as predisposed to 
poverty, and their eligibility for relief continued after the 1845 changes.
83
   
Married women whose husbands were still alive but absent, however, were another matter.  
Because it was assumed that husbands could (and would) provide for their families if a 
woman was deserted she remained the legal responsibility of her husband as they were still 
legally married.  Moreover, if there were children they were seen as a priority.  In an 
attempt to tackle this problem the proportion of abandoned women and children was 
specifically addressed in the 1845 New Poor Law.  Section 80 of the law first restated that 
neglecting or deserting husbands and fathers were to be branded as vagabonds, and 
secondly, authorised penalisation by the local court in the form of a fine or imprisonment.
84
   
One of the largest impacts of the 1845 legislation was the regulation of procedures for Poor 
Law officials.  This was done through the organisation of a central Board of Supervisors at 
the highest level, then local parochial boards for each parish and an Inspector of Poor 
assigned by the local board to meet with each applicant.  Any person seeking relief would 
go to their local Inspector of Poor and provide all relevant details for the Inspector to 
determine if they qualify (such as residence, place of birth, marital status, dependent 
children, occupation, earnings, disablement, living relations, and so on).  Their need for 
relief was further assessed by a visit from the Inspector to his or her listed residence within 
twenty-four hours of the application.  The recommendation decided upon by the Inspector 
was then considered and finalised by the Parochial Board.  Until their approval or refusal 
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There were effectively two types of relief available: indoor or outdoor.  Indoor relief was 
the placement of the pauper in the poorhouse, which according to section 60 of the 1845 
Act was for ‘the aged and other friendless impotent poor, and also...for those poor persons 
who, from weakness, or facility of mind, or by reason of dissipated and improvident habits, 
are unable to take charge of their own affairs.’86   The second option of outdoor relief 
allowed paupers to remain in their own homes and receive small funds for their survival.  
This could range from rent payments to clothes for children to money for funeral 
provisions.  
Finally, section one of the new Act explicitly states that any reference to a male person 
throughout ‘shall extend to a Female as well as a Male.’  Still, married women were not 
considered the same as single women.  For instance, section 76 stipulates the applicant 
must prove residence of five years in the parish where applying.  Section 77 stated that any 
applicant born outside of Scotland, specifically England, Ireland or the Isle of Man, and 
unsettled in Scotland, could be removed to their native country through the funds of the 
poor relief.
87
  If married, however, the woman must give her husbands’ parish of 
settlement or place of birth.
88
   
Concerns about Distribution of Funds and the Impact on Deserted Wives 
Although the first half of the nineteenth century saw reforms of the Poor Law intended to 
better regulate distribution of poor relief to paupers, there is room to debate the 
effectiveness of these changes.  Historians, and some contemporaries, have found evidence 
that in practice distribution of poor relief did not match up to the written legislations.  
Moreover, in the nineteenth century conservative discourses developed about ‘deserving’ 
and ‘undeserving’ poor and respectability.  These distrustful attitudes towards paupers 
arguably had a greater impact on who received relief than the actual law. It is also 
important to highlight that the Poor Law legislation was devised under the impression that 
paupers would be male.
89
  Several studies, nevertheless, have shown that a majority of 
applicants to poor relief were women.
90
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Contemporaries and historians describe the Scottish Poor Law as austere, yet with the 
benefit of hindsight, evaluate the legislations as more complex as a result of the non-
regulated system before 1845.  According to William Forbes, an advocate in 1845, 
Scotland was stricter compared to England for two reasons: first, it legally bound relations 
of a pauper, if capable, with the responsibility of keeping them from becoming destitute, 
and second, because it did not aid the unemployed.  Nevertheless, these rules were not 
always abided as Forbes wrote: 
The Scotch system, limiting its responsibilities to the impotent to the 
absolute exclusion of the able-bodied, professes to provide for the former 
alone; but the practice is better than the theory, for it has been the custom to 
relieve the able-bodied, during temporary distress, from the Church 
collections, and by private subscriptions, but not only by legal assessment, 




Rosalind Mitchison, in 1974, also found that the old Poor Law was more severe than 
England’s, yet, it was ‘more practical and less doctrinaire than credited in the past by 
nineteenth-century commentators.’92  Room for allowances continued despite the 
provisions for a Board of Supervisors and local Parochial boards in the 1845 Act.  For 
instance, studies of Glasgow found that although the new Poor Law presented more liberal 
ideas on a national scale, by the 1850s the local board in Glasgow became more 
conservative in their opinion on the best way to help paupers.
93
   
Conservative discourses on how to treat the poor existed since before the nineteenth 
century in Scotland, yet Smyth argues they were given more credence in the late 1800s.
94
  
This conservative discourse was the ‘notion that poverty was the consequence of personal 
immorality’.95  This idea followed the principles that believed aid to the poor did more 
harm than good as it encouraged dependency on relief.
96
   Therefore, charity should only 
be given to the ‘deserving’ and respectable paupers, who would independently support 
themselves when capable, but if unable, would not abuse the system by remaining on the 
Poors’ Roll long term.  While the 1845 Act seemingly brought fewer restrictions on 
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Scotland’s impoverished, Smyth argues that in practice those who applied for poor relief 
were being judged on the preconceived notion that impropriety and poverty were directly 
linked.  Thus, to the detriment, or benefit, of any applicants Poor Law Inspectors based 




In consequence female applicants were at a disadvantage; a single woman was judged on 
her character (which was further marred if she was an unmarried mother), or, if she was 
married she was viewed as legally one with her husband (making his place of birth or 
residence her own) and his dependent and responsibility.  Pat Thane found the same 
situation existed under the English Poor Law, reformed in 1834.  She claimed, ‘[t]he 
policy-makers ignored or underestimated severe problems of poverty among adult able-
bodied women.’98  As a result English women did not benefit from the New Poor Law of 
1834 as much as English men, because policy makers ‘assumed that women [who worked] 
simply supplemented the earnings of the male breadwinner’.99   
The combination of conservative discourses and an increasing number of applicants caused 
Poor Law officials to question who was receiving support from poor relief.  One group 
targeted was deserted wives.  There were several reasons policy makers gave deserted 
wives special attention.  Firstly, husbands who deserted their families were seen as 
disgraceful, yet a guilty by association notion transferred to the women and children left 
behind.  Deserted wives and children were labelled as burdens; this attached a stigma to 
women and children tied to neglectful and irresponsible men.  They were viewed critically 
by policy makers and not offered the emotional or social support needed to revoke those 
negative discourses that influenced the way policy makers wanted to deal with them.  




Secondly, it was thought that struggling couples colluded to defraud the Poor Law 
Inspector by claiming the wife was deserted, while her husband would temporarily remove 
himself from the family home.
101
  The suspicion that deserted women were colluding with 
husbands for supplemental funds remained a concern in Britain even into the twentieth 
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Thirdly, Poor Law Officials, as well as those supplying the funds for poor relief, viewed 
deserted wives and children as a financial burden on the parish.  The Glasgow Herald 
article from March 1852, ‘Disgraceful Case of Desertion’ told the tale of a deserting 
husband who sent his pregnant wife and two year old child from Wick to Glasgow where 
he promised to meet them.  He instead left them in Glasgow alone and destitute.  The wife 
was eventually forced to apply for poor relief, which brought her case to the attention of 
Glasgow’s Poor Law Inspector, Mr Kirkwood:  
The inspector at once relieved her immediate wants, and with the assistance 
which she obtained from the [distant] relative… the poor woman’s situation 
was rendered as comfortable as the distressing circumstances would admit 
of.  Of course, Mr. Kirkwood lost no time in communicating to the husband 
at Wick the position of matters at Glasgow, and requested to be relieved of 
the maintenance of his wife and children...This failing to produce any 
satisfactory reply, the Inspector, finding that he was likely to make nothing 
of the husband by mere correspondence, despatched a messenger-at-arms to 
Wick, from whence, to the no small astonishment of the natives, Mr. 
Malcolm was conveyed en route for Glasgow... [the husband was] brought 
before Sheriff Bell the following morning, and the fact of refusing to 
maintain his wife and children having been distinctly proved, both by the 
reluctant admissions of his unfortunate partner and the documents in the 
possession of the Inspector, the Sheriff adjudged the defendant to pay a fine 
of £5, in addition to refunding the expense which the parish had been put to 
in supporting his wife and sending for him to Wick.  The alternative was 60 
days’ imprisonment; and, as the bill of costs is rather heavy, Mr. Malcolm, 
we believe, must consent to remain in durance vile till he obtains a 
remittance from Wick, where he carries on business to some extent.
103
   
The concern for parish funds can be seen in such efforts by parish officials to track down a 
deserting husband, bring him to court, and force him to repay the sum of the funds given 
by poor relief.  If a husband was found, he was furthermore strongly urged to return to his 
family.  However, these efforts only increased the financial burden of deserted families as 
the means to cover such expenses for travel and litigation costs against the deserting 
husband were also covered by the parish funds.
104
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When a deserting husband was reported the parish took over the financial responsibilities 
for the family whilst the absenting husband was searched for and, if found, brought before 
the Court for punishment.  As stated in the 1845 Act, this could range from a fine to 
imprisonment with hard labour.  For instance, John Cameron of St. Cuthbert’s Parish was 
sentenced to sixty days imprisonment with hard labour for deserting his wife and five 
children.
105
  Arguably, however, penalising a deserting husband with a fine or 
imprisonment did not provide the reconciliation desired between husband and wife.  Even 
if a husband was found, he could not be made to resume providing for his family.  Some 
husbands refused to support their wives and children and accepted imprisonment instead.  
Such as George Crow, who deserted his wife and three children and moved to the 
Highlands to become a preacher with another woman.  From May 1874 until March 1875 
Mrs. Crow had been living on out-door relief of 3s.  According to the witness who brought 
Crow to the Sheriff Court Crow, ‘distinctly refused to support his wife, and stated that he 
would rather go to prison than do anything for her…[He] says that it was the minister that 
married him to his first wife, but Jesus married him to the other one.’  The Sheriff sent him 
to jail for 60 days with hard labour and no option of a fine.
106
 
Growing concern over husbands and wives taking advantage of outdoor poor relief led 
policy makers to propose methods of dissuasion.  They believed that if wives and children 
no longer had poor relief to fall back on husbands and fathers would not be so quick to 
abandon them.  R. A. Cage found that in 1852 Glasgow’s local parochial Board ‘ordered 
that a list of deserted wives and children be published as a means of reducing their 
numbers’, and offered a monetary reward to those willing to provide information on 
deserting husbands.
107
  Seemingly, the shame of publicising this disgraceful behaviour was 




By the 1880s officials labelled deserted wives as subjects of special circumstances—along 
with mothers of illegitimate children, wives of men imprisoned long-term, and persons 
considered to be of bad habits—who were recommended for indoor relief.  The poorhouse 
seemed to originally be intended as a multifunction space for paupers that provided 
lodging, labour to prevent idleness, medical care, education for children, and a reformatory 
for prostitutes or paupers addicted to drink.  In the second half of the nineteenth century 
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the poorhouse was used as a means test to determine which applicants truly were in 
want.
109
  C. S. Loch wrote in 1898 that if an Inspector of Poor doubted the claims of an 
applicant a second option instead of refusal was to offer the poorhouse.  It was believed 
that if persons were indeed destitute then they would accept the indoor relief out of 
desperation.  If they refused or withdrew their application then it proved they had other 
options available.  Hence, Loch described the poorhouse as divided between two classes of 
paupers: the test class, who received ‘strict discipline and deterrent administration…to 
make the test effective, and to secure order and decent conduct’; and the deserving poor—
the aged, sick and infirm—who used the house as a refuge and ‘should received liberal 
sympathetic treatment.’110  
Still, the consideration of deserving and undeserving factored in to the logic of the Scottish 
Poor Law.  This is exemplified in the following quote discussing female applicants and the 
type of aid they should receive: 
The recommendation that only indoor relief should be offered to deserted 
wives admits also of qualification.  Because a woman has had the 
misfortune to be deserted by her husband, it does not necessarily follow 
that she is bad, or merits that her home should be broken up.  If a woman, 
through no fault of her own, has fallen on evil days, the true function of the 
Poor Law is to raise, rather than further degrade her.  All such cases should 
be considered on their merits.  A point specially to be kept in view is the 
position of the children.  It is very undesirable that children should be 
brought up in a poorhouse.  If a mother with children be received into a 
poorhouse, the children should, as soon as possible, be boarded with 
respectable guardians.  But the mother of the children is the natural, and, as 
a rule, the best guardian.  If, therefore, the deserted wife is a person to 
whom the upbringing of her children can safely be entrusted, the Parish 
Council should certainly grant outdoor relief, taking measures at the same 
time, under section 80 of the Poor Law Act, to compel the deserting 
husband to do his duty.  Clearly the Board’s recommendation will apply 
only to women of bad character [italics original to the text].
111 
Outdoor relief above all was viewed as an encouragement for potential collusion as wives 
claiming to be deserted would be given money to continue living at home.
112
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In 1877, Mr. Adamson, the Inspector of Glasgow City Parish, was quoted as saying: ‘[t]he 
rule as to deserted wives seems harsh; but experience shows that facility of getting parish 
support for the children is a great encouragement to desertion, and also that many 
desertions are collusive, with the very object of burdening the rates.’113  Clearly, the 
designation of poor relief was very much subject to the perceived character of the 
applicant, except that married women were not judged as individuals but as wives and 
mothers.    
One reason the practice differed from the theory was the heightened concern over 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.  Importantly, the Scottish poor relief system was 
individualised as each parish had their own Inspector of the Poor and Parochial Board.  In 
effect every parish had different conditions to be met in order to receive poor relief, and 
therefore no study of one parish can serve as an example for Scotland as a whole.  Still, 
studies of parishes do reveal important patterns.  For instance, Gordon’s demographic 
study of Paisley Parish identified migrants and ‘widowed, abandoned or single parents’ as 
the predominant category of applicant.  However, Gordon acknowledged that the majority 
of those groups were female, but so too was the majority of Paisley’s population.114  
Mitchison’s studies of poor relief before 1845, found examples of able-bodied applicants 
receiving funds even though not officially entitled to them.
115
  Cage’s study of Glasgow 
likewise found relief given to able-bodied paupers before and after the New Poor Law, but 
argues that Glasgow officials disagreed with the liberal changes taking place centrally with 
the Board of Supervisors, and became ‘reluctant followers.’116  Although they repeatedly 
attempted to finalise an end to the practice of funding the unemployed, times of crisis in 
the nineteenth century required rules to be bent.
117
 
 This study of Paisley, Forfar and Montrose parish has similarly discovered that the 
different economic conditions of each parish influenced the types of applicants found in 
the records and the subsequent attitudes from the local board and inspector.  Deserted 
wives are more complicated applicants, as they were the legal responsibility of their 
husband, and his ‘natural obligation’.118  Moreover, some deserted wives may have been 
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able-bodied, whereby they would not qualify for relief.
119
  Yet, even if able-bodied, as 
described by Gordon and emphasised in Thane’s article, women were predisposed to 
poverty.
120
  The prevalence of the breadwinner ideology meant women were paid less than 
men as it was assumed that they were dependents.  Therefore, even with employment, 
married women struggled to earn enough to support a family on their own.
121
  Young 
children, as well, prevented healthy women from working, and as mentioned earlier, the 
health and welfare of children was given priority over the parents.  Hence, in this study the 
majority of deserted wives applying for relief in these parishes listed themselves as 
partially disabled, possibly because they were, and possibly because it would help them 
receive relief.  Furthermore, one of the parishes shows evidence that suggests the means 
test was being used with deserted wives in the later decades.   
Thus, we find deserted wives as applicants in Poor Law Parish Registers.  The presence of 
deserted wives in Poor Relief applications is an indicator of two aspects of marital 
breakdown in nineteenth-century Scotland: the legal and social attitude towards deserted 
wives and the men who deserted them; and a glimpse of the wives and husband who ended 
their marriage outside of the legal process.  
Case Studies of Three Parishes: Paisley, Forfar and Montrose  
The Poor Law Registers of Paisley parish, Montrose parish, and Forfar parish were 
collected and analysed in search of applications from deserted wives between the period 
1830 and 1880.  The first consideration was to find parishes in the east coast and west 
coast.  These three parishes were chosen as case studies based on the availability of sources 
for comparison.  Paisley Central Library has a wealth of well-kept Poor Law Records for 
this west coast parish, while the Angus Archive in Forfar holds the records of fifty local 
parishes on the east coast of Scotland.  The Paisley records (which include Abbey Parish) 
were extensive and great in number.  There were much fewer applications from Forfar, 
hence the inclusion of Montrose as another east coast example.  Montrose, a town more 
similar to Paisley in regards to industrial centres, had a sizeable number of applications 
available, though still fewer than Paisley.  Menmuir parish Poor Law records were also 
examined, but had far fewer applications from the same time period, and no applicants who 
listed themselves as a deserted wife.  Overall, Paisley had more applications from deserted 
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wives in the five years collected for this study than the total number of applications 
collected from Forfar and Montrose combined. 
The discrepancy in number of applicants between the three parishes chosen was due to the 
variation in population size.  Paisley, the largest of the three, already had a population of 
57,466 by 1831.
122
  Fifty years later in 1881 the population had actually decreased slightly 
to 55,638.
123
  Montrose in 1831 had 12,055 residents, which by 1881 had only risen to 
16,303.
124
  Lastly, Forfar in 1831 had a population of 7,549 that almost doubled to 14,470 
by 1881.
125
   
The main industry of these parishes was textiles.  Paisley is an example of a Scottish town 
that reached its industrial peak in the first half of the nineteenth century.  In 1839 there was 
an established network of forty cotton mill factories with almost 5,000 employees around 
Paisley.
126
  This was due to the reliance on water power making Renfrewshire, especially 
Paisley, an attractive region to build factories.  This only lasted until the use of water power 
was replaced by steam power as the century wore on, causing Glasgow to become the new 
centre of industry.
127
  In time the strength of the cotton industry in Scotland faded away 
leaving Paisley to suffer from a loss of employment and enter into economic decline as 
manufacturing flourished elsewhere in Britain.
128
   
Montrose and Forfar, both in Forfarshire, though also heavily involved in the textile 
industry managed to avoid Paisley’s downturn.  Montrose’s main manufactories were flax-
spinning and weaving, and had several other manufactories such as soap, starch, and a ship-
building industry as Montrose was a port town.
129
  Forfar’s main industry was linen, 
specifically heavy linens.
130
  By 1843, 3,000 people were employed in weaving.
131
  The 
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region of Angus as of 1836 had one of the highest concentrations of flax-spinning mills 
numbering at eighty-two of the 170 in Scotland.  Angus also had 26 of the 48 jute factories, 
and was one of the three predominating counties for linen.
 132
  Even by 1901, Forfar 
remained an important town for the linen industry.
133
  It was possible that the dominating 
presence of textile factories meant more employment opportunities for women, including 
married women.  As shown later on in this section, many deserted wives did state 
occupations, of which the majority worked in textiles.   
Patterns Found in the Poor Law Applications of Deserted Wives  
In total the collected number of Poor Law applications made by deserted wives was 335.
134
  
252 of the 335 are applications made to the Paisley Parochial Board, 42 are from Forfar, 
and 41 are from Montrose.  The records available for Paisley parish began in 1839, 
allowing the study to start in the year 1840 and continue decennially until 1880.
135
  Forfar 
parish’s Record for Applications for Parochial Relief began in 1855, for that reason the 
applications collected cover every five years from 1855 to 1880.  This quinquennial system 
was used for Montrose parish as well.  The earliest Poor Law record available for Montrose 
was June 1846.  Due to the low number of applications per year, any woman who applied 
as a deserted wife between 1846 and 1868 (the first General Register of Poor volume) was 
included.  After 1868, applications from deserted wives every five years were collected up 
to 1880.  The number of applications collected per year from each parish is shown in Table 
4.5.    
Due to the differences in application formats, not all the same information is available for 
each applicant over the three parishes.  Paisley had the most detailed application form.  
Forfar’s application form was the briefest, with the bare minimum written down by the 
clerk.  The form for Montrose was more similar to Paisley’s, but placed a greater emphasis 
on recording the exact amount, type and length of relief given to the applicant and her 
family members, whereas Paisley’s form suggested a greater concern with proving the 
applicant’s settlement and relations.136  From the Paisley applications there is an 
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opportunity to determine the length of the marriage before desertion, and the interval 
between the desertion and application (as is available from the CS cases).  Those numbers 
are listed in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
Table 4.5 Number of Poor Relief Applications of Deserted Wives Collected  
 
 
a. From 1846-1868 there were 33 relevant applications collected out of 701 total  
 
Table 4.6 demonstrates that the highest percentage of wives claim to have been married 1-5 
years before their husband absconded; this length of time between marriage and desertion 
for Poor Law applicants was similar to that shown in Table 4.1 for the CS.  One of the 
biggest differences between the Poor Law applications and the CS cases was the ability for 
a deserted wife to apply immediately after she realised her husband had left her.  Unlike the 
divorce legislation forcing a deserted spouse to wait at least four years before they could 
file for a divorce, poor relief was available as long as the Inspector of Poor believed the 
applicant was truly destitute and in need of Parochial Board funds.  Therefore, Table 4.7 




                                                                                                                                                                                
as their own settlement.  If a pauper applied for relief in a parish that was not their settlement, the officials 
would then request the true parish of settlement to compensate the funds given to that pauper. 
Year Paisley Paisley Forfar Forfar Montrose Montrose Total 
 
















Wives Per  
Year 
1840 281 38 -- -- -- -- 38 
1850 319 62 -- -- 6 0 62 
1855 -- -- 54 6 21 0 6 
1860 435 75 119 8 22 1 84 
1865 -- -- 151 8 87 4 12 
1870 421 47 148 3 78 4 54 
1875 -- -- 92 2 63 4 6 
1880 303 30 218 15 63 0 45 




Table 4.6 Length between Marriage and Desertion, PRA Paisley 
 
Deserted Wife as Applicant  1840 1850 1860 1870 1880   252 [100%] 
Under 1 yr   1  5 6 4 0 16 [6.34%] 
 1-5 yrs    10 11 20 13 5 59 [23.4%] 
 6-10 yrs    11 12 15 11 4 53 [21%] 
 11-15 yrs   3 8 13 4 4 32 [12.7%] 
 Over 16 yrs   6 11 9 3 2 31 [12.3%] 
 N/A    7 15 12 12 15 61 [24.2%] 




Table 4.7 Interval between Desertion and Action, PRA Paisley 
 
Deserted Wife as Applicant  1840 1850 1860 1870 1880   252 [100%] 
Under 10 days   1 6 13 16 3 39 [15.5%] 
 Under 1-1 mo   5 13 19 6 2 45 [17.8%] 
2-12 mos   17 19 27 9 5 77 [30.5%] 
 1-2 yrs    7 2 4 4 1 18 [7.14%] 
 3-5 yrs    5 6 1 2 1 15 [5.9%] 
 6-10 yrs    1 1 2 4 1  9 [3.57%] 
 Over 10 yrs   0 1 0 3 2  6 [2.3%] 
  N/A    2 14 9 3 15  43 [17.06%] 




Table 4.8 Ages of Applicants Listed as Deserted Wives, Poor Relief 
 
Paisley PRA                      
14-20                          2 
21-30                          87 
31-40                          88 
41-50                          45 
51-70                          15 
N/A                             15 
Total no. of Apps.      252 
Forfar PRA— (37 Applicants)  
14-19                                0     
20-29              12       
30-39              19    
40-49               4       
50-70               2 
N/A                                    0 
Total no. of Apps.             37
  
 
Montrose PRA        
14-19             0 
20-29             7 
30-39             22 
40-49              6 
50-70              5 
N/A                                   1 




The age of the applicant was one piece of information available from all three parish forms.  
This information is also beneficial because it is not available in the CS divorce documents.  
From the data given in Table 4.8 it can be seen that most wives in each parish were 




The age of the applicant’s husband was not required in the Forfar or Montrose forms, and 
therefore was only included erratically.  From those chance ages gathered—twelve 
applicants listed the age of their husbands in the Montrose records, but only one from 
Forfar—the most common age group was 30-39; the same as that of a deserted wife.  The 
Paisley records have 177 of the 252 applications with the age of the deserting husband 
listed, from which most husbands fell into the age group 21-30; younger than the age found 
most common for the wives.  When the three parishes are combined the most common age 
group for deserting husbands was 20-30.  
A study of Poor Relief applications from three parishes in Scotland reveals that even with 
employment and working children, families without a male wage earner struggled with 
poverty.  This was a consequence of the breadwinner wage associated with male 
employment, and the lower wages distributed to women and children, who if employed, 
were considered dependents and therefore only deserved a supplemental wage.
137
  
Therefore a deserted wife, even if a wage earner, still required extra assistance and this 
became the charge of the Parochial Boards.  In the parish of Paisley, out of 252 
applications for poor relief, 163 of these deserted wives had a listed occupation.  The most 
common employment of these 163 women was in the textile industry, followed by women 
employed as a domestic servant or housekeeper (including cleaners and washers).
138
  In the 
Forfar Poor Law applications out of 37 applicants, 34 had listed occupations, the majority 
of whom worked in the textile industry as a sewer, cotton spinner, millworker, winder or 
weaver.
139
  The third parish of Montrose had 41 applicants, 26 of whom listed an 
occupation.  The most common form of employment found was domestic services, 
followed by mill or factory work.
140
  That a high proportion of deserted wives worked 
outside of the home reflects the discrepancy between male and female employment and 
wages; ‘latterly rising real wages of the husband, if employed, enhanced emphasis on 
family life and the emulation of middle-class child-rearing attitudes, and diminished 
prospects for re-entry into a domestic sector which had stabilised or was even contracting 
slightly maintained married women’s employment at very low levels.’141  Women were 
expected to marry and receive support from an employed husband, but when the marriage 
failed, deserted wives were compelled to re-enter the workforce to earn what they could 
from low wages and limited employment. 
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Number and age of children was another category present on all three forms.  It was more 
common for a deserted wife to have children when she applied for Poor Relief.  The 
maintenance of dependent children was a determining factor for the Inspector of Poor and 
Parochial Board in determining whether the applicant was eligible for relief and if so, how 
much.  Of the 252 Paisley applications, 210 had dependent children, or 83 per cent.  In 
Forfar, 30 of the 37 applicants had dependent children, or 81 per cent.  And from the 
Montrose applications, 30 of the 41 applicants had children, or 73 per cent.  From all three 
parishes, the majority of women had two or three dependent children.  According to Cage, 
‘children were continued on the roll until the age of ten and were provided with school fees 
from the age of six until the age of ten.’142  The term dependent excluded any adult 
children, children who were living apart from the applicant, or children who were 
employed.   
Previous case studies of Poor Law applications in Scotland conducted by Smyth for Coffin 
Close in Glasgow, and Gordon who looked at the Paisley Poor Law records from 1861 and 
1871, also found that most female applicants had young children.
143
  Gordon even argues 
that ‘[i]t is a mark of the humanity (or realism) of the system, in fact, that “having a young 
child” was considered sufficient grounds for a woman’s inability to work.’144  The extent 
of the Parochial Board’s humanity, however, was tested when the child or children were 
determined to be illegitimate.  Smyth found that, ‘[w]here the pregnant woman was single, 
the relief given was invariably the Poorhouse.  One married woman who was pregnant was 
initially refused aid, but this may have been because the child was not her husband’s.’145  
Two applicants from Montrose, Mary Striven and Margaret Peebles, applied for relief 
claiming to have been deserted by their husbands, but their disablement was young 
children.  Mary Striven was confined due to child birth, and Margaret Peebles was destitute 
with an eight year old and a two and a half year old child.  Both women were noted as 
having illegitimate children.  Unlike Smyth’s applicant, however, Striven was given 
temporary relief for a month, and when she applied a year later after having another 
illegitimate child, she was again given temporary outdoor relief.  Margaret Peebles was 
also given outdoor relief of 10s. in order to buy her sons shoes.
146
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‘Maintenance of children’ was even a phrase used by the Paisley Clerk when listing the 
applicant’s disablement.  In 1840, 28 of the 38 applications listed the disablement as 
‘maintenance of children’.147  Whether wholly disabled, partially disabled, or able (along 
with a column for details), was a third category of information available on each Poor 
Relief form.  As discussed earlier, able-bodied applicants risked refusal or only indoor 
relief.  Women, nevertheless, could be fit and healthy, but still unable to escape poverty, 
whether due to low wages, lack of employment, or dependent children.  In Paisley, Forfar 
and Montrose, the majority of the deserted wives stated they were partially disabled (after 
those who did not list anything or N/A).  In Paisley and Forfar, the second most common 
answer given was ‘able’.  In the Montrose applications, no woman described herself as 
able, possibly indicating a stricter local parochial board.  The smallest percentage of 
deserted wives stated they were wholly disabled in each parish (see Table 4.9).  
 
Table 4.9 Wholly or Partially Disabled, Poor Relief 
 
Paisley PRA— 
Wholly Disabled         46 [18%] 
Partially Disabled       53 [21%] 
Able        56 [22%] 
Not Available       97 [38.5%] 
Total         252  
 
Forfar PRA— 
Wholly Disabled         3 (4a) [8%] 
Partially Disabled       11 [30%] 
Able         8 (9a) [22%] 
Neither                      6 [16%] 
N/A         9 (10b) 
[24%] 
Total          37 (40ab)  
 
a. One woman applied three times in 
one year; the earliest date lists her as 
N/A, second as wholly, and the third 
as able   
b. One woman applied twice, the first 
application stating she was wholly 
disabled due to an injury to her rib, 




Wholly Disabled          3 [7%] 
Partially Disabled        36 [88%] 
N/A          1 [2%] 
Total                         41c 
      




The descriptions of these women’s disablements are significant for the historian to 
determine what caused them to apply for poor relief.  Forfar only asked for the type of 
disablement (wholly or partially), though some applicants volunteered extra information.  
For example, one woman stated she was wholly disabled in child bed, while another 
woman said she was only partially disabled as she was in the last month of pregnancy, 
presumably preparing for child birth when she would be unable to work.  One woman 
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stated she was wholly disabled due to asthma and bronchitis, and another one said it was 
an injury to her rib that put her out of work.  Another woman listed herself as able, but her 
disablement was starvation.
148
  In Montrose most of the wives described themselves as 
partially disabled due to young children.  The second most common description was illness 
or disease.  Five women complained of general weakness and one of exhaustion.  Only 
three women stated that their disablement was desertion.
149
  If these disablements are 
analysed alongside the discourse of deserted wives as burdens on the community it appears 
that having young children was indeed a predisposition to poverty if a single parent.  
Pregnancy and childbirth impaired the mother’s ability to work and support herself and 
children, leaving limited options to avoid poverty.  The description of an injury or disease 
suggests these deserted wives were capable of managing on their own until hurt or ill.  
Weakness and exhaustion are telling as well, as they imply these women were working 
themselves to the point that they became incapable of carrying on as the sole provider for 
their family.
150
   
The most common description of disablement in the Paisley applications varied by year, 
but often contained more detail than ‘wholly’, ‘partially’ or ‘able’.  As already mentioned, 
in 1840 the majority of deserted wives stated their disablement was young children.  The 
second highest disablement listed was abandonment by their husbands.  In 1850 the most 
cited disability was desertion, followed by childbirth, and then destitution.  1860 the most 
common disability was again desertion, but the second most common reason for applying 
to the Poor Law was to fund the wife’s search for her absconding husband.  Twelve 
women, of the 75, stated they were travelling to locate their husband and had arrived in 
Paisley in the hope of finding him there, or as a stopover as they continued their search.  
One woman was listed as, ‘worn out travelling from Kilbirnie and applies for a night's 
lodgings’; another said, ‘has been travelling in search of husband but is exhausted and 
unable to proceed any further’; and another explained, ‘husband deserted her in Derry 2 
months ago and she came here 2 weeks ago in search of him but finds he has left Paisley 
and she wishes means to convey her home to Carluke.’151  The fact that these wives opted 
to search for their deserting husbands rather than stay at home in the hope that he would 
return is a part of the hidden nature of desertion.  There is no way to know how often this 
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occurred (in 1880 two applicants from Forfar said they were in search of their husbands, 
one asking for fare to Aberdeen to be paid by the Parochial Board as it was the next stop in 
her search
152
), or how often wives were able to catch up to their husbands.  It is apparent 
from the persistence of these women that deserted wives would not react passively to their 
abandonment, but would risk destitution and homelessness to track their husband down 
and demand his return.  What is also evident is the support deserted wives expected from 
the Poor Law Officials, despite the condemnation of deserted wives receiving outdoor 
relief.    
In 1870, the most common disablement was also desertion, but the second most common 
complaint was illness or injury, followed by pregnancy.  There is also evidence of women 
who did their best to avoid going on the Poors’ Roll: one woman stated she was, ‘disabled 
by sore leg, but that does not hinder her from winding—was supported by son James, but 
he died ten weeks ago—was four or five months off work before he died- was Clerk on 
Railway’; she had been capable of surviving without poor relief as she had the earnings of 
her son and herself, but once he died her earnings as a winder were not enough even for 
her own support.
153
  Lastly, in 1880 most applicants complained of having young children 
and pregnancy, followed by desertion, and the third most common disablement was injury 
or illness.  
While the reason for the application was the most important issue for the Inspector of Poor 
and Parochial Board, it meant that the reason for the desertion itself was often an excluded 
aspect of information.  Similar to the CS case details, the Poor Law applications usually 
only supply the reader with the type of desertion experienced by the applicant, rather than 
the reason which led to it.  The most common means of desertion was emigration.  An 
article published in the Glasgow Herald in September 1867 reported an awareness of this 
as a contemporary issue in Scottish society.  In response to an article on cotton spinners 
deserting their families to emigrate, the Secretary to the Cotton Spinners wrote a letter to 
the editor of the Glasgow Herald.  He explained that the loss of employment had left close 
to 400 spinners out of work and displaced.  In order to help their fellow tradesmen, a 
solution was devised to send spinners to America, of which 30 men were chosen to go.  In 
defence of these thirty men’s decision to emigrate for employment, the author went 
through all thirty men’s families to clear their names as deserters.  The main argument of 
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his letter was to state that four hundred idle men were starving, and in an attempt to better 
their situation, emigration was the only viable solution: 
 With thanks to you, Mr Editor, I am done; and I think that from this statement the 
public can calculate how many paupers the spinners have made by emigration, 
likewise, to estimate at its true value, the rubbish that is sometimes spouted by 
public men before public bodies, in despite of one of “God’s laws,” which says—
“Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour”.154   
 
 Enlistment, though argued by Phillips and Schwartzberg to be a common feature of 
familial desertion, was only found in ten of the Paisley applications, and one from Forfar.  
More husbands were listed as seamen than soldiers.  Montrose had nine of the 27 husbands 
listed as seaman.  Working at sea had risks for families (death or lost at sea), but 
advantages for unhappy husbands who found working on ships a means of employment 
and an opportunity to travel abroad leaving behind dependents and starting over in a new 
country.
155
  Overall the most frequently cited statements as to the whereabouts of the 
husband were: overseas, somewhere else in the country, or unknown.
156
     
An application where the reason for the desertion was listed gives some insight into the 
problems that led to marital breakdown.  Of the examples available the most cited reason 
for the desertion was related to money and employment.  For instance, the wife of John 
Wright claimed her husband left her and their children to sail to America with his brother, 
who also left behind a family.  Before he left he told his wife of his plans saying that he 
was want of employment.
157
  Andrew Elvine, a weaver, with his wife’s consent left his 
family and job six weeks before to sail to America in hopes of ‘bettering his condition, 
meaning to send for his wife and family should he succeed’.158  Though both husbands 
emigrated for work neither sent money nor returned to Scotland, thus abandoning their 
families. 
Though Paisley Poor Law records have greater detail available on the applicant’s life, only 
the applications from Forfar and Montrose include the relief given to the applicant.  Table 
4.10 shows the results of the applications collected. 
                                                          
154
 ‘Emigration of Cotton Spinners, and desertion of their wives and families. To the Editor of the Glasgow 
Herald’, Glasgow Herald, 6 September 1867. 
155
 Prices for travelling overseas varied by country, but were costly and required capital; Levitt and Smout, 
The State of the Scottish Working-Class, pp. 244-246. See also Phillips, Putting Asunder, p. 286.  
156
 These answers were to be expected from most wives, however some wives did have a vague idea of where 
their husbands were, but were still unable to get support from them.  
157
  Paisley Poor Law, 1840, Vol. 11/1, Statement 314. 
158
 Paisley Poor Law, 1840, Vol. 11/1, Statement 466. 
170 
 
Table 4.10 Result of Application, Poor Relief 
Forfar PRA— 
Inspector:    
               Relieved                            23  
 Poorhouse              18a 
 Infirmary                               1 
 Total:               42  
    
Parochial Board: 
      Admitted               16 
      Withdrawn                 2 
      Allocated Aliment                3 
      Sanctioned                                11 
      Refused                2b 
      Taken off b/c Husband  
         Returned                               3 
N/A    5 
Total:                 42 
   
a Two women did not go to the Poorhouse when it   
    was offered 
b  Reason for refusal by Parochial Board:  
   1) Woman refused to live with her husband;  




      Money: 
               Less than 2s.pwk              5 
               2-3s.pwk               9 
               3-4s.pwk               9 
               4-5s.pwk               4 
               6s.pmth                2 
      Board & Lodging               3 
      Maintenance                1 
Indoor/Poorhouse               5 
N/A                 3 




The amount and type of relief was determined by the number of dependents the applicant 
had, the earnings or lack of earnings contributed by herself or her children, and the 
character of the applicant.  Jane Simpson, for example, was given 3s. per week in cash in 
relief to support herself and four dependent children. She had six children in total, but 
Janet aged 14 lived with her grandmother, and John aged 16 had an apprenticeship as a 
carpenter earning 4s.6d. per week.
159
  Those who received relief in the form of board, 
lodging, or the poorhouse were all listed as injured and without children (except for one 
woman who had a 3 ¾ year old child), and presumably deemed unable to take care of 
themselves.  An important reality of the Scottish Poor Law, however, was the fact that it 
was not capable of providing funds to pull a person out of poverty.  It was only available to 
keep a person and families from being completely destitute.
160
  This discretion in funds 
was meant to ensure paupers did not resolve themselves to poor relief rather than work to 
pull themselves out of poverty. 
What do these findings suggest about these parishes?  Each study highlights different 
aspects of the lives of deserted wives due to the differences in the applications.  Although 
Paisley parish did not record the relief given to the applicants, it did ask whether or not the 
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applicant had been chargeable before.  From the statements collected an average of 38 per 
cent of the 252 applicants had been on the Poors’ Roll at some point in their life; this 
suggests the difficulty of escaping poverty, and how easily women could fall into it.  
Paisley was also unique in that 30 per cent of the 252 applicants were born outside of 
Scotland, 28 per cent listed Ireland as their place of birth, and the remaining four 
applicants were from England.
161
  All applicants from Montrose and Forfar by comparison 
were born in Scotland, except for one Irish and one English woman who applied to Forfar.  
These examples could indicate the increasing severity of Poor Law officials towards 
paupers.  The woman from Ireland, who was listed as a vagrant and able-bodied, applied 
for her three children in 1865 and was given temporary relief by the Inspector, but was 
then withdrawn from the Roll by the Parochial Board.  Presumably, this was because she 
was not a resident of Forfar parish and had described herself as neither wholly nor partially 
disabled.
162
  The English woman listed her residence as Blairgowrie and occupation as an 
outdoor worker.  Her application stated that she was able-bodied, but with a three month 
old child.  Her husband had deserted her, and she was on her way to Aberdeen to search for 
him.  The Inspector offered her the poorhouse as relief, but the application states that she 
did not go.
163
   
Forfar shows use of the means test to determine deserving and undeserving paupers.  For 
instance, from 1855 to 1875 most women were offered outdoor relief, except in 1880 when 
it was offered to only one woman, and this may have been due to the notation ‘[husband] is 
said to be a bad character.’164  Indoor relief, or the poorhouse, was offered from 1855 to 
1875 to six deserted wives, although five of these women, out of the thirty applicants with 
children, were ‘relieved’ by having their children sent to the poorhouse, and three of those 
mothers were also offered admittance.  This seemingly contradicts the official position on 
indoor relief and children quoted earlier; however, it could be that although four out of five 
of these women had jobs, four out of the five women had ‘no home’ listed as their 
residence, and were therefore considered unable to maintain their children.  Moreover, 
perhaps these mothers recognised if not welcomed the opportunity to ensure a roof and 
meals for their children; none of their applications state that the offer was refused.   
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Seemingly the means test was in full force by 1880 as, out of eleven applicants, ten were 
offered indoor relief.  Five of the ten were either partially or wholly disabled, three were 
able (two with young children and one claimed starvation), and two did not list a 
disablement, but one applicant stated her husband was a bad character, while the other 
stated she did not know where her husband was and she was out of work.  Of the ten 
offered the poorhouse, three women refused: two were the women listed as able-bodied 
and the third was the woman claiming ‘no regular work for six weeks’, although she had a 
daughter who worked as a weaver and another who was illegitimate.  As this sample is 
small, no generalisations can be made, however, these findings could support the argument 
that deserted wives were subject to tougher judgements by Poor Law officials in the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
Montrose, also a small sample of deserted wives and poor relief, gave full accounts of the 
pauper until their removal from the Poors’ Roll or their death.  Similar to Forfar before 
1880, the Montrose sample shows more outdoor relief being given.  As listed in Table 
4.10, thirty out of 41 applicants were given outdoor relief in the form of money or board.  
Five out of the 41 were offered the poorhouse; all of those applicants required medical care 
and had no earnings otherwise, and accordingly only stayed in the poorhouse for a short 
amount of time.  Only one woman is described as being struck off the roll because she 
‘declined’ the offer of the poorhouse, but was given 13s.6d.165  Unlike Forfar or Paisley, 
however, no deserted wives who applied to Montrose parish were able-bodied.  Most were 
listed as partially disabled, which may have entitled them to outdoor relief instead of the 
poorhouse.  Based on the relief authorised, it is arguable that Montrose may have been a 
more liberal parish: 18 out of the 41 applicants listed some form of income, either from 
their own labour or a family member, yet were still given outdoor relief of small amounts 
of cash per week or month.  Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that the majority of 
these women listed their disablement as children or an illness (only one stated it was her 
husband’s desertion), which were only temporary problems, not indicators of the woman 
being undeserving.  Furthermore, three women who were living in lodging houses and had 
no residence otherwise were given money to pay their board rather than sent to the 
poorhouse.   
The Montrose poor relief statements also provide some long-term insight into the lives of 
deserted wives.  Of the 41 applications, 39 recorded the woman’s movements after she first 
applied.  27 of those 39 were eventually struck off the Poors’ Roll.  Five women were on 
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the Roll for less than one year, however, the average number of years was 19, and the 
longest time recorded was Christina McLeod Cameron, who applied in 1875 and remained 
on the Roll until 1916 when she died at the age of 89.  Fourteen of the 39 died while still 
chargeable, and although some were much older, like Christina, the average age at death 
was 59.  This suggests that although many of these women may have applied due to 
children or an injury or illness, most stayed on the role for many years afterwards.  
Seemingly, this contradicted the purpose of the Poors’ Roll as envisioned by officials; 
however, it is unsurprising considering the relief given was never intended to pull a person 





What is evident from these poor relief applications and the CS cases was the complicated 
and hidden nature of desertion in nineteenth-century Scotland.  The act of desertion in 
itself was an act of deceit and trickery.  It required the deserter to disappear without a trace, 
remove themselves as far away as possible, and severe all communication.  Yet, there are 
also examples of husbands who deserted their families through neglect, or by committing 
themselves to a job away from home.  These forms of desertion were not unique to 
Scotland or the nineteenth century, as shown through the work of Leneman, Phillips, 
Stone, Bailey, Schwartzberg and Twomey.  Nevertheless, the history of desertion as a 
ground for divorce in Scotland is limited to the work of Leneman.  Unofficial instances of 
desertion have been noted, but not focused on, in the case studies of poor relief by 
Mitchison, Cage, Smyth and Wendy Gordon.  This chapter contributes to the 
historiographical gap by examining desertion as it was recorded officially in the CS 
through divorce cases, and unofficially in the Poor Law records.   
It has been repeatedly quoted as the poor man’s divorce, and as the Poor Law records 
show, desertion and poverty were linked.  Nevertheless, using poor relief applications to 
study desertion skews the argument by only exploring impoverished women.  The more 
accurate analysis of desertion’s connection to poverty would be to assert that whether or 
not the couple were financially stable, once deserted the wife was more likely to fall into 
destitution due to the restraints placed on married women’s employment.  Some women 
were able to support themselves through independent employment, however, the large 
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amount of women who applied to poor relief proves many women struggled to manage a 
female-headed household.  
The extent of applications for poor relief from wives claiming to be deserted, separated, or 
neglected, also shows that a larger portion of separation took place outside of the CS.  An 
exact number is unavailable, yet, for example, this study has found 55 divorce cases in the 
year 1870 at the CS (the only place to apply for a divorce or separation), while in parishes 
of Paisley, Forfar and Montrose there were 54 deserted wives applying for poor relief in 
1870.  The three parishes alone show an equal number of unofficial desertions to the 
number of divorces, and presumably this number of deserted wives in 1870 was much 
higher as every parish in Scotland had a Parochial Board to administer poor funds, not 
including the number of wives and husbands who did not report their desertion.  In 
conclusion, although the divorce law allowed for dissolution of the marriage on this 
ground, the complicated legal process (particularly the requirement of four years of non-
adherence) and economic factors, made this legal remedy inaccessible and impractical for 
many deserted husbands and wives.  Poor relief, on the other hand, was more obtainable, 
provided financial assistance the day of the application, and included services to track 
down the deserting husband and force him to return or be punished.  Still, even with these 
sources, desertion has proven to be as elusive to historians as it was to the authorities, and 
arguably the most common form of marital breakdown.  
Chapter Five: Separation and Cruelty, Part I      
 
Introduction 
In nineteenth-century Scotland there were two legal forms of intervention available to a 
spouse in an abusive marriage. The largest number of reported incidents came through the 
criminal courts which provided temporary forms of relief for an abused spouse.  The more 
substantial gesture was a summons for separation and aliment.  However, only a small 
minority of wives (and even fewer husbands) sought a judicial separation.
1
  As discussed 
in Chapter Two, the number of divorce and separations were rising and continued to do so 
into the twentieth century, but the increase in numbers of actions mentioning cruelty is no 
indicator of levels of marital violence.  Overall, it is widely agreed that the majority of 
marital violence was not officially reported, thus eliminating any chance of determining 
accurate figures beyond trends.   
Aiming to analyse marital violence whilst continuing to be aware of the quantitative 
limitations, this study uses examples of marital violence as found in Court of Session (CS) 
judicial separation cases and criminal trials of wifebeating.  Although the samples are 
small, the rich detail is not lacking.  Accordingly, this chapter has been divided into two 
parts; the first part discusses the discursive contexts around marital violence in Scotland, 
and the second presents the sources and findings.   
Historians of English history suggest legislative and discursive changes showed a 
hardening of attitudes towards violence by the turn of the century.  In Scotland divorce and 
separation laws, which may have seemed progressive in the beginning of the 1800s due to 
their egalitarian principles, were impacted by the judiciary discourses and prejudices of the 
criminal law.  As a result, they did not take the same steps towards protecting wives from 
abusive husbands.  Evidence of discursive changes is complicated and differs between the 
civil and criminal courts.  Nevertheless, the tales of marital strife, violence, and cruelty 
throughout the sources show cohesion in the types of abuse used, sources of conflict, and 
use of provocation.   
Separation a mensa et thoro (otherwise referred to as judicial separation) was available in 
the nineteenth century on the grounds of adultery or cruelty to both the husband and the 
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  Though these two legal grounds existed, this study only found judicial separation 
actions filed on the charge of cruelty in the CS extracted cases, suggesting that separation 
for adultery was not as commonly sought as divorce for adultery.
3
  This was perhaps due to 
the restricting stipulations of a separation.  The terms for a judicial separation were the 
granting of the spouses to live apart (essentially permission for non-adherence), whilst 
maintaining the other marital expectations of chastity and financial provision; the couple 
remained legally married, and the husband was required to monetarily support his wife in 
her separate residence through aliment payments until they reconciled.      
It is necessary to briefly establish that the contemporary terms used in the nineteenth 
century were cruelty or maltreatment.  Both cruelty and maltreatment could embody 
physical and non-physical abuse.  Cruelty was the term used when listing the grounds 
available for judicial separation; however, maltreatment was the term more often used 
within the CS’s required legal documents.  For instance, a summons for an action of 
separation and aliment would state: ‘[t]herefore the Lords of our Council and Session 
Ought and Should Find it proven that the Defender has been guilty of grossly abusing and 
maltreating the pursuer his wife’.4  Outside of the civil courtroom the term used by the 
media and the public was wifebeating.  This connotes a very specific type of gendered 
violence between a married couple, where the husband was the abuser and the wife was the 
victim.  There does not appear to be a significant difference between the legal and popular 
definition, except that the legal terms were more encompassing of wives and husbands, and 
physical and non-physical abuse.  Lastly, the official terms for tolerable violence that did 
not legally constitute cruelty, due to its use as a form of discipline, were chastisement or 
correction.  Previous to the nineteenth century it was widely accepted, both in the law and 
the general population, that a husband was entitled to use moderate corporal punishment on 
his wife if she ‘deserved’ it.  By the late nineteenth century, officials revised this sanction, 
although, as this chapter will go on to show, not enough.  As a result in 1878 Fraser wrote, 
‘Where, however, the cruelty, said to be used towards the wife, does not amount to gross 
personal violence, it is a valid defence to the husband that the wife’s conduct was improper 
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and deserving of punishment’.5  For this chapter the terms cruelty, maltreatment, marital 




The main historical debate related to marital violence in the nineteenth century is the issue 
of continuity and change: was there a shift in attitudes towards violence?  And if so, did 
this shift influence the level of marital violence committed by Victorians as the nineteenth 
century drew to a close?  Nancy Tomes arguably began the debate in 1978 when she 
identified that English society had become less tolerant of violent offences in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  She concluded that this rejection of violence resulted in 
fewer men assaulting women by 1900.
7
  Her evidence for this decline, however, was based 
on the discourse of middle-class authorities, and she provides no evidence of changes 
among working-class attitudes.
8
   
Martin Wiener agreed with and expanded Tomes argument in 2004 concluding that the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in England witnessed the 
emergence of a new ideal of masculinity encapsulated in the notion of a ‘new “reasonable 
man”’.  His evidence centres on homicide and ‘felonious and malicious wounding’ rates 
that he found declined by the turn of the century.  He argues that it was the development of 
new Victorian values related to masculinity that contributed to a decrease in violence 
committed by men, especially towards women, and that working-class women benefitted 
most of all.
9
  His conclusions, however, are problematic as he does not fully take into 
account the impact of manslaughter charges on the decrease in homicide rates.  Wiener 
acknowledges that by the latter half of the 1800s society was less comfortable with capital 
punishment, which was the sentence for homicide; as a result there was an increase in 
charges of manslaughter.
10
  Furthermore, though Wiener states the benefits of using 
homicide as evidence of intolerance towards male violence, by focusing on murder he is 
only looking at extraordinary instances of violence whilst overlooking more commonly 
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used forms.  For wives in abusive marriages it was daily acts of cruelty that defined their 
relationship.  His research offers no proof that this type of daily abuse was declining at the 
turn of the century.
11
  
Another aspect of this debate to address is the exclusion of non-physical cruelty.  The 
argument that violence against wives was decreasing by the turn of the century, as asserted 
by Tomes and Wiener, used reports of violent assaults to determine the decline.  Due to the 
perceived difficulty in policing non-physical cruelty penal law did not fully recognise this 
form of marital abuse.     
There now appears to be a consensus that there was a shift in public attitudes that made 
violent behaviour less acceptable in England.
12
  However, since Tomes’ article a number 
of historians have argued against her assessment of a decline in the incidence of 
wifebeating and violence against women.  Ellen Ross, A. J. Hammerton and Roderick 
Phillips concluded in their separate studies of marital violence that while the number of 
reported assaults did decline by the turn of the century, it was impossible to prove that the 
number of wifebeating assaults also decreased.
13
  
More recently historians have questioned the reality of discursive shifts and when they 
took place in the nineteenth century.  Anna Clark, in her article ‘Humanity or Justice?’ for 
instance, found that the English legislation, often cited by historians as evidence of the 
change in attitude towards violence in reality merely limited violence against women rather 
than making any full attempt to prohibit it.
14
  Furthermore, legislations of the nineteenth 
century turned wifebeating into a class issue instead of a gender issue.  Clark purposefully, 
however, avoided a quantitative discussion of levels of marital violence focusing instead 
on the issue of changing attitudes.
15
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Elizabeth Foyster challenged both aspects of the debate.  She argues there was a 
redefinition of marital violence during the two hundred year period she studied, which was 
earlier than the 1860s identified by Hammerton as the decade when English judges began 
accepting wider definitions.
16
  She further argues that even with the expanded notion of 
cruelty, the middle-class magistrates and judges’ attitudes did not impact on the general 
public’s views of wifebeating.  Foyster argues that the perception of marital violence as a 
working-class issue meant legislation did little in reality to address the bigger issues and 
instead focused on physical violence committed by working-class men against ‘provoking’ 
working-class wives.
17
  Hence she concludes that wives by the turn of the century still 
experienced the same types of violence and in no less quantity than the women at the start 
of her period.
18
   
Thus far, this debate centres on case studies of marital violence in nineteenth-century 
England.  As Annmarie Hughes stresses, the theory of ‘softer patriarchy’, identified by 
English historians as a factor in decreased male violence towards women, excludes 
Scotland because it ‘ignore[s] the distinctiveness of Scotland’s legal, religious and cultural 
environment which mediated condemnation of violent men in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.’19  A few historians, most notably Leah Leneman, Carolyn Conley and 
Annmarie Hughes, have applied the same questions to Scotland and found significant 
differences.  Leneman argued that a more intolerant view towards wifebeating had 
developed by the early nineteenth century within the court system of Scotland.  Based on 
the judicial attitudes towards wives seeking separation on the ground of cruelty she argued 
there was a shift away from accepting wifebeating as a means of correction.
20
  Her 
evidence, however, was based on cases of judicial separation filed with the Commissary 
Courts, which were replaced in 1830 by the CS.  She did not include the attitudes of judges 
in the criminal courts, which in the nineteenth century were where more abused wives 
turned for protection.
21
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Carolyn Conley’s work on domestic homicide in Scotland in the late nineteenth century 
was predicated on distinguishing the country from neighbouring England and Ireland.  
When compared with Ireland, and following the notion that Scotland was less violent (as 
supported by the judicial record),
 22
 her analysis of domestic homicides found instead that 
convictions for spousal homicide were ‘slightly higher in Scotland than in Ireland’, and 
that, ‘[m]en accused of killing their wives were more likely to be convicted than the 
average defendant.
 
 Eighty-one percent of the Scottish men tried for killing their wives 
were convicted, as were 60 percent of the Irishmen.’23  Of the men convicted of murder, 
however, more than half had their sentences reduced and avoided the death penalty (in 
both Scotland and Ireland), except in the instance of husbands who used weapons.  She 
also noted that while Irish judges spoke of wife murder as rare, Scottish judges lamented 
that it was all too frequent.
24
  In regards to the defence of intoxication, Conley found that 
Scottish criminal judges were less likely to accept drunkenness as a defence for homicide 
than Irish judges.
25
  Still, this defence was used in ‘over 75 per cent of Scottish spousal 
homicides.’26  
Conley’s research follows the discursive notion of the Scottish as a respectable ‘orderly, 
well-behaved people’ that she argues existed as a national identity in the nineteenth 
century.
27
  Therefore, her findings represent the perspectives of the middle and upper 
classes who ‘othered’28 the working classes and immigrants in the High Court in order to 
maintain that reputation.  Her conclusions based on records of homicide trials, however, 
conflict with the work of Hughes, whose research uses Scottish criminal court trials from 
the nineteenth century to the end of World War One.  Conley and Hughes’ work shows a 
difference in judicial attitudes regarding murder and domestic violence.  
Hughes argues that the new male of Victorian English society did not exist to the same 
degree in Scotland.  Instead male violence towards women was legitimised by the light 
sentences repeatedly given to wifebeaters.  ‘Minimal risk’ sentences and ‘marriage 
mending’ as used by Scottish criminal courts allowed the practice of wifebeating to 
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continue as an acceptable form of male behaviour.
29
  Hughes also criticises the impact of 
middle-class discourse explaining that, ‘[n]ot only did it absolve middle-class men from 
complicity and condemnation, but it also helped to silence middle-class victims because 
wife-beating was associated with the “animality” of the poor and the shame of inadequate 
feminine skills.’30  Ultimately, Hughes argues that the legislation passed implied a change 
in attitude, yet these views only existed in theory.  In practice there was little done to 
condemn the use of violence against wives.
31
      
To contribute to this debate, this chapter picks up where Leneman’s work on Scotland 
ended.  As highlighted by the historiography, certain sources are associated with specific 
types of violence.  This study looks at the legal representations of marital abuse as 
provided by judicial separation records and newspaper reports.  The use of CS cases 
provide a window into marriages plagued by abuse and cruelty where the couple was able 
to afford the legal process, thereby representing the more indefinable group of men and 
women who fell between the working class and middle class.  However, due to the limited 
number of separation cases available, and in order to address the representations of marital 
violence as predominantly a working-class issue in this period, newspaper reports have 
been included.  This discussion seeks to answer the questions of how the legal definition of 
cruelty related and compared to the reality of marital conflict and violence; and whether 
tolerance of marital abuse was declining in Scotland in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.  To begin, it answers the contemporary discourse used to identify wifebeating as a 
societal issue related predominantly to working-class men, although there was some 
discussion of broader issues, particularly the inequality between men and women.   
Contemporary Discourse on Wife Beating in Scotland 
In 1856 the Aberdeen Journal reprinted an article originally published in the Manchester 
Guardian titled ‘Wife Beating Advocated as Scriptural.’  It told the story of a man who 
upon being charged with beating his wife claimed a Reverend George Bird, at Whitehaven, 
had preached that husbands were entitled to use violence against their wives.  The 
Reverend spoke out in defence of the prisoner saying that, ‘it is a man’s duty to rule his 
own household; and that, if his wife refuse to obey his orders, he is justified, according to 
the law of God, in beating her, in order to enforce obedience.’32  The prisoner was 
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sentenced to one month imprisonment with hard labour, and the Reverend appears to have 
continued preaching physical chastisement.  The purpose of the article for contemporaries 
is questionable, as it seemingly merely reported the story, but in reality, the lack of 
condemnation of the Reverend, and the meagre one month punishment for the wifebeater 
furthers the public perception of wifebeating as acceptable when justified by someone 
clearly of the middle class and authority.   
Mention of wifebeating in contemporary sources reveals the discourses and attitudes 
towards marital violence.  If there was a change in society’s tolerance of male violence in 
Scotland, it would be captured in these sources.  Though much evidence of nineteenth-
century perceptions on this form of violence comes from legal sources, popular culture 
also demonstrated how the issue infiltrated into everyday life.
33
  Some examples represent 
wifebeating very differently from the legal documents.  In broadside ballads, for instance, 
marital violence was often portrayed humourously for entertainment value.
34
  Wives were 
depicted as aggressive, argumentative and disobedient in humour ballads, while their 
husbands either tried to stand their ground non-violently or through threats and fighting 
back.  Though the verbal fight may have begun due to the husband’s complaints, the 
physical fighting was more often than not instigated by the wife.  In ‘The Comforts of 
Man’, the husband as the victim is exemplified:  
We’d scarce been married more than a week/ When I found her tongue 
began to speak/ She broke my head with a large brown pan/ And I soon 
found out the comforts of man. 
Betty, says I, you and I must now part/ You’ve cut my head and broken my 
heart/ I was ready to faint I began for to cry/ When a roll of fresh butter 
came dab in my eye.
35
 
‘The Week’s Matrimony’ also illustrates the aggravating wife and her husband who 
responded in kind: 
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 On Wednesday morning I looked blue/ My wife was cross and snappish 
too/ I soon found out she had a tongue/ And we went at it both ding-dong/ 
Vexation on vexation rose—/ First came abuse and then came blows/ She 
tore my hair and sratch’d my face/ And in return I smash’d the place/ She’d 
quickly conquer me she said/ Then with the tongs she broke my head/ So I 
went at her left and right/ And we mill’d each other by Wednesday night.36 
These representations of wives provoking their husbands, though not to be taken literally, 
highlight one of the more damaging discourses related to marital violence.  In nineteenth-
century Scottish society wives were questioned and judged in the judicial process to see if 
their husbands’ abuse was justified, which if proven, could reduce the degree of violence 
from cruelty to chastisement.  If the judges found any evidence of the wife behaving 
poorly, the husband could either be exonerated or given a lighter punishment as the assault 
was deemed defensible.  Hughes argues this was a product of class typecasting; the 
working-class stereotype allowed excuses for bad behaviour.
37
   
In Glasgow’s Caledonian Mercury an article titled ‘An Afflicted Husband’ illustrates this 
discourse existing in the criminal court.  The presiding sheriff in a case of wife assault in 
Leith— reminiscent of the above ballad except the husband used tongs to attack his wife— 
was reported as saying:  
 He would frankly state that it was rarely that a case so painful and 
melancholy came before him; and he should be very glad if he could 
believe the prisoner’s statement, that the injuries received by his wife were 
the result of a fall… He thought that he had been as sorely tried as a man 
could be, and likewise that he had always been an honest, respectable 
person, but he must also believe, on the strength of evidence, that, excited 
by his wife’s misconduct, he had so far forgot himself as to use his wife 
with unmanly violence… He went on to say that he would give what effect 
he could to the mitigating circumstances of the case; but his public duty 
demanded him that such an offence should be severely punished.
38
 
The severe punishment awarded was a fine of £5 or fifteen days imprisonment.
39
  In 1875 
the Dundee Courier & Argus & Northern Warder published a report on two cases of 
wifebeating tried in the Police Court titled ‘Wife Beating Under Provocation.’  One of the 
husbands, a riveter, listed the disobedient, neglectful and drunken behaviour of his wife in 
defence of his assault, seemingly with effect since even with testimony from his wife and 
witnesses claiming she did not provoke him, the magistrate was reported as saying: 
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‘looking at the whole case, he would make the penalty as lenient as possible, which would 
be a fine of 10s 6d or seven days in prison.’40  Even Frances Power Cobbe noted that the 
concept of the deserving, disobedient wife was the rule rather than the exception.
41
   
Another discourse directly related to the notion of wife blaming was the influence of drink.  
Alcohol was viewed as the cause of most common violence, and thus an excuse for 
belligerent behaviour.  Men were not personally blamed for using cruelty against their 
families; instead violence was attributed to the effects of alcohol combined with working-
class brutality.
42
  Hence, temperance advocates believed if drink was removed from the 
situation the violence would stop.
43
  They too used discursive means.  For example, a 
broadside ballad tilted ‘The Drunkard Reclaimed’ told the tale of a man who came across a 
frantic woman and child fleeing from her abusive drunkard husband: ‘While conversing 
with this woman, I told her of a plan/ That would keep her husband sober, and make him a 
steady man/ He must go sign teetotal, and then you’ll be reconciled/ And he will love his 
darling wife and beautiful child.’  The man then went and found the husband and told him 
of his idea: ‘He had some strong objections, but at last he did consent/ And ever since that 
moment they have been happy and content/ She went back to her husband, and both were 
reconciled/ And now they live in harmony, and he loves his wife and child.’44   
Magistrates were also reported as advocates of teetotalism when faced with a man 
convicted of assault while drunk.  The Dundee Courier published the article ‘Bailie Taylor 
as a Temperance Reformer.  Whisky and Wife Beating’ recounting two husbands brought 
to police court for assaulting their wives, both released after agreeing to sign the pledge.  
For the first husband the magistrate was reported as saying: ‘”Would he promise to join the 
“Blue Ribbon” if he allowed him to go this time?” The accused said he had joined that 
before.  Bailie Taylor—Join it again.  The accused promised to take the Magistrate’s 
advice, and he was then dismissed.’  Bailie Taylor’s interaction with the second husband 
was equally forgiving:  
The Bailie—Will you stop striking your wife if I let you away?  Accused—
Yes, sir.  The Bailie—Do you promise if I let you away that you will go 
with Mr. Scrymgeour and join the Good Templars, and work regularly?  
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Accused promised that he would take the pledge, and he was then 
dismissed from the bar.
45
 
In Scotland the temperance movement’s most active members were middle-class women 
who argued that men who drink were the leading cause of unhappy marriages and families.  
Megan Smitley found that there was a pattern of middle-class women engaging in 
philanthropy and then becoming temperance reformers.  She argued it was the conditions 
they witnessed in local impoverished areas of Scotland that led many philanthropists to 
link poverty (especially of women and children) to the presence of alcohol in the family.
46
  
However, the use of drink was also viewed as a feature of working-class behaviour and 
culture, and therefore expected.  Consequently, when an intoxicated man beat his wife 
society accepted it as an aspect of working-class life; this was furthermore supported by 
the rulings of the judiciary.
47
 
Women who drank, by contrast, were demonised as bad wives, bad mothers, unwomanly, 
and associated with the lowest class of people incapable of redemption.
48
  In 1870 when an 
elderly watchmaker and green grocer from Jersey was arrested for ‘having cruelly ill-
treated his wife by having, among other things, fastened her head in an iron mask’, the 
story was dramatically reported in the Dundee Courier.  The iron mask was descriptively 
captured by the reporter as being a heavy item of three pounds, with iron bars and rings an 
inch wide and inches apart, a hinge in the front and padlock on the back which went over 
her head and sat on her shoulders.  However, the article went on to say that the wife was a 
drunkard, ‘who had a half-stupid appearance.’  In an attempt to force sobriety the husband 
had locked her in a large box with iron bars and then tried the mask.  Despite 
acknowledging the cruelty of locking up the wife the magistrate only sentenced the 
husband to a fine of 10s. and had the wife (who admitted her addiction to drink in court) 
agree to a separation of bed and board.
49
  Furthermore, the fact that the magistrate 
encouraged a separation due to the wife’s alcoholism reaffirms the inequality placed on 
women who did not meet marital expectations.  In 1875 a magistrate at the Eastern Police 
Court of Glasgow, Bailie Torrens, told a woman found lying drunk on Orr Street with a 
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baby in her arms, ‘I think no wonder that such women as you get a beating from your 
husbands.  I think you deserve it sometimes.’50 
New discourses are evident in the latter decades of the nineteenth century following the 
emergence of women’s rights campaigns, though they did not displace the old discourses.  
The historiographical debate over the development of intolerance towards wifebeating and 
the subsequent impact of these shifting attitudes, centres on the increasing attention given 
to male violence by the media, judiciary and politicians. This attention was generated by 
the burgeoning feminist discourses calling for an end to violence against women.  
However, while some historians have interpreted this as indicative of a decrease in such 
violence, others argue there was not a change, just a newly found awareness.  Elspeth King 
identified two female Scottish poets to demonstrate the growing feminist agenda, who also 
addressed the issue of wifebeating in their writings.
51
  Marion Bernstein, a music teacher, 
poet, and single woman from Glasgow, depicted wifebeating and society’s tolerance of it 
(through the lack of effective legislation), as an effect of gender inequality.  In her poem 
‘Women’s Rights and Wrongs’ she wrote:  
You’d give the lash to wife beaters 
But surely you should know  
If women legislated, they’d  
Have had it long ago.
52
   
 
And in her poem ‘A Dream’ she illustrated how the law should be through the reversal of 
gender roles:  
Now no man could venture to beat his wife 
For the women had settled by law  
That whoever did so should lose his life  
Then he’d never do so any more.53   
 
‘A Dream’ resembles the contemporary ballad ‘Scotch Bloomers’ that also described a 
world where men and women’s roles were reversed: ‘Their husbands they will wop and 
squander all their riches/ Make them nurse the kids & wash their shirts & breeches/ If the 
men should say a word they’ll be such jolly rows, sirs/ Their wives will make them sweat 
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and beat them with the trousers.’54  Though ‘A Dream’ was not meant to be comedic, 
‘Scotch Bloomers’ shows that writers employed imagery of an upside-down world to 
express humour as well as inadequacies of society. 
Jessie Russell, inspired by Bernstein, likewise questioned the penal legislations in her 
poem ‘Women’s Rights Versus Women’s Wrongs’.  In her stanzas she points out that 
patriarchal hegemony resulted in the lack of severe punishments for male criminals: ‘But a 
life for a life, and the murderer’s hung, and we think not the law inhuman/ Then why not 
the lash for the man who kicks or strikes a defenceless woman?’55   
Their poetry also reflects the 1870s Parliamentary debate over instituting flogging as a 
penalty for convicted violent offenders in Great Britain.
56
  In 1874 Disraeli initiated an 
enquiry into brutal assaults.
57
  The report questioned the effectiveness of the existing 
punishments for brutal assaults, possible changes to certain crimes and punishments, and 
whether flogging should be considered as a new form of punishment, particularly in the 
event of crimes against women and children.
58
   
Though assaults on women and children are mentioned specifically, wifebeaters were not 
the main focus.  However, the responses from some Scottish sheriffs and sheriff substitutes 
revealed judicial opinions on the issue of wifebeating.  Forty-six separate letters of reply 
were included in the report, representing forty-two counties of Scotland.  In response to the 
question on the sufficiency of the penal law, it was found that a sheriff without a jury (also 
known as summary procedure) was capable of sentencing a maximum punishment of sixty 
days imprisonment or a fine of 10s.
59
  Out of the 46 responses, 54 per cent (25) stated that 
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they found the penal law ‘sufficiently stringent’ as a means of deterring violent assaults; 30 
per cent said no.  For the question, ‘should flogging be authorized…especially in cases of 
assaults on women and children?’, 74 per cent (34) said yes and 22 per cent said no.  A 
large proportion of those who said yes to flogging insisted it should only be decided in 
court with a jury and used in an instance of extreme brutality.  
Some letters also included a quick sentence on the frequency or infrequency of violent 
assaults.  Two representatives of Forfar and two of Renfrew stated that wife beating was ‘a 
crime on the increase.’60  The first letter of the report, signed by twelve sheriffs and sheriff 
substitutes speaking on behalf of 23 locations, stated: ‘since 1831, and more particularly of 
late years, and in large towns, crimes of violence and of aggravated violence have 
increased, and we believe that increase is more than is due simply to increased 
population.’61  Sheriffs from Fife, Lanark, Renfrew and Bute stated wifebeating was a 
problem in their districts, while individual letters from Inverness, Shetland, Argyll and 
Inverness, Tobermory (Mull), Aberdeen and Kincardine and Fife all stated violent crimes 
were not a problem or of rare occurrence.  Only D. Macleod Smith, sheriff substitute of 
Elgin, reported, ‘I am glad to be able to add that, within the last few years, assaults of all 
kinds within this county have been undergoing considerable and increasing diminution.’62 
The first circular of the Brutal Assaults Report begins, ‘Sir, Mr. Secretary Cross having at 
present under his consideration the measures to be adopted for the more effectual 
repression of the crimes of violence, now unhappily so common among certain classes of 
the population…’63  The notion of working-class men being the main and therefore most 
likely perpetrators of violent crimes was ever present in nineteenth-century discourse.  This 
attitude could also be seen in the responses, for instance Sheriff Substitute James Campbell 
wrote:  
Assaults on women and children, as a rule, are in no way premeditated, but 
result from sudden paroxysms of passion, arising frequently out of the 
miserable conditions of the social life of the lowest classes, and the 
offender is usually more or less under the influence of drink.
64
   
Drink was frequently mentioned as the universal feature of violent crimes.   The sheriff 
substitute who responded for both Tobermory and Nairn claimed excess drinking led to 
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violence.  And Alex Falconar of Nairnshire wrote: ‘it is my full conviction that, with few 
exceptions, all the cases of assault that occur in Scotland, arise from drink got in the 
public-houses under which the country groans.’65  
In the newspapers, numerous letters and opinion pieces were published on the use of the 
lash for wifebeaters.  While there were some supporters, such as Bernstein and Russell, 
who felt the only just punishment for an abusive husband was the lash, there were 
seemingly more opponents, although the reasons for protesting the lash differed.  Hughes 
found that officials rejected the implementation of the lash on wifebeaters because they felt 
that in many instances of husbands using violence it qualified as chastisement, as the wife 
had provoked him and therefore deserved discipline.
66
  In 1874 the Dundee Courier & 
Argus published a letter printed in the Times written by ‘A Scotch Employer’ that began, 
‘Before statesmen are asked to empower magistrates to inflict the lash for wife beating it 
would be well to look at both sides of the question.’  He then told the story of meeting a 
boy named Alec who had to carry his ‘sawbath breeks’ (Sabbath trousers) out of his house 
every Monday morning to hide so his mother would not pawn them for drink, despite the 
fact that his father was, ‘a steady man; that had high wages’.  The author used this example 
to argue that it was the miserable condition of some working-class people that led to 
marital violence, but these wives were not free of blame: ‘[w]hat justice is there in 
punishing a man who even resorts to drink or to violence when he has a wife like Alec’s 
mother to deal with?  Let us pause and try and get deeper down and try and reach the 
source of the sorrow.’67  Another letter anonymously written to the Dundee Courier & 
Argus in November 1874 stated: ‘And there are few who will not admit that men who have 
become so brutalised as to repeatedly beat the woman whom they have sworn to protect 
and cherish, deserve the same kind of treatment they extend to their wives’, but then went 
on to discuss the use of the lash on thieves as a more appropriate criminal for such a 
detrimental punishment: 
Hence there might be less mischief or wrong done in applying the lash to a 
degraded habitual thief than to a man who, in passionate moods, has been 
known to lift his hand to his wife.  Of course, this involved the very 
difficult question of provocatives, a question that, if ever the lash becomes 
legally applicable to the backs of wife-beaters, will have to be duly 
considered by the Sheriffs’68    
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The other side who opposed the lash for wifebeaters argued on behalf of the wife.  There 
was recognition evident in public discourse that using the lash on violent husbands would 
put the wives of these men in even more danger.  A report on ‘an exemplary sentence’ of 
twelve months with hard labour by Sheriff Cheyne of Dundee to a ‘brutal fellow of a 
husband’, who repeatedly abused his wife and child (listed as the only one ‘alive’), was 
used as an example of effectively punishing a wifebeater without flogging: 
Although the cowardly blackguards who ill-use women—especially those 
whom they have sworn to love and protect—rightly deserve to have meted 
out to them the kind of punishment they inflict, there was to be kept in 
view the effect that such chastisement inflicted by order of a Judge would 
have upon the offender considered as a husband…. men living under the 
same roof with a woman by whose evidence they were flogged would be 
simply out of the question.  And we opine that those who have displayed 




Cobbe also made this point in her 1878 article, arguing that the lash as a possible penalty 
would not only put more wives at risk, but also deter wives from reporting their husbands’ 
assaults, which she added was already a problem in England.
70
  Her solution was a bill that 
would empower judges in criminal courts to grant an order of separation, aliment, and 
custody of the children to abused wives who requested protection from their husbands.
71
  
Her proposal was discussed in an anonymous letter published by the Dundee Courier & 
Argus & Northern Warder in April of 1878.  Applying her arguments to Scotland, the 
author agreed with Cobbe that flogging as a punishment for wife abuse would be 
dangerous, and so called for a consideration of Cobbe’s Bill.  The author, however, did not 
fully endorse the bill, citing the potential difficulty magistrates and judges might face in 
granting separations to wives.  Although some complaints may be genuine, the author 
wrote that others may not be; such as instances of ‘justified’ assaults or provocation, as 
well as the possibility that unhappy wives would charge cruelty without grounds in order to 
‘get away from her husband’s control, and yet live off him’, or the extreme scenario of 
wives tempting their husbands to violence in order to have them arrested.  Accordingly, the 
author concludes that the Flogging Bill is not the answer, but Cobbe’s bill still requires 
some thought: ‘In the meantime, it is no easy matter for wives in Scotland who 
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undoubtedly ought to have it, getting a separation, owing to the trouble and expense of a 
suit in the Court of Session.’72 
This observation about the Court of Session offers unique insight into public perception of 
the civil law and court system.  The Court of Session was only available to parties involved 
in a civil action, an expensive and potentially lengthy process.  In contrast to the criminal 
courts, the CS was used less often for charges of violence.  In London for instance, 
Jennifer Davis identified that poor women regularly used the police courts to speak of 
violent husbands, though they were sometimes only seeking intervention rather than an 
arrest.
73
   
However, police intervention was not always wanted by an abused wife, as there were 
potentially more negative consequences than positive.  For instance, in Scotland, the police 
could make an arrest and charge without a citizen’s request; meaning a police officer could 
charge a violent husband with assault or breach of the peace without the wife’s consent.74  
There was also a concern for the wife’s safety if her husband was arrested and punished.  
The issue of husbands responding to their arrest with more violence or abuse was 
addressed earlier in the discussion on flogging, but that scenario was hypothetical.  In 
reality wives whose husbands were arrested, temporarily restrained, put in prison, or 
convicted faced a backlash once their husbands were released from police custody.
75
  In 
Airdrie, for instance, the wife of George Smith had boiling tea thrown at her after she 
called the police to protect her from her husband’s abuse.76  In Dundee Police Court it was 
reported that, 'As the prisoner was leaving the dock he scowled at his wife, who was sitting 
in court, and said "Wait or I come out!" The wife—"Do you hear that now."'  The husband 
had been convicted of wifebeating and imprisoned for thirty days.
77
 
As pointed out by contemporaries, penalties related to violent offenders especially 
wifebeaters were ineffective forms of prevention or deterrence.  Punishments were 
restricted to a certain amount of days in jail or money depending on the court in which the 
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offender was tried, and that was dependent on the precognition decided by a procurator 
fiscal.
78
  Most cases of assault, if considered minor offences, were tried in police court 
(established in the early nineteenth century) and presided over summarily by a bailie or 
magistrate with jurisdiction to sentence a maximum of £5 or sixty days’ imprisonment.79  
For slightly more serious assaults, a prisoner was sent to sheriff court, which was given 
jurisdiction in 1828 to try cases without a jury provided the maximum sentence was £10 or 
sixty days imprisonment.
80
  Farmer argues that by the end of the nineteenth century most 
minor offences were tried summarily due to their ‘cheapness and speed’, allowing more 
convictions of lesser sentences.
81
 
The increase in summary procedures reflected the growing demand for policing public 
spaces, evident through the higher rate of crimes being reported and tried.
82
  However 
Donnachie distinguishes this increase as reflecting more reports of crimes against property, 
whereas crimes against the person were declining in early nineteenth-century Scotland.
83
  
Hughes asserts that there was a shift in priorities to a greater concern for property than 
people, as implied by judiciary penalties.
84
  Riggs also argues that the early nineteenth 
century showed a trend towards more lenient sentencing than those found in the early 
modern period; the forms of harsh punishment so readily used in the eighteenth century 
were gradually replaced by the mid-nineteenth century with comparatively lighter ones, 
specifically, transportation was converted to penal servitude.
85
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century convictions for assaults against wives were 
regularly tried in summary courts.  Significantly, Hughes found that, ‘around two-thirds of 
all men convicted’ under these circumstances were not given prison sentences.86  Those 
convicted were given alternative penalties such as fines, cautions or admonishment.  If sent 
to prison the average sentence was less than six months, and sometimes one month or less.  
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She argues that this leniency was further encouraged in the early twentieth century by 
marriage mending, probation and instalment plans for paying fines.
87
 
As shown in the Brutal Assaults Report, the majority of the sheriffs and sheriff substitutes 
said they found the legislation sufficient.
88
  Still it was apparent that many felt harsher 
penalties could be more effective to discourage violent assaults, hence the high number 
who supported flogging.  The weakest aspect of the penal code, according to those 
respondents who found the laws inefficient, was the option of a fine.  Walter J. Spens, 
sheriff substitute in Hamilton, who provided a response to Secretary Cross, had also 
written a letter to the Glasgow Herald less than a month earlier, arguing against the 
reinstitution of the lash.  In this letter he voiced the inefficiency of fines: ‘Cases of wife-
beating occurring in my district are not now frequent, and I believe this to be due to a 
declared and inflexible rule, that wife-beaters, when proved guilty, receive sentence of 
imprisonment without the option of a fine.’  He explained that in his experience the option 
allowed violent offenders to escape punishment, as often a support system from other men 
formed to bail one another out of prison: ‘I believe in many cases [money is] raised by a 
man’s friends (sometimes by a subscription in court); or, if colliers, by their brother 
workers in the same pit—very much with the idea, “it’s you to-day, it may be me 
tomorrow.”’89  Duncan White was able to avoid ten days’ imprisonment because he was 
given the option of a 21s. fine, which his employer paid for him.
90
  Sheriff Substitute J. M. 
Lees of Lanarkshire also declared, ‘the maximum penalty of 5/. [as] a perfect mockery.  In 
frequent cases I have seen the money paid by the prisoner, or collected for him, as soon as 
the clerk of the court had read the sentence.’91  Those who supported a harsher penalty for 
violent offenders were not necessarily advocating prison or flogging; some merely 
suggested an increase in the maximum amount of money.  Several sheriffs and sheriff 
substitutes proposed the raising of the fine to between 20s. and 50s., even after saying the 
penal law was sufficient. 
The other effect of sentencing fines on wifebeaters was the impact on the family’s 
finances.  An editorial in The Scotsman written by an anonymous woman illustrates this 
issue as part of the public discourse on how to penalise violent husbands:  
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 Day after day I read in your papers accounts of wife-beating, in which 
conviction is followed by sentences so lenient that it is a mockery to say 
they either avenge the wrongs or protect the future of the poor bruised 
victims; while, with regard to the offenders, they only irritate them, and in 




 A postscript was included asking, ‘I should like to know who earns the fines paid in these 
cases?  I suspect it is the wife.’93  The Glasgow Herald reported a case where a husband 
failed to appear in court and thus forfeited three guineas.  Instead his wife arrived and,  
'Although the poor woman was severely bruised on the body and face, she set about raising 
money, and succeeded in gathering the amount of the pledge, through which her cowardly 
husband was liberated.'
94
   
The inefficiency of the Scottish penal code regarding assaults on wives was most 
problematic for the wife.  Not only were husbands able to redirect the blame onto their 
wives through the discourse of female provocation, they were also able to retaliate for any 
judicial punishment they received by further threats, beatings or terrorisation.  Thus, 
another fault in the penal law flagged up by the sheriff substitutes was the gap between an 
arrest and a trial.  Two sheriff substitutes from Fife included this complaint, one writing:  
In cases of assault on wives, it is of the greatest importance that the trial 
shall take place as soon as possible.  The delays which are inseparably 
from securing a trial by jury when imprisonment for 60 days is thought an 
inadequate punishment, are very apt to lead to the escape of the criminal.  
If he is admitted to bail (which it is his right to get) he very often has 
succeeded in softening his wife’s feelings towards him, and the tale which 
she then tells in the witness box is scarcely recognisable as a narrative of 
the same event which she described soon after its occurrence.
95
 
The second concurred, explaining that ‘witnesses are tampered with or threatened, and it is 
with difficulty the prosecutor can present to the jury evidence sufficient to justify a 
conviction.’96  A sheriff substitute of Lanarkshire wrote that even when trying cases of 
assault on women and children summarily, ‘I have found it next to impossible to get the 
parties assaulted to depone in support of the charge.’97  Evidence of this can also be found 
in newspaper accounts.  The wife of Timothy Garty was knocked down and hit with a 
hatchet, nevertheless when she appeared in court it was publicised that, '[i]n the course of 
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her examination, the woman, who seemed anxious to screen her husband, stated that the 
blows were not painful, and that he was not in the habit of lifting his hand against her.'
98
  
Garty was sentenced to sixty days with hard labour.  Similarly, the wife of John Mailly 
plead, ‘that the accused should be leniently dealt with, the wife said she was not much hurt, 
although her face was cut, discoloured, and swollen; in fact, she was struck “in the gentlest 
manner possible.”’  Sheriff Hamilton, the same man who sentenced Garty to 
imprisonment, gave Mailly a caution of 26s. or ten days imprisonment.
99
  Lastly, 
Scotland’s restrictions on evidence excluded wives as competent witnesses, but required at 
least two witnesses for proof.
100
  Hughes argues this was verification of the Scottish 
judiciary’s preference for domestic disputes to be handled within the family.101   
Still, wifebeaters made regular appearances in Scottish criminal courts.  In 1831 The 
Scotsman reported, ‘Wednesday, no fewer than six low drunken fellows were placed at the 
bar of the Police Court, on charges of beating and maltreating their unfortunate wives.’102  
Forty years later the Glasgow Herald printed a blurb on some of the latest sentences for 
convicted wifebeaters and referenced the public perception of wifebeating:  
A notion exists that Paisley is noted for wife beating cases, but although 
that notion is not well founded, and has arisen in all likelihood from the 
fact that there is a singular absence of other offences in this town, and that 
wife beating only bulks large in proportion, the records of the Police Court 
this week are calculated to confirm the imputation that the brutal practice is 
a very common one.
103
       
Reports of husbands tried for assaulting their wives are present throughout the nineteenth-
century Scottish newspapers, but an increase in cases reported is evident from the 1860s, 
which arguably corresponds with the rise of the first wave feminist movement.
104
   Again, 
this rise in reports of marital violence should not be interpreted as evidence of the real 
number of incidents.  Newspapers only reported cases of marital violence that were 
prosecuted, sensational or topical.  
What is evident from the contemporary sources is a continued discourse of blame and 
provocation into the 1880s: working-class women were judged on their ability to keep a 
                                                          
98
 ‘Aggravated Wife-Beating Cases’, The Scotsman, 18 November 1873.  
99
 ‘Wife-Beating’, The Scotsman, 24 September 1873.  
100
 Wives became competent, but not compellable witnesses with the 1898 Criminal Evidence [Scotland] 
Act; Hughes, ‘The “Non-Criminal” Class’, p. 35. 
101
 Ibid, pp. 34-35.  For a discussion of reconciliation in English summary courts see Behlmer, ‘Summary 
Justice and Working-Class Marriage’, pp. 254-258, 270-271.  
102
 ‘Horrid Brutality’, The Scotsman, 26 November 1831, p. 3.  
103‘Wife-Beating’, Glasgow Herald, 9 March 1871.   
104
 This finding is based on a collection of wifebeating reports in The Scotsman Archive available online and 
the Scottish newspapers available on the Nineteenth-Century British Newspapers database. 
196 
 
happy husband and home, while working-class men were deemed more like animals than 
men.  Drink was seen as an excuse for bad behaviour, but also a justification for chastising 
a drunken wife.  Newspaper articles labelled husbands accused of beating their wives as 
‘brutal’, ‘unmanly’, ‘cowardly’, ‘scoundrel’, ‘disgraceful’, and even ‘monsters’, but still, 
no severe legislation was enacted as punishment.  Even the consideration of flogging, 
never implemented for violent criminals in Scotland, indicated the view that such criminals 
were confined to the working class, for as Foyster pointed out, ‘[t]here is no way that this 
would have been a topic for debate if MPs imagined that members of their own social class 
could have been subject to this penalty.’105 
Furthermore, though physical violence was frequently mentioned in detail in criminal trial 
reports, there is very little mention of non-physical abuse.  Letters and editorials on marital 
violence usually only addressed wifebeating as the big issue, but as the CS judicial 
separation cases will demonstrate, abusive marriages involved a much more complex type 
of cruelty than strikes and blows.    
In the second part of this chapter the sources and findings of the CS separation cases and 
sample of criminal court wifebeating cases will be discussed in detail.  The discourses 
explained above will be applied to these cases to determine how the judicial authorities 
coped with the reality of martial violence when presented in their courtrooms.  As shown 
through the trajectory of ideas in the nineteenth century, the general notion that violence 
within marriage was a working-class concern put working-class wives at a disadvantage as 
their characters were often put on trial alongside their husbands.  Within the civil court, 
however, wives were given a greater opportunity to present and plead their cases.        
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Chapter Five: Separation and Cruelty, Part II      
 
Introduction: Sources and Findings in Court of Session Judicial Separation 
and Criminal Court Cases 
The Edinburgh Court of Session (CS) case records illuminate the reality of cruelty within 
abusive marriages.  This reality was often hidden by predominating public perceptions that 
marital violence was a class issue, as outlined by D’Cruze: ‘Working-class violence was 
constructed as a social problem, highly visible to contemporaries and well documented.  
Middle and upper-class offenders were certainly tried and punished, but by and large this 
occurred only when their offence proved impossible to ignore or redefine.’1  Wifebeating 
was not considered an issue of the middle and upper classes, and if it was brought to the 
attention of the public, it was due to the extremity of the offence.  In actuality, the true 
extent of marital abuse can never be stated in a numerical amount.  It exists as a dark 
figure, both historically and today.  From this study’s sampling of divorce and separation 
records available from the decennial years of 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870 and 1880, 
there is some light shed on individual experiences of marital abuse, and further attestation 
of the complexity of defining and proving cruelty within the courtroom.   
As the small number of cases found prohibits any generalising they will be supplemented 
by wifebeating trials reported in the newspapers.  The trial reports collected were printed in 
Scottish newspapers from across the country: The Scotsman, Glasgow Herald, Aberdeen 
Journal, and Dundee Courier & Argus & Northern Warder.  In total 102 cases were found, 
ranging from 1831 to 1896.  The highest numbers of trials were reported between the 
1860s and 1870s.   
Of the 254 decrees found from the benchmark year study of the CS, 128 cases of divorce 
and separation were collected, fourteen of which were actions for separation and aliment, 
or 11 per cent of the 128.  Out of the fourteen summons sent to the CS, thirteen were given 
decrees of judicial separation, and one was declared assoilized (dismissed).  The ground on 
which the action was filed was cruelty and maltreatment for each case.  In every case the 
pursuer was the wife.   
As cruelty was not grounds for divorce, this chapter’s focus is on judicial separation.  It 
should be noted, nevertheless, that cruelty was also an issue cited in divorce cases where 
the official grounds were adultery or desertion.  For example, of the 65 adultery divorce 
                                                          
1
 Shani D’Cruze (ed.), Everyday Violence in Britain, 1850-1950; Gender and Class, (Essex, 2000), pp. 3-4.  
198 
 
cases, seventeen mentioned maltreatment of the wife by the husband.  Of the 48 desertion 
divorce cases, five mentioned maltreatment as well.  These cases will not be discussed in 
this chapter, however, as any mention of maltreatment was usually brief and unspecific. 
To draw conclusions based solely on these small numbers would be inaccurate.  Though 
the rate of divorce and separation in Scotland was increasing towards the turn of the 
century, these findings do not add any definitive quantitative data to the debate of marital 
violence increasing or decreasing.
2
  It may be that more women were reporting their 
husbands’ cruelty, which caused the number of cases reported to rise (in both criminal and 
civil court).  This would be reflected in the rising number of cases where maltreatment was 
reported.
3
   
 
Cruelty as Defined by Scots Law and Forms of Violence and Abuse Found in 
Cases 
Hammerton proposes that in England more abused wives were reporting their maltreatment 
in the second half of the century due to a shift in judges’ attitudes regarding the legal 
definition of cruelty.  He demonstrates that as middle and upper-class husbands sometimes 
used more verbal, mental and economic cruelty against their wives, these women struggled 
to prove maltreatment until a more encompassing definition was accepted.
4
  The increase 
in England, however, was a direct result of the new English legislations after 1850, such as 
the 1857 and 1878 Matrimonial Causes Acts.  Scotland, on the other hand, did not have the 
same legislative restructuring of divorce law in the mid-nineteenth century as England.
5
   
The legal definition of cruelty, according to nineteenth-century Scots law, had six forms of 
abuse that qualified for a separation a mensa et thoro: physical, verbal, economic, 
constructive, wilful communication of venereal disease and tyrannical cruelty.
6
  Although 
all of these forms have been cited as warranting a judicial separation, the judges repeatedly 
emphasised that for a ruling of cruelty, ‘the grounds of action must be grave and weighty, 
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and such as established an impossibility that the duties of the married life can be 
discharged.’7 
Thus the definition of cruelty in Scotland did not solely rest on physical violence, but did 
hinge on proving the wife’s life was at risk if she continued to live with her husband.  
Though the legal definition did not change from 1830 to 1890, Scots law followed the 
system of precedent, meaning if one Lord Ordinary ruled in favour of judicial separation 
on the grounds of non-physical cruelty another Lord Ordinary could cite this decree as 
justification for a similar interlocutor.
8
  This was illustrated in the 1870 action initiated by 
Mrs. Elizabeth Gordon or Steuart against her husband Mr. Andrew Steuart.  Lord Gifford 
found Mr. Steuart ‘guilty of abusing and maltreating’ his wife and granted a separation of 
bed and board.  Lord Gifford included a note with the interlocutor detailing the precedents 
applicable to the pursuer’s summons and the defender’s answers.  Though the defender and 
his lawyer cited a case from 1850 claiming ‘a single isolated case of violence, producing 
no permanent injury to health, was not enough’, the Lord Ordinary countered that there 
was indeed violence committed by the defender and: 
also abundant threats of violence, sufficient, the Lord thinks, to justify 
reasonable apprehension, which the event shewed [sic] was well founded, 
and such reasonable apprehension, even without actual blows, seems 
enough.—See Milford v Milford, 18th December 1866, Law Reports, 1 
Prob. and Div., 295.  See also Harris v Harris, 2 Hagart’s Reports, 148, in 
which very slight violence coupled with threats was held enough.
9
   
The fourteen separation cases discussed in this chapter offer detailed accounts of 
discontented marriages.  Significantly, it was found that the economic status of each couple 
does vary.  Some couples were wealthy, the Steuarts for instance, while others would fit 
into the upper-working class and the lower-middle class.  Significantly, the majority of 
these couples did not fit into one economic profile, though there are several occupations 
shared by two of the defenders.  Still, it is important to state that of these cases, the average 
expense for the Court action was £42.
10
  While this was considered a cheaper price than in 
England, it was unaffordable for many lower working-class couples.  An overview of the 
couples’ backgrounds is provided in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below. 
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Table 5.1 Residences and Occupations of Separation and Aliment Case Couples 





1830 Grieve or Winton Edinburgh Builder 
II 
Daughter of Coal 
Merchant 












II Runs Grocery (Widow 
of Grocer) 




File-cutter III  
1870 Graham Gordon or 
Steuart 
Auchlunkart Esquire of 
Auchlunkart 
I Daughter of Esquire 
of Park in Banff 
1870 Nicol or Pringle Edinburgh Iron-dresser III Daughter of 
Shoemaker 
1870 Wilson or Johnstone Leith Engineer II Runs Temperance 
Hotel 
1870 Fernie or Taws Dundee Engineer II  
 
1880 Lawrenson or Findlay Edinburgh Grocer II Keeps Lodgers 
 
1880 M’Call or Cairns Edinburgh Polisher III Washer 
 
1880 Morrison or Cook Dunfermline Innkeeper II Works at Inn 
 
1880 Myles or Souter Edinburgh Dairyman II Runs Dairy Business 
 
1880 Perry or Mein Dumfries Master Joiner II  
¹ Based on W.A. Armstrong’s classification of nineteenth-century occupations from census records: 
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Table 5.2 Marriage and Cruelty, Court of Session Cases 
Length of Marriage                        Total: 14  
Less than 1 yr                1  
1-10 yrs                               4  
10-15 yrs                                                       3  
15-20 yrs                1 
20-30 yrs                5  
 
When Cruelty Began                       Total: 14 
Shortly after marriage               6   
 2-5 yrs                 2  
10 years + after marriage                              3  
Not Available                3 
 
Time btw First Cruelty & Action    Total: 14 
Less than 1 yr                3  
1-2 yrs                 1  
2-15 yrs                 4  
5-10 yrs                 4  
Over 10 yrs                2  
 
 
Physical Violence  
Within the separation cases gathered from the CS, the most predominant forms of cruelty 
found were physical, verbal and economic.  In every case there was at least one instance of 
physical abuse reported to the judge.  Verbal abuse was the most prevalent complaint, as it 
featured in every case as the most frequently employed form of cruelty.  Economic abuse 
was the third most common form and was found in five of the fourteen cases.
12
  There was 
one wife who mentioned mental abuse as part of her husband’s maltreatment, one wife 
who complained her husband communicated a venereal disease to her, and one woman 
who stated her husband spat in her face. 
The type of physical cruelty described to the CS (legally referred to as personal violence) 
ranged from forceful removal from a room to throwing nearby objects to stabbing with a 
penknife.
13
  Catherine Pringle of Edinburgh was ‘totally blind and [was] thus rendered very 
helpless and defenceless’ against her abusive husband Robert Pringle, an Iron Dresser.  In 
three out of the four assaults described by Catherine to the Court, her husband ‘seized her 
by the throat’ to choke her.  The fourth time, he ‘violently struck her on the face with a 
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pass key and chased her out of the house.’14  According to the cases, most daily incidences 
of violence were committed with bare hands; however, the extreme episodes, and the 
claims most likely to prove maltreatment, often included the use of a weapon.  Nine out of 
the fourteen cases mention the use of a weapon to harm or threaten the wife.  It is also 
apparent that weapons were a means to terrorise, such as James Souter, a dairyman in 
Edinburgh, inflicted on his wife Christina.  She stated that, ‘he purchased a butcher’s knife, 
with which, in the presence of the children, he repeatedly threatened to stab [her], and 
which he carried about on his person during the day, and kept concealed about his bed at 
night.’15  Similarly, John Mein, a joiner in Dumfries, would frequently strike his wife with 
the ‘stout cane with a bone handle’ he used as a walking stick; he even tried to choke her to 
death with it.
16
    
Likewise, every case of wifebeating or wife assault tried in the criminal courts described a 
physically violent attack by a husband against his wife.  In the trial reports collected, all 
102 cases reported physical abuse.  Where details of the episode were available, the most 
common assault was a blow or a strike, then kicking after being knocked down.  Thomas 
Alexander, a shoemaker in Glasgow with previous convictions, exemplified this 
combination of violence when he struck his wife, knocked her to the ground and then 
kicked her.
17
  79 of the 102 prisoners were accused of using their bare hands to assault 
their wife.  The majority, or 61 per cent, of these husbands were sentenced to 
imprisonment, half of whom served 30 to 60 days.  The second most commonly sentenced 
length of imprisonment was less than one month.  Only ten of the prisoners were also 
sentenced to hard labour.  33 per cent of the 79 husbands convicted of beating their wives 
bare-handed were fined; the expense of the fine varied, although most men received fines 
of £1 to £2, followed by fines of less than a guinea (21 shillings), and fines of £2 to £3.  
The majority of men fined were given the alternative of prison if unable to pay (see Table 
5.4).       
23 per cent of the 102 reports stated that the husband had used a weapon in his attack (see 
Table 5.3).  The most frequently used weapon was often a household item: wooden 
objects, metal objects, boiling water, knives, hatchets, even shoes.  The frequency of 
physical assaults, often with dangerous weapons, reaffirms that marital cruelty could be, 
and often was, life threatening.  As mentioned earlier, life-threatening cruelty qualified a 
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spouse for a judicial separation, yet, when similar episodes were presented to a criminal 
court abusive husbands received comparably light sentences for violence often described 
as brutal.  Hughes argues that the 1862 Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act had the 
potential to toughen the punishments for such offenders—the Act specifically addressed 
assaults where life was threatened, limbs were broken, lethal weapons were used to the 
effusion of blood, or the accused had three previous convictions—by sending their cases to 
the High Court or to be tried by a jury, which could result in more severe penalties, such as 
longer prison sentences.  However, her investigation of criminal court rulings shows that 
sheriffs and magistrates continued to work within their own jurisdiction applying lenient 
sentences rather than utilise the 1862 Act.
18
   
 
Table 5.3 Criminal Courts Where Sample of Wifebeating 










Police/Burgh Court 78 65 13 
Sheriff Court 15 10 5 
Summary Trial 6 4 2 
High Court of Justiciary 3 0 3 
Unlisted 6 4 2 
Total 102 79 23 
 
 
Equally, my own sampling of wifebeating cases suggests that the Police and Improvement 
Act was not used efficiently (see Table 5.3 and 5.4).  Out of the 102 cases found, 78 were 
tried in police court (or burgh court in the 1830s), fifteen in sheriff court, and three in the 
High Court of Justiciary, suggesting that many violent husbands were kept in the lower 
courts and subsequently given lighter sentences.
19
  There is some evidence of the 1862 Act 
being utilised; specifically, the two cases tried in the High Court after 1862 did involve the 
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use of a weapon, the effusion of blood, and previous convictions.
20
  John Hughes, a 
seventy year old man charged with assaulting his wife with a piece of wood or hammer 
about the head, face, breast and hands, to the effusion of blood, pled guilty stating, ‘that he 
had lately been very eccentric in his habits and weak in mind, almost imbelice [sic]; and 
that he scarcely knew the nature of the offence committed', and was sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment by the Lord Justice-Clerk in 1876.
21
  When Thomas Morrison, who 
had already been convicted four times for assaulting his wife, stood in front of the Lord 
Justice-Clerk in April 1865 he was given a sentence of eighteen months after the jury 
unanimously found him guilty of his fifth attack.  Although eighteen months was the 
lengthiest penalty found in this sample, it was not the maximum sentence Morrison could 
have received; his sentence was explained by the Lord Justice-Clerk and reported in the 
article:  
considering the previous convictions of the prisoner, and the last sentence 
of twelve months’ imprisonment he had received for beating his wife, the 
natural course for the Court would be to give a sentence of penal servitude, 
which could not according to law be less than seven years.  But taking into 
consideration that the injury inflicted upon Mrs Morrison was not of a 
permanent character—no thanks to him for that, however—and unwilling 
to give such a long term of punishment, the Court would try again the 
effect of imprisonment, but as sure as ever he lifted his hand to his wife 
again, he would be sentenced to a long term of penal servitude.
22
 
Of the 23 cases where a weapon was used, thirteen were tried in police (or burgh) court, 
and five in sheriff court (see Table 5.3).
23
  The majority of the 23 prisoners were sentenced 
to imprisonment of 30 to 60 days, although just two were also sentenced to hard labour.  
Fines were only given to three men and ranged from less than 21s. to £2, with prison 
sentences if unable to pay (see Table 5.4).  Only six of the 23 received punishments of five 
months or more (two from the High Court of Justiciary and four from the sheriff court).  Of 
the five husbands accused of harming their wives to the effusion of blood, three were 
sentenced to twelve or more months imprisonment, while the other two received ten days 
and eight days in prison. Thus, it seems that even with legislation encouraging harsher 
penalisation of violent assaults enforcement by the judiciary was not guaranteed.  For 
instance, in 1872, ten years after the Act was passed, Alexander Ross of Edinburgh struck, 
stamped on, kicked, and beat his wife with the heel of a nailed shoe and with a shoemaker's 
knife.  He also injured her ten year old son who attempted to defend his mother.  Despite 
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the brutal nature of the attack, the use of a lethal weapon, and Ross’ three previous 
convictions, he was tried in the burgh court by a baillie and sentenced to six days 
imprisonment with a £1 caution or another six days if unable to pay.
24
   
 
Table 5.4 Sample of Wifebeating Cases Tried in Criminal Courts and 






with Weapon Total  
Type of Sentence       
Dismissed 3   3 
Transported   1  1 
Cautioned  1 1 
Sent to Higher Court 1a   1 
Failed to Appear 1  1 
Fined 26 3 29 
<21s.  6 1 7 
£1-2 8 2 10 
£2-3 6   6 
£3-4 4   4 
£4-5       
>£5 2   2 
with alt. of prison  23 3 26 
cautioned  5   5 
Imprisonment 48 18 66 
Length of Sentence:       
<1 month 14 4 18 
1-2 months 30 8 38 
3-6 months 2 2 4 
>6 months 3 4 7 
with alt. of fine  2   2 
with caution/security 3 1 4 
with hard labour 10 2 12 
Total No. Cases 
Collected 79 23 102 
 
a
 This case from 1832 did not provide much detail besides the name and occupation of the 
prisoner; it stated that due to his three previous convictions his case was remitted to the 
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Verbal Abuse as Legal Cruelty 
Although physical violence was the predominant form of abuse cited in criminal courts and 
most separation cases, verbal abuse could constitute cruelty when it demonstrated 
harassment, menace, and threats of physical violence.  Furthermore, the unrelenting use of 
unkind words towards a wife would be considered cruelty when they disrupted her from 
performing her marital duties.
 26
  This line appeared to be blurry, however; for example, 
when discussing ‘Words of Abuse and Habits of Drinking’, Fraser wrote that, ‘Words of 
abuse and reproach, however irritating, blasphemous language, however disgusting, and 
habits of intoxication, however annoying to the wife, without bodily ill-treatment or threats 
of it, are not cruelty.’27  Thus, many wives suffered years of maltreatment in the form of 
verbal abuse as words alone were often not enough to warrant a separation.
28
  Andrew 
Steuart, an esquire of Auchlunkart and at one time a Member of Parliament, called his wife 
‘a blackguard, liar, fool’ and told her to ‘go to the devil’.29  Christina Winton, daughter of a 
coal merchant, complained her husband would ‘vilify her with the most degrading of 
names and epithets’.30  Both Mrs. Russell and Sarah Mein were called whores by their 
husbands along with other ‘vile names’.31  The use of verbal cruelty was hurtful and 
degrading for wives, but it was even more humiliating and effective when used publicly, 
especially for women who considered themselves respectable.  Hence, Mrs. Russell 
complained that Mr. Russell, ‘[used] most disgusting language to [her] and using very 
obscene language—this was heard by a great many people.’32  John Smith would degrade 
his wife, daughter of a Glasgow manufacturer, by calling her names to his servants, 
particularly ‘poor silly, stupid body’.33   
The line between chastisement and cruelty was crossed, though, when a husband began to 
make threats of physical violence or murder.  According to Scots law, the threats once said 
out loud, even if the wife was not present to hear them, indicated a predisposition to harm 
and a future risk for the wife.
34
  The wife of John Johnstone, previously a coal merchant in 
Edinburgh but lately an engineer in West Calder, was able to benefit from this aspect of the 
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law; though she could not prove he had physically assaulted her, his verbal abuse and 
violent threats were deemed enough for a decree of separation.
35
  John had told his 
daughter ‘that he would blacken [his wife’s] body if he could catch her,’ and when he 
could not find his wife he said, ‘he wished she were drowned,’ and that ‘it would be the 
happiest day he would see when he saw her carried off in a stretcher.’36   
Most cases of alleged cruelty illustrated that verbal abuse was more regularly used, but was 
also usually present during physical abuse.  For instance, Elizabeth Morrison, wife of 
James Dick Cook an innkeeper of the Park Tavern in Dunfermline and characterised in the 
court room as a drunkard, stated that he repeatedly threatened to shoot her with a loaded 
gun he kept in the house, both in front of people as well as privately.
37
  John Mein, a joiner 
in Dumfries, who called his wife a whore, threatened various ways he wanted to kill her: 
‘to throw her out of the window, or over the stair, or into the fire.’  In December 1879 he 
‘seized the pursuer by the neck of her jacket, forced her down on the floor and tried to push 
her face into the fire, at the same time swearing and calling her obscene names.’  She was 
able to free herself before she was burned.
38
  Verbal abuse often preceded physical assault, 
sometimes by years.  Robina Findlay, wife of Robert Findlay a grocer in Canongate 
Edinburgh, claimed, ‘[w]e lived very comfortably together till about seven years ago, when 
he began to treat me badly.  He used violent language.  He began to threaten me with 
personal violence between two and three years ago.’  After that she claims he frequently 
told her he would ‘do for her’ and would ‘rim a knife into her.’39   
Though the legal definition of cruelty did not fully recognise the harm caused by verbal 
abuse in the nineteenth century, it was clearly a cause of distress.
40
  Equally so, many 
husbands who claimed provocation when accused of wifebeating, such as that found in the 
ballads, described what was ostensibly verbal abuse by their wives.
41
  Moreover, the use of 
vulgar words was associated with low-class characters.  John Archer found in his study of 
men and violence that working-class men used verbal abuse to initiate violent 
confrontations, and that this aspect of working-class masculinity was culturally accepted.
42
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In contrast, Judith Rowbotham found that women who used foul language detracted from 
their femininity, and were also associated with the lowest classes.
43
  Therefore, insults, 
opprobrious epithets and vile words used by a respectable man towards a respectable 
woman (or vice versa), were considered even more damaging as such language was not 
expected or tolerated.   
Economic Abuse as Legal Cruelty 
Economic abuse has been a constant in the history of marital cruelty.
44
  It was less 
straightforward than personal violence, yet the Scottish Court recognised that part of the 
marital contract was the provision of basic needs for a wife and children by the husband.  
A ‘good husband’ was idealised by the middle classes as a caring, companionate partner 
whose masculinity was tied to his ability to command respect, obedience, and maintain 
domestic order.  This reverence to his authority, however, was dependent on his ability to 
provide and protect for his family and any other dependents.
45
  Within working-class 
families the idea of a ‘good husband’ catered to more achievable goals.  Though the 
respectable working class also promoted the ideals of breadwinning, protecting and 
educating, the conflicts and tensions that escalated from these pressures meant that 
deviations were tolerated and excused.
46
  Ultimately, husbands, whether wealthy or 
impoverished, were expected to keep their families alive and comfortable. 
Complete neglect and abandonment constituted desertion and grounds for a full divorce.  
However, for a man who was still living with the family, Fraser wrote, ‘there can be no 
plainer case of cruelty than the refusal of the necessaries of life to the wife.  But this must 
                                                          
43
 Judith Rowbotham, ‘“Only when drunk”: the stereotyping of violence in England, c. 1850-1900’, in 
D’Cruze (ed.), Everyday Violence in Britain, 1850-1950, (Essex, 2000), p. 164 
44
 Leah Leneman, ‘“A tyrant and tormentor”: violence against wives in eighteenth and early nineteenth-
century Scotland’, Continuity and Change, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1997), pp. 31-54, pp. 36-37; Nancy Tomes, ‘A 
“Torrent of Abuse”: Crimes of Violence between Working-Class Men and Women in London, 1840-1875,’ 
Journal of Social History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring, 1978), pp. 331-332; Ayers and Lambertz, ‘Marriage 
Relations, Money, and Domestic Violence in Working-Class Liverpool, 1919-39,’ in Jane Lewis (ed.), 
Labour and Love; Women’s Experience of Home and Family, 1850-1940, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 195-219;  
Annmarie Hughes, ‘Working Class Culture, Family Life and Domestic Violence on Clydeside, c. 1918-1939: 
A View From Below,’ Scottish Tradition, Vol. 27 (2002), pp.70-73. Linda Gordon found that the economic 
non-support of a husband was ‘[b]y far the most striking and consistent women’s complaint’ in 1930s 
Boston; Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives; The Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston 
1880-1960, (London, 1988), p. 258.     
45
 John Tosh, A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England, (London, 
1999), pp. 60-62; Leonore Davidoff, Megan Doolittle, Janet Fink and Katherine Holden, The Family Story: 
Blood, Contract and Intimacy, 1830-1960, (London, 1999), pp. 147-151; Hughes, ‘Working Class Culture’, 
p. 64.  
46
 Anna Clark, The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class, 
(Berkeley, 1997), pp. 248-263. 
209 
 
always be taken with the qualification that the husband is able to give them.’47  The 
complaint of financial want was measured against the station and condition the complainer 
was accustomed to.  Out of the fourteen cases, six husbands were accused of economic 
cruelty.  Each husband, failed to act as a provider and protector.  Three of the husbands 
earned a wage yet contributed very little or nothing to the support of their wives and 
family; only one step from committing wilful and malicious desertion.
48
  Janet Taws, for 
instance, claimed her husband, an engineer in Dundee, abused her verbally and physically 
when she asked for some of his wage.
49
  
The three other husbands refused to work, thus not contributing financially: two were 
drunkards and hindered their wives from earning a separate wage, while the third, a 
polisher named John Cairns, lay in bed for three months, though perfectly well, and 
refused to work, forcing his wife ‘to seek work for her own maintenance and [get] some 
work at washing.’50  Elizabeth McCorquodale’s second husband depleted the customer 
base of her grocery store in Edinburgh that she inherited after her first husband died.  John 
McCorquodale, a butler when they married, became the grocer of the shop, yet refused to 
support Elizabeth and her children (the parties involved had no children between them): 
‘on the contrary by his violent and outrageous conduct he has driven away almost the 
whole custom of the shop and nearly ruined the business.’  One witness for the pursuer 
stated that she, a spirit merchant’s wife, had been a customer at the shop for four years, but 
since Elizabeth’s marriage to John, ‘I have not frequented the shop much since the month 
of December last, but have rather avoided it in consequence of what I saw then.  I did not 
like the conduct of the defender, because he abused the pursuer and was violent and 
outrageous in my presence.’51  Twenty years later, Mary Cook similarly struggled with a 
husband who not only violently assaulted her, threatened her life, and slept with a servant, 
but who also squandered away the £1,200 she brought with her to the marriage and 
sabotaged any additional income to the family ‘by his idle and dissolute habits.’52   
Some historians of marital violence argue that in relationships where the wife became the 
breadwinner (or at the least the more stable wage earner), the chances of violence 
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  In 1865 John Glumie was arrested for wifebeating reportedly because, ‘his 
wife, who had been in the habit of earning as much by her hands, making men’s clothing, 
was now unable to do so, having a child to nurse.’54  Conversely, that same economic 
independence enabled some abused wives to seek protection or the strength to challenge 
their husbands.
 55
  The assaults listed above, though not directly mentioned as provocation 
in the court documents, are arguably a reflection of ‘the struggle for the breeches’ as 
discussed by Clark.
56
  But equally, these conflicts reflect the difficulty wives faced when 
forced to compensate for a failed breadwinner husband.     
Other Legal Forms of Cruelty 
Other forms of non-physical cruelty acknowledged by the Scottish Court were the wilful 
communication of venereal disease, spitting in the face, and constructive cruelty.
57
  Janet 
Taws described several types of maltreatment inflicted on her by her husband, including 
the passing on of a venereal disease.
58
  Elizabeth Peters described episodes of brutal 
violence perpetrated by her husband, a managerial bleacher and proprietor in Arbroath, one 
of which, ‘the defender being in a state of intoxication put the pursuer into a corner of the 
kitchen and spat in her face till he exhausted himself, and assaulted the pursuer and bruised 
her arms.’59 The two types of cruelty not found in the fourteen cases, but qualified as 
grounds for a separation were if a husband was guilty of committing criminal acts (which 
would make her an accomplice if she did not separate from him), and constructive cruelty, 
which was the abuse of a third party in front of the wife purposefully done to upset her.
60
  
For instance, a witness in a case of child cruelty charging a labourer from Old Assembly 
Close, Edinburgh, with neglecting his three children, claimed the father drank and would 
not work as a way of punishing his wife.
61
 
Significantly, sexual violence is not mentioned in Fraser’s Treatise on Husband and Wife.  
Sexual activity is only mentioned in a brief paragraph stating that the refusal of sexual 
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intercourse by a husband or a wife to their spouse was not grounds for a separation.
62
  
Baron David Hume had established the legal opinion on marital rape by the early 
nineteenth century: a wife gave her implied consent upon the marriage union, therefore a 
husband could not rape his wife.
63
  This exemption did not legally change until the 1980s 
when two cases (1982 and 1984) of wives charging their separated husbands with rape 
forced the Scottish Courts to re-examine Hume’s judgment.  Though these husbands were 
acquitted, it led to a ruling in 1989 in the CS that ‘abolished the marital rape exemption in 
a case involving a cohabiting couple’.64  Historians who have attempted to examine sexual 
violence in centuries past have found the task thwarted by the fact that marital rape did not 
legally exist and therefore was no ground for divorce or separation.
65
  Bourke and 
Hammerton argue that where sexual assault offenses seem absent, they may in fact be 
found between the lines.  Both historians cite the location of attacks or mention of a lack of 
clothing as telling more than the wife may be able to.
66
  Thus, in the CS separation case, 
when Isabella Johnstone stated the following in her complaint it was likely her husband 
had intended a sexual assault upon his sleeping wife:
 
 
upon the morning of the 1
st
 of January 1870, the pursuer while in bed was 
attacked by the defender who was perfectly sober.  The pursuer’s screams 
for help brought her daughter Jessie to her assistance when it was found 
that the gas was out and that the defender was in bed with his clothes on in 
a menacing position towards the pursuer.  The defender was using foul 
opprobrious and threatening language to her.
67
 
He furthermore chased her about the house swearing to find her, until she was able to 
escape with her daughter to her sister’s neighbouring home.  D’Cruze similarly found that 
accounts of violence described in a court case between husband and wife may suggest 
more sexual violence than appears: 
the location of violence (in the bedroom) or its patterning (kicking the belly 
or genitals) can infer the totality of the control an abusive husband was 
seeking to impose.  In a culture where female sexuality had such symbolic 
potency and was also such a key determinant of a woman’s reputation, 
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almost any kind of male violence could draw upon some kind of sexual 
metaphor to express rage or exert dominance.
68
     
Following this line of thought, in 1880 Sarah Mein may have been subjected to sexualised 
violence when her husband kicked her in the stomach the day before his removal to the 
Crichton Lunatic Asylum in Dumfries for alcoholism.
69
  However, neither she nor her 
lawyers presented it as sexual assault. 
 
The Evolution of Mental Abuse as Cruelty 
Mental abuse was not deemed a form of cruelty in nineteenth-century Scottish law.  Even 
in the twenty-first century mental abuse, recently labelled as coercive control by scholars 
and legal authorities,
70
 was only legally recognised and added to an expanding definition of 
domestic violence in the United Kingdom as of March 2013.
71
  This admission of 
psychological abuse exists to the benefit of men and women today, yet in the nineteenth 
century it was not an issue the courts wanted to deal with.  Listed under the section ‘cases 
where there is much discomfort and much misery but where the law…refuses to recognize 
the conduct of the offender as legal cruelty,’ Fraser wrote, ‘mere mental distress no ground 
for separation [sic].’  With the admission that mental cruelty could cause as much injury as 
personal violence, the courts nevertheless refused to recognise it as a form of cruelty on the 
issue of practicality.
72
   
The problematic nature of mental cruelty is illustrated in the case of Mrs. Catherine Smith 
who filed for a judicial separation and aliment against her husband John Smith on the 
ground of maltreatment, but after a nearly three year long suit, John Smith was assoilized 
of the charges.  The interlocutor was followed by a note from the Lord Ordinary that stated 
he was unable to grant a separation to Catherine as the evidence she provided did not meet 
the Court’s expectations of what constituted cruel ‘conduct’.73  Catherine’s complaint 
stated that three years after their marriage her husband ‘deprived her of, and took the elder 
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of her two boys… then a child of two years of age, and sent him to live with [John’s] sister 
in Glasgow, where he was kept entirely away from the Pursuer.’  Following this,  
[John] took the entire charge of the household affairs out of her hands, and 
committed it to a servant; and by this and other such like expedients, he 
systematically persecuted the Pursuer, lacerated her feelings—most 
seriously affected her peace of mind—endangered her health, and degraded 
her in the eyes of her acquaintances, servants and neighbours.
74
 
A little over a year later he ‘took her younger and then only other child away from her’, 
also sending him to the Aunt’s in Glasgow.  After this second assault on her status as a 
mother Catherine left and went to her father’s.  While at her father’s, Catherine gave birth 
to her third son.  Upon learning of this and ‘after a good deal of negotiation between the 
parties and their friends and advisors, and after the two eldest children had been taken 
home from Glasgow, a reconciliation was brought about’ whereby Catherine returned to 
her husband’s home in Kirkintilloch with her newborn son in July 1845.  In October 1846 
John again resumed his psychological maltreatment of his wife by hiring a housekeeper, an 
Englishwoman named Miss Grant.  He gave Miss Grant full responsibility of the house and 
the children, giving her the keys and authority over Catherine: ‘[t]he Pursuer was thus 
constantly and systematically wounded in her feelings, exposed to insult at the hands of her 
husband and Miss Grant, and degraded in the eyes not only of her servants, but also of her 
friends and neighbours.’75 
Reading Catherine’s complaint in the twenty-first century conjures up images of mental 
cruelty or coercive control; John did not physically assault his wife (beyond pulling her 
from rooms forcefully), ‘but’, as Williamson points out, ‘these small, and sometimes 
insignificant incidents, represent the way in which, by creating an unreality that 
undermines the self-identity of the victim, the perpetrator is guilty of a crime against 
identity and liberty, one which, as Stark rightly theorizes, is based on gender roles.’76  The 
anguish caused by her displacement from mistress of the household and particularly as the 
carer for her children is evident.  This was the same husband who called his wife ‘poor 
silly, stupid body’ when speaking of her to his servants.  It is also important to note that 
Catherine was the daughter of a manufacturer in Glasgow, raised in the middle class, 
making her treatment even more demeaning as she considered herself a woman of status. 
                                                          
74
 CS46/1850/2/16 McMichael or Smith v Smith. 
75
 CS46/1850/2/16 McMichael or Smith v Smith. 
76
 Williamson, ‘Living,’ p. 1422.  
214 
 
In Catherine’s complaint she describes herself through the gender roles associated with the 
middle-class married woman: ‘being degraded from her natural position as mistress of her 
own domestic establishment’; ‘he continued to deprive her of her proper place, and of all 
authority as mistress in the house’; ‘he continued to keep her in the degraded and slavish 
position; turned the pursuer out of the room, regardless alike of her remonstrances and 
tears, and thus prevented her from paying a mother’s attention to her sick offspring.’77  
Catherine identified herself as the domestic keeper of her husband’s home and the devoted 
mother to her children; these were her rightful roles and duties, and what was expected of 
her as a wife.  And yet, her husband had taken these responsibilities away from her and 
reduced her to a ‘slavish position’ where servants were a level above her in the chain of 
command and she had to ask permission to hold her sons.  As historians have argued, the 
development of the domestic ideal, particularly in the middle-class household, relegated 
this space as the woman’s sphere. 78  Nevertheless, the hegemonic relationship of man and 
woman was even more reinforced due to the husband’s ability to give and take away her 
authority.  For this reason cases similar to McMichael or Smith v Smith were not rare or 
isolated.
79
  Moreover, under the defining of legal cruelty it is written that a ‘husband taking 
management of household from the wife’ was not a form of cruelty.80  For his own defence 
John Smith stated that: 
 Shortly after the marriage of the parties in July 1840, the defender 
discovered that the pursuer was ill qualified for the duties of a wife, or of 
the mistress of a family.  She was not only ignorant of household affairs, 
but seemed from weakness of purpose and want of apprehension, neither 
capable nor desirous of becoming acquainted with them.  When she 
became a mother her deficiencies were still more lamentably apparent, and 
her neglect or mismanagement of her children occasioned to the defender 
the greatest pain and anxiety.  
He went on to say that it was at the expense of his own feelings, too, that he sent his 
children away, indicating the affection he felt for them.  He opted to send them to live in 
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what he considered to be a better environment, which in the nineteenth century was his 
right as a father.
81
  
Another ruling where the defender was assoilized by the CS suggests that mental cruelty 
continued to be out of the jurisdiction of the judiciary.  In 1877 Edith Eliza Finlay or 
Macculloch filed for separation and aliment (for her and her infant son) against her 
husband George Wallace Macculloch, of Foxwood House Dumfriesshire, on the ground of 
cruelty.  She alleged he had a passionate temper, was violent, drank to excess, kept bad 
company (which he brought into their home), was verbally abusive and repeatedly 
threatened her bodily harm.  In one of her complaints there is an indication of George’s 
mental health: 
once, when she was ill and was unable to leave her room [pregnant], he 
rushed upon her in a frantic and excited state, and put her into a state of 
terror by attempting to cut his throat with a razor, which he brandished 
before her and drew across his throat.  On another occasions he threatened 
to take his life, and he insisted always on having a loaded revolver 
suspended overhead in the bedroom at night, much to her alarm for her 




In his defence George stated the allegations were false and only came from the negative 
influences of Edith’s family whom she was currently residing with, upon his consent, and 
where he had visited for their child’s baptism.  Lord Adam ruled in favour of George 
stating that Edith failed to prove her case, only granting her expenses to be paid.
83
  As this 
case was found in The Scotsman details of the trial are unavailable.  However, of all the 
other CS cases found for this study, the only two with a decree of innocent for the defender 
were examples of mental cruelty being the dominant form of abuse rather than physical, 
despite the pursuers’ descriptions of some physical abuse.    
Hammerton argues that the 1869 and 1870 English case Kelly v Kelly represents a turning 
point for judiciary attitudes towards mental cruelty.
84
  In Scotland it was not until 1895, 
during the Mackenzie v Mackenzie case, that a wife was awarded a right to non-adherence 
due to her husband’s attempts to re-engage her obedience and conjugal duties by taking 
away her children and threats to ‘put her under lock and key.’85  The successful suit of 
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Mackenzie against her husband perhaps demonstrates the shift in attitude of judges towards 
intolerance of tyrannical yet non-violent behaviour of a husband to his wife.  The earlier 
case examples, however, suggest this change was late in coming. 
 
Marital Cruelty and Children 
Children can have two conflicting effects on an unhappily married couple.  They can 
exacerbate already existing problems, such as creating economic pressure or struggles for 
attention.
86
  But, contrastingly, they are often the reason why couples remain together even 
in an abusive marriage.
87
  As discussed above, fathers were considered to have natural and 
sacred rights over their children.  Studies of England have found that nineteenth-century 
judiciary based their judgments for custody on the rights of the father, not on what would 
be best for the children.
88
  Arguably, though there were differences in legislation, the same 
want in consideration is evident in the Scottish courts.  Mothers married to an abusive man 
were in very precarious positions, as there were several concerns if they wanted to leave 
their husbands.  Firstly, before the Conjugal Rights Act of 1861— which allowed parents 
to ask for custody—custody was not decided in the divorce or separation action, but in a 
separate petition to the Inner House.
89
  Secondly, fathers had the common law right to their 
children as property.  Thirdly, if a wife did want to leave she had to consider how to 
support herself and her children without her husband’s income.  Further adding to the 
pressures placed on wives to stay in unhappy marriages was the notion that a mother 
should be self-sacrificing for her children; it was considered appalling if a mother did not 
put her children before herself.
90
  In consequence, unhappy mothers often continued living 
with their husbands in order to stay with their children.
91
  The main advantage of filing for 
a separation, though an expensive and sometimes lengthy process, was the provision of 
aliment.  A successful action for the wife meant her husband was legally ordered by the CS 
to support her and her children (if awarded custody) in a separate dwelling.    
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In the separation and aliment cases, twelve out of the fourteen couples had children.  The 
average number of children from these couples was 3.6.  Two couples had no children at 
all, and one woman had three children from a previous marriage, but none with her second 
husband, the defender.  Out of the twelve couples with children, three wives complained of 
direct violence towards their children; two husbands threatened their children, three 
husbands were violent to the mother in front of their children, and two husbands threw 
their children out of the house with their mother (see Table 5.5 below).  Linda Gordon 
found in her study of nineteenth-century Boston that wife beating ‘was often correlated 
with child neglect…Only 13 percent of wife-beating victims were child abusers, but 41 
percent of wife-beaters were also child abusers.’92  Considering the small sample and 
nature of sources being examined for this study, the same figures are not available, 
however, it can be said that the majority of these cases of cruelty involved violence in 
some form (either threats, abuse of the mother in front of them, thrown out of the house or 
physical assault) towards children.  Catherine Pringle’s daughter testified that her father 
threatened their family the last night they saw him: ‘before he left he warned us to get out 
of his way, as he would be sure to take some person’s life that night.  My mother and the 
children took refuge in a neighbour’s house.’93  
In the criminal court cases of wifebeating, only six of the 102 collected cases mentioned a 
husband assaulting a child as well as his wife.  The punishments, however, varied.  In 
1831, George Loughton was sentenced by the High Court of Justiciary to seven years 
transportation for coming home drunk and beating his sleeping wife and twenty month old 
child with a bottle and stick.
94
  In 1876 a man convicted of 'knocking [his wife and 
daughter] to the ground, and when lying there seizing them by the throats and otherwise 
conducting himself in a disorderly manner', was given sixty days imprisonment with no 
alternative of a fine.
95
  But twenty years later, a man taken to Paisley Police Court for 
assaulting his wife and stepdaughter by pulling them by the hair and striking them with his 
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14 1880 Perry or Mein 0 - - - - 
(b): born 
 
Out of the twelve wives with children who filed for separation and aliment, five asked for 
custody.  Four husbands fought this request, but eight mothers took or kept their children 
with them after the final separation.  Out of the remaining four families, three had adult 




It was not until the 1861 Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Act that judges in the CS were given 
the power to grant custody of the children, rather than custody automatically going to the 
father; yet, there is evidence of wives seeking custody with their plea for separation before 
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  The earliest case, Grieve or Winton v Winton, details the complexity of 
separation and custody.  Christina Winton began the action against her husband Campbell 
Winton, a builder, in 1820, but under enormous pressure from him reconciled in spite of 
being granted a plea of separation by 1823.  She stayed with him until 1827 then petitioned 
to reawaken her separation and aliment action as Campbell had resumed his maltreatment 
shortly after her return.  She was one of the few women to cite direct violence to her 
children, claiming ‘he kicked her off a chair and upon the floor, while holding an infant in 
her arms’ and ‘in a fit of fury he broke to pieces the bedstead upon which she and her new 
born child were laid.  He also locked [Christina] and her infants out of their bedrooms and 
house when sick, leaving them exposed in the streets.’99  She was awarded a decree of 
separation and aliment in 1829, but her plea for custody was denied despite her numerous 
attempts to appeal the ruling, causing the court case to last until 1832.  Due to Christina’s 
first action being filed in 1820, only three years after her marriage, her original plea asked 
for custody of her then only child.  During their reconciliation from 1823 to 1827 they had 
two more children.  When she reawakened her case she again asked for custody.  However, 
the Lord Ordinary only granted the custody of her first child with the decree of separation.  
Campbell had also asked for custody of the children claiming, ‘[he] is plainly entitled to 
the custody of them’, and later stated, ‘he is materially interested, that none of [their 
children] shall remain with the pursuer and her relations’ (the cause of their marital 
unhappiness according to Campbell).
100
  He was awarded custody of the two youngest.   
It is unclear why the Lord Ordinary allowed Christina custody of only the oldest child, as it 
is unexplained in the Court documents, particularly when compared to the following 
judge’s note from the Gordon or Steuart v Steuart case, where the wife and husband also 
fought for custody.  Elizabeth Steuart was only granted custody of her youngest child, a 
four year old, as she was too young to remove from her mother’s care: 
 Under the Conjugal Rights Act, however (24 and 25 Vict., 86), section 9, 
the Lord Ordinary in the present decree is entitled to provide for the 
custody of the pupil children.  The youngest child of the marriage, a girl, is 
only four years old.  It seems right that the pursuer, who is not to blame for 
the present separation, should have the custody of this child, but the Lord 
Ordinary does not feel warranted in going further. The next child is a boy, 
aged eleven, the others are above puberty, the eldest being major.  No 
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sufficient grounds have been established for interfering with the custody 
and education of these children.
101
 
In the Steuart case, it was the youngest child who was determined to need her mother’s 
care, while the older children would stay with their father.  This ruling was common 
practice in England according to Foyster, who found that children between infancy and 
seven years of age were deemed to require their mother’s care, but it was believed that 
children over seven would be best placed with their fathers.
102
  Similar attitudes are evident 
in Scottish cases.  Overall, the custody disputes in the separation cases show five wives 
pleading for custody, four out of those five were contested and fought by the husband (only 
one husband gave no answer to the summons against him, and the wife was granted 
custody).  For the four other women, two were only given custody of one child, while the 
husband was allowed to maintain the rest; one husband was assoilized (John Smith), and 
one husband, Robert Taws, was awarded custody while his wife was given visitation 
rights.   
What is also evident is that judges did not characterise the maltreatment of a wife by her 
husband as a feature of his abilities as a parent.
103
  Thus, a husband could be abusive to his 
wife but deemed a fit father, as illustrated in the Lord Ordinary’s decision for Janet Taws 
who was awarded a separation and aliment from her husband Robert Taws without custody 
of her children.  Underneath the ruling for a separation, Lord Adam wrote:  
The Lord Ordinary does not think that there is anything in the defenders 
conduct which makes it necessary that he should be deprived of the 
custody of his children.  Neither their health nor morals will be injured by 
their residing with him and under his control.  The pursuer will be entitled 
to have access to them at such times as may be arranged.
104
 
Although cruelty was proven by Janet, the Lord Ordinary stated that based on her 
behaviour in court, it seemed likely that Janet was responsible for some of the ‘quarrels’ 
between her and Robert.  Despite her quarrelsome nature, the Lord Ordinary declared that 
Janet did not deserve to be maltreated and therefore granted the separation.  Even so, while 
her character did not prevent her from obtaining a separation, it did influence her claim for 
custody.  This case was filed in 1880 and perhaps does support a change in judges’ 
attitudes towards chastisement, though with the limited sample it is difficult to say 
positively.  Still, Fraser’s Treatise written as late as 1878, suggests that the official legal 
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position allowed for some tolerance of physical violence if in the form of correction or 
chastisement: ‘where however, the cruelty, said to be used towards the wife, does not 
amount to gross personal violence, it is a valid defence to the husband that the wife’s 
conduct was improper and deserving of punishment.’105  It is discernible that there was a 
divide between legislations and judiciary rulings in the second half of the nineteenth 
century; the discourse of provocation and wife blaming was still used in legal texts, but 
some judges were setting their own precedents discouraging this notion, at least in the CS. 
 
Sources of Conflict and Provocation in Separation Cases and Criminal Court 
Cases 
Analysing the aggravating factors surrounding episodes of violence is rarely 
straightforward, yet scholars of marital violence in Scotland have agreed on three main 
issues as the sources of conflict for marital abuse: sexual jealousy, money, and marital 
expectations of domesticity.
106
  Though these categories are very general, most 
disagreements that led to abuse stem from one or more of these matters.  In the nineteenth 
century these three sources of conflict are equally applicable to the CS separation and 
aliment cases and are also evident in wifebeating cases tried in the criminal courts. 
According to the wives’ complaints and testimonies, seven wives claimed they had not 
done anything wrong to warrant maltreatment.  Christina Winton stated she ‘did everything 
in her power to please him.’107  Elizabeth Peters included in her complaint that, ‘a day or 
two after the death of [her] father…and before his funeral…[her husband], without the 
slightest provocation on [her] part, struck her on the face and breast to such an extent that 
she was quite disfigured in which state she had to appear at her father’s funeral.’108   
Whereas Leneman and the Dobashes found jealousy and possessiveness as the most 
common source of conflict, only two wives indicated this as the cause for their husbands’ 
abuse: Catherine Cairns and Sarah Mein were called ‘whore’—an insult that implied 
suspected adultery and sexual violence—and Sarah found herself locked out of her home 
when she returned from a trip and was subsequently attacked when she tried to get in, 
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despite having asked for and received permission from her husband to travel.
109
  Still, as 
shown in other historical studies, the mistrust demonstrated by abusive husbands reflects, 
as Barclay explains, ‘their frustration with their wives’ “active” behaviour, regardless of 
the form it took.’110   
Money, the second source, was cited by three of the seven wives.  An assault could follow 
after the wife either asked for money or refused to give her husband any to support his 
‘dissipated habits’.  In Leith’s Summary Court, for example, a wife claimed her husband 
beat her because she would not allow him to spend any more money on liquor.
111
  
Relationships were also complicated by a shared business.  For instance, Christina Souter, 
who ran a dairy business with her husband, went out after him to stop him selling some of 
their cows: ‘He poked me out of the door with a stick, and then followed me to Mayfield 
Terrace and knocked me down.  He struck me on the mouth and knocked one of my teeth 
out and cut all my lip.’112  By the time of Christina’s action, she and her husband had sold 
off most of their cows and closed their business.  James Souter was reportedly 
unemployed, but Christina’s middle son had opened a dairy business of his own across the 
street from his father’s and she had moved in with him. 
The third source of conflict, marital expectations, is the most general category, and 
therefore covers a wide range of domestic related issues that led to cruelty.  Christina 
Smith, for instance, admitted conflict arose when she disobeyed her husband’s orders to 
stay away from her children, and to not interfere with the servants.
113
  Elizabeth Peters’ 
husband threw dishes at her when he did not like the dinner put in front of him.
114
  In the 
criminal court, a husband from Bolton was convicted of ‘grossly maltreating his wife 
because…[her] neglecting to mend a hole in his trousers pocket had been the cause of his 
losing 14s.'
115
  These episodes were precipitated by the wife disobeying orders, her 
domestic failures, and her reprimands, all related to her role as mother and mistress of the 
home.  The use of violence to remedy a wife’s conjugal failings, as Barclay wrote, was ‘a 
demonstration of power.’116  Any disobedience of a wife disrupted the patriarchal 
hierarchy, and threatened the husband’s power over his dependents.  To reaffirm his 
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position as the head of the household and restore familial order it was socially acceptable 
in the nineteenth century to discipline a wife.
117
    
Sources of conflict, however, are not the same as provocation.  As Foyster explained, 
‘cruel violence was unprovoked violence’; meaning provocation implied validation.118  For 
the twentieth century, the Dobashes found that, ‘[t]he idea of provocation is a very 
powerful tool used in justifying the husband’s dominance and control and removing moral 
indignation about his resort to force in securing, maintaining, and punishing challenges to 
his authority.’119  The allowance of provocation to be heard as a defence was in effect 
accepting that there may be a justifiable reason for abuse.  It implicated the woman as the 
one at fault.  Foyster argues that provocation was less acceptable as a defence in 
nineteenth-century English criminal courts, nevertheless, she continues, this did not 
necessarily dissuade the general public from tolerating marital violence as a form of 
chastisement and enforcing authority.
120
   Hughes’ work on wifebeating in nineteenth and 
twentieth-century Scotland found that, ‘Scottish courts and the press continued to identify 
wives as the source of provocation’.121    
Following Hughes findings, this analysis of reported wifebeating trials and CS cases shows 
the language of provocation was still being used from 1830 to 1880 and onward.  Table 5.6 
outlines the number of times provocation or drink was used as a defence for wife assault in 
the sample of 102 cases.  Of the 102, eighteen reports cite a form of provocation.  Over 
half of these husbands were sentenced to imprisonment, all sixty days or less.  If fined, the 
cost was less than £2, and all with the alternative of prison.  Drink was mentioned slightly 
more; 23 times out of the 102.  Again, the majority of offenders were given prison 
sentences for thirty to sixty days, although only five men were sentenced to hard labour.  
Fines were also used relatively sparingly, and ranged from 20 shillings to £3 with the 
alternative of prison.  For instance the article reporting on a labourer from Edinburgh given 
forty days imprisonment in summary court for assaulting his wife by striking her in the 
face, knocking her down, kicking and trampling her, stated, ‘the prisoner, in his defence, 
said he had received much provocation.’122  According to the Dundee Courier & Dundee 
Argus, Bailie Macdonald was swayed by a defence of provocation in 1880: ‘[three fellow 
weavers] had known Patrick for many years as a sober hard working man, but he was sadly 
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tried with a drunken wife.  After hearing the evidence, the Bailie found the charge proven, 
but as he believed Patrick had been sorely tried, he dismissed him without inflicting 
penalty.’123  In the CS cases, seven out of fourteen cited specific instances of provocation 
that allegedly instigated the abuse. 
The examples used by husbands to justify their maltreatment are interchangeable with the 
sources of conflict.  As Hughes, Ayers and Lambertz argue, the maintenance of this 
domestic ideal was rarely accessible for working-class couples, therefore, ‘money 
problems had enormous potential for creating tensions between husbands and wives.’124  
That money was indeed an issue was evident in the coverage in 1899 of James Hardie from 
Possilpark, Glasgow, who attempted to murder his wife and then take his own life.  Mrs. 
Hardie explained that up to the night he stabbed her: 
 Hardie had been out of work for about two years, in consequence of ill-
health.  Latterly he had been eccentric and peculiar in his behaviour.  They 
had, however, lived amicably together.  Lately his inability to work seemed 
to prey upon his mind, but he never displayed a tendency to violence, either 
towards her or himself.
125
 
Pawning, in particular, was a unique feature of working-class life in the nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, and a regular source of conflict.  While many wives used pawn 
shops effectively to temporarily supplement a lack of wages from their husbands, these 
businesses were also used to get money quickly for supporting destructive habits.
126
  Some 
husbands and wives would pawn furniture, clothing, and other household items to buy 
drink when out of money.  For instance, the wife of an elderly weaver was beaten for 
hiding the blankets when she feared that her husband, who had been drinking all week, 
would pawn them.  When he asked for the blankets and she refused he struck her in the 
face, tore her clothes, and took the children’s blankets instead.  He was sentenced to ten 
days imprisonment by Bailie Morton.
127
  Another husband assaulted his wife with a 
walking stick but was only punished with a fine of £1.1s. or fourteen days imprisonment 
because his wife was a drunkard and had been ‘pawning everything in the house to obtain 
drink.’128 
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Table 5.6 Provocation and Drink Defences Found in Wifebeating Cases 
Tried in Criminal Courts and Reported by Local Newspapers, 1831-1896a 
 
  Provocation Drink Total  
Type of Sentence       
Dismissed 2 1 3 
Transported   1 1 
Cautioned      
Sent to Higher Court      
Failed to Appear      
Fined 5 5 10 
<21s.  2 2 4 
£1-2 2 2 4 
£2-3      
£3-4 1 1 2 
£4-5      
>£5      
with alt. of Prison  5 5 10 
cautioned  1  1 
Imprisonment 11 16 27 
Length of Sentence:      
<1 month 5 4 9 
1-2 months 4 10 14 
3-6 months 1 1 2 
>6 months 1 1 2 
with alt. of fine       
with caution/security 1 1 2 
with hard labour 3 5 8 
Total  18 23 41 
Total No. Cases 
Collected 102 102 102 
 
a
 Although divided into two categories, cases where provocation or drink are mentioned do overlap.  
Ten of the provocation cases mention drink, while eight of the drink cases mention provocation.  
 
 
Money was a recognised source of conflict for working-class families, but it was also a 
provocation frequently cited by middle-and upper-class husbands.
129
  Four CS cases, all 
middle and upper-middle class couples, said their wives’ extravagance led to their marital 
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unhappiness.  Two of those four men also complained that their wives’ frivolous spending 
put them into debt.
130
  Alexander Peters stated that his wife: 
 is a person of a stubborn and unyielding disposition and also very 
extravagant in her expenditure, and he was also rendered uncomfortable 
and unhappy by the wasteful extravagance of the pursuer, both in the 
management of her household affairs and in her personal expenses and 
tastes.  She in these respects very far exceeded the income of the defender, 
and notwithstanding his remonstrances she persisted in this course of 
extravagance which the defender clearly saw was exhausting his means and 
running him rapidly into debt. 
He furthermore claimed this debt caused him to lose his co-partnership with Messrs. 
Webster Salmond & Co. and move down to a managerial position in the Ward Mill 
Bleachfield.  Money was such a concern to him that he admitted they lived unhappily 
together—though denying the ‘special charges against him’—and stated he would not fight 
the action for a separation from bed and board, but would argue against the requested 




Another provocation described by husbands was domestic failure.  Ross found in her study 
of London from 1870 to 1914, that ‘the failure of wives to provide such services even for 
very good reason—such as a husband’s refusal or inability to provide money needed for 
meals—was looked on by men as a major breach of their marital claims.’132  Again Ross’ 
study focused on the working-class couple; however, this issue was not restricted to the 
lower classes.  Even in families with servants, husbands were equally intolerant of their 
wives’ domestic shortcomings.  Unsurprisingly, these were the same husbands who 
criticised their wives’ extravagance in this study.  
Provocation not only implied bad behaviour and the need for discipline, but also 
legitimised the use of violence as a means of correction.
133
  Nancy Tomes found the phrase 
‘she was very quarrelsome and used aggravating words’ as a typical defence used by 
working-class husbands in London.
134
  This study of CS and criminal court cases of 
wifebeating identifies that this form of provocation existed in a wider context than 
working-class marriages.  John Smith stated his wife had a ‘temper, which was always 
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discontented, [and] had become more violent and acrimonious.’135  In his defence against 
specific allegations of physical abuse, John answered:  
 The story as to the pursuer being forcibly thrust out of the kitchen amounts 
to nothing, even as it is told. Its only foundation is, that, upon the 
defender’s checking the pursuer for interfering injudiciously with a new 
servant, she addressed to him some vituperative epithets, upon which he 
led her with him out of the room.  Another allegation of the defender 
having struck the pursuer in present of Mr Blackwood, misrepresents the 
actual occurrence, which was of this nature—that in the presence of the 
gentleman mentioned, the pursuer, while at the tea-table, had done all she 
could to irritate the defender by accusations against him, and by 
intimations of what she and her friends would do, by involving him in a 
litigation in this Court, upon which the defender put his hand to her mouth 
to terminate a discourse so improper and unbecoming.  Nothing further 
took place, and the evening passed off as if nothing had happened.
136
   
One of the more telling examples of provocation was verbal and physical assault by the 
wife.  It demonstrates that women were indeed violent, too.
137
  In fact, Ross’ quotation 
used in the title of her 1982 article, ‘fierce questions and taunts’, describes the behaviour of 
wives when their husbands withheld money or spent it on themselves.
138
  Barclay argues 
that, ‘[i]n the eighteenth century, female violence, like female sexuality, was a threat to the 
discourse that labelled women as passive and men as strong.  Women’s violence towards 
men was generally believed to undermine masculinity, while female defiance was a 
challenge to male authority.’139  John Mein explained in his defence to the CS, ‘that for 
some years there have been bickering and quarrels between the pursuer and defender, and 
mutual recriminations.  These quarrels were generally begun by the pursuer.’140  Similarly, 
Mr. Souter claimed his wife was very violent; for instance, she threw dishes at his head 
cutting him severely.  When accused of being arrested for assaulting his wife and their 
adult son, he admitted to being fined £3.3s. and a caution of £5, but said, ‘the true parties 
to blame were the pursuer and her son, for they, without cause, attacked and assaulted the 
defender and his son-in-law…In trying to protect himself the defender may have hurt the 
pursuer, but he had no intention of doing so.’141  In an 1872 sheriff court case a wife 
claimed her husband had come home ‘the worse for liquor, and, without provocation’ beat 
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Defences were provided in order to dispute charges and to be exonerated.  Still, attitudes of 
entitlement and privilege were evident from some husbands.  In particular the 1870 case of 
Gordon or Steuart v Steuart illustrates cruelty in an upper-class household.  In 1847, 
Elizabeth Georgina Graham Gordon, daughter of Thomas Gordon, Esquire of Park in the 
county of Banff, married Andrew Steuart, Esquire of Auchlunkart, and proprietor of other 
estates in Banff County.  Elizabeth and Andrew were also ‘cousins-german’.143  Together 
they had five children living, though eight were born.  Elizabeth described her husband as 
having always ‘displayed a most irritable, capricious, and ungovernable temper. And his 
language and conduct towards the pursuer gradually became so cruel and violent’ that they 
almost separated in 1862, but reconciled until July 1869 when Elizabeth left Auchlunkart 
permanently.  Andrew’s abuse began in the form of verbal cruelty, followed by threats of 
physical violence and threats to throw her out of the house.  His words eventually escalated 
into a physical assault in July 1869, twenty-two years after their marriage:   
 in the presence of … two of their children, and of Jane Millar, the pursuer’s 
maid, the defender used the most violent and abusive language towards the 
pursuer, threatened to kick her and every servant with her out of the house, 
and finally struck and beat the pursuer repeatedly about the head, until she 
was completely stunned and fell to the ground, where she lay for some time 
without the defender making any attempt to assist or relieve her, or in fact 
taking any notice of her whatever.
144
   
Elizabeth left the next day, taking their children with her and contacting both her solicitor 
and her brother, a Major and curator bonis of Mr. Steuart’s estate.  Her determination to 
never return to her husband’s home is evident from her complaint; nevertheless, she could 
not force him to provide an aliment for living separately.  The purpose of the action 
therefore was to obtain financial support for herself and her children: she asked for £500 
per annum plus £50 per annum per child claiming that Andrew earned £3,000 per annum 
through his estates.  
To deny and dispute his wife’s claims, Andrew provided an unusually detailed background 
of his life, starting from childhood.  The most important contributing factor to the defence 
was his development of mental health issues.  Even as a young boy Andrew admitted to 
having ‘a warm and somewhat vehement temper.’  Educated all over the United Kingdom, 
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he inherited his property in 1844, while still attending the University of Cambridge.  He 
claimed the combination of intense studying and his inheritance responsibilities ‘told most 
seriously on his health, both mental and bodily.’  In 1852 he ‘had repeated attacks of 
illness, and these last culminated…in temporary deprivations of reason, requiring curative 
treatment in the Royal Asylum at Perth, where he resided for about eighteen months.’  
After his time at the Royal Asylum he decided to begin a career in politics, becoming a 
member for the Borough of Cambridge in 1857 and again in 1859.  By 1862 this public life 
and his role as proprietor had retriggered his earlier health issues; 
he unfortunately contracted an impassioned mode of language, which he 
admits he ought not to have carried, at least into private life.  Owing to 
circumstances the defender often used violent language without attaching 
to it their significance which in the mouth of most men would have borne.  
For this, in his case, great allowance ought to be made, and the defender 
regrets exceedingly that this appears not to have been sufficiently kept in 
view by his family.
145
    
Andrew maintained this line of defence.  He stated he had ended his political career and on 
doctor’s orders was staying in his room alone and in bed to avoid any aggravations.  It is 
apparent that Andrew expected this story to serve as a foundation for his defence.   
The principal conflict between the Steuarts was household expenditure—Andrew claimed 
he inherited debt with his property, and had much more limited means than expected of 
him, but Elizabeth would spend money on luxuries against his wishes.  The tensions and 
disagreements escalated into the first and only physical assault between the couple in July.  
Andrew was reprimanding his wife for hiring another female servant while she ‘asserted 
her right to keep as many servants as she pleased, when the defender asserted his right to 
turn out any he thought in excess.’  Elizabeth further infuriated her husband by calling for 
the servants to come ‘witness what ought to have been private.’  Andrew’s denial of 
cruelty, his defence that he was provoked, and his plea for an absolvitor and custody of the 
children illustrates his belief in his authority and expected privileges as a husband and man 
of status.  The Lord Ordinary commented substantially on this case stating in the 
Reclaiming Note: 
 This is a very painful case, especially looking to the social position of the 
parties... The Lord Ordinary thinks that it is sufficiently proved that…the 
defender committed a violent assault…and inflicted serious injury by 
repeated blows with his clenched fist.  The defender himself does not 
dispute the assault, but alleges that the blows were given with his open 
hand, and he pleads provocation.  The provocation has not been proved, 
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and the whole evidence goes to shew that the blows were given, not with 
the open hand, but with the clenched fist.  
The Lord Ordinary is disposed to hold that no other actual assault resulting 
in personal injury has been proved, and he gives the defender the benefit of 
this…The Lord Ordinary thinks that the actual and violent assault of 26th 
July 1869, taken in connection with the oft-repeated threats, and the use of 
violent and unjustifiable language, entitled the pursuer to decree of 
separation.  Especially is this the case in the rank of life to which the 
pursuer and defender belong [italics added].
146
 
Andrew Steuart argued a defence of deficient health and provocation expecting leniency 
afforded by his position as an esquire and politician.  Despite his protests the Lord 
Ordinary found the sum of Andrew’s past behaviour warranting of a separation with 
aliment.   
 
Perceptions of Marital Violence 
As discussed previously, the point at which judicial opinion on wifebeating shifted from 
tolerated to unacceptable is at the centre of the historiographical debate on marital 
violence.  Leneman, whose study ended in 1830, asserted that it was in the first half of the 
nineteenth century that Scottish judges showed this change in attitudes.
147
  Conversely, 
Conley concluded that in the late Victorian period diminished responsibility and 
provocation still excused men accused of wife murder from homicide convictions, 
although men who murdered their wives were more likely to be convicted of culpable 
homicide and given harsher sentences.
148
  Hughes also argues Scottish judges continued to 
sanction provocation and diminished responsibility as legitimate defences into the 
twentieth century.
149
  Evidence from this study suggests provocation was indeed still used 
in both civil and criminal courts as a mitigating factor in wife assault.  However, judiciary 
rulings show both the persistence of those attitudes as well as evidence of less tolerance of 
wifebeating.  For instance, the ruling in Gordon or Steuart v Steuart demonstrates that by 
1870 the Lord Ordinary showed intolerance of ‘respectable’ husbands using violence 
against ‘respectable’ wives.  However, his inclusion of the couple’s status indicates this 
may have influenced his decision.
150
  Comparatively, also in the early 1870s, The Dundee 
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Courier, Argus, and Northern Warder printed the following report for a case of 
wifebeating heard in Police Court by Bailie Johnson: 
The Magistrate, after hearing the evidence, said he had no doubt but the 
accused was guilty of the charge of assault.  He and his wife seemed to live 
very disagreeably, and there was no doubt but that there was provocation 
on the part of the wife; but no man, whatever provocation he may receive, 
could be justified in striking his wife.
151
 
Though the magistrate was clearly stating he did not accept this as a defence, the husband 
had been convicted of beating his wife with a metal weight, yet was given the rather light 
sentence of a 20s. fine or ten days in prison.  A similar sentiment was expressed in the 
report of another wife assault case in 1874:  
Bailie Muirhead remarked that he was reported to have said that the 
Magistrates were determined to put down wife beating.  He had said no 
such thing; what he did say was that the Magistrates were determined to 
punish wife beaters with the utmost rigour.  As to the putting down of it, 
unless they had the power of flogging he believed they would continue to 
have wife beating in Edinburgh.
152
 
The wife beater in this case, an Andrew M’Manus (with a previous conviction), was 
sentenced to sixty days’ imprisonment with hard labour, as well as a new caution.  
However, Muirhead’s comment that he only expects to punish men brought to court 
suggests an awareness of the ineffectiveness of judicial penalties, and ultimately the impact 
they have on dissuading the general population from this behaviour.  This concern was not 
limited to Edinburgh.  An anonymously written article attempted to cast light on this issue 
of ineffective sentences claiming that the: 
scandalously slight sentences given by Bailie Ross [of Aberdeen] to the 
two cowardly fellows who beat their helpless wives in the brutal manner 
detailed, can only be considered as giving very large encouragement to 
them and like reprobates to go on in their brutal course, and may be said to 
lead indirectly to such more serious cases…153 
There is suggestion of changing discourse amongst the judiciary encouraging less 
tolerance, but what is also evident is that the earlier acceptance of wifebeating and 
provocation was still a competing discourse.
154
  Thus, David Niddrie in 1872 was 
sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment for his fourth conviction of wife assault, but 
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Sheriff Cheyne blamed drink as the cause as his wife was hiding furniture from him to 
prevent him pawning it.
155
  The combination of this wife-blaming discourse and futile 
penalties indicates that any changing attitudes were culminating in words rather than 
action.  Moreover, it does not provide any evidence of a decline in wife abuse. 
  
Intervention and Relationships 
In mid-nineteenth-century Scotland homes were not the havens of privacy associated with 
modern living.  In the towns people lived in intimate settings with little privacy between 
the thin walls and echoing closes.  Large families commonly lived in one or two room 
homes, many with lodgers or boarders, possibly a single servant, sharing the already 
limited space.
156
  In rural areas homes were also small and part of close knit communities, 
where neighbours knew one another and windows served as boxes of entertainment.  
Wealthier families lived in homes more separate from the community, sometimes out in 
the country or what became suburbs with few neighbours at all, but this did not mean 
privacy.
157
  To be in the middle or upper class required symbols of status, one of which 
was the employment of servants.
158
   
Marital violence, taken in the context of these living conditions, was often more of a public 
affair.
159
  Hughes argued, in her work on Clydeside in the interwar period, that it was not 
only an increase in private living conditions that led to less intervention, but the discourses 
of ‘respectability’ versus ‘animality’ that working-class families struggled against.  In 
order to maintain respectability for their family, abused wives sacrificed their own 
wellbeing.  Moreover, the notion of marriage-mending encouraged by authorities 
permeated public discourse and, Hughes believes, then became ‘internalized’ by working-
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  The public nature of marital violence is illustrated in both Leneman’s and 
Barclay’s studies, which found neighbours, family and servants were more willing to 
intervene in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth.
161
   
This study of Scottish marital violence, though a much smaller sample, similarly found that 
family, neighbours, servants and even strangers were known to physically intervene to stop 
a husband from brutally beating his wife.  Newspaper reports of wifebeating cases likewise 
indicate that third party intervention was not uncommon.  Hammerton and the Dobashes 
have written on the use of ‘rough music’ or charivari as a form of community justice 
against violent husbands, but agree the practice died out by the twentieth century.
162
  
Though there is no report of a similar communal response in the CS cases, the Dundee 
Courier reported in 1863 that, ‘[a]n inhabitant of Buckler Brewer, notorious for his wife-
beating propensities, was lately shaken in a floursack by the women of the village, until he 
promised amendment.’163  Of the 102 criminal court cases collected from the papers, only 
seven individuals were noted as interfering when wives were being assaulted.
164
  The fear 
of stepping in between a belligerent husband and his wife was indeed reasonable.
165
  In one 
instance a husband beating his wife with his fists, tearing her hair and threatening their 
child was confronted by their lodger.  The husband’s response was to bite the lodger on the 
nose to the effusion of blood.
166
  In another trial a labourer named O’Donnell attempted to 
stop a husband from beating his wife, but was instead attacked by both the husband and 




 The most common party to intervene from the CS cases was a family member.
168
  Ten out 
of the fourteen cases featured at least one instance of family intervention during an 
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  Children were often the only witnesses present to stop an attack.  Younger 
children would run for help, while older ones would intervene physically to help their 
mother.
170
  Elizabeth McCorquodale’s ten year old daughter would bang on the connecting 
wall to their neighbour to cry for help as the neighbour would often intervene.
171
  Isabella 
Johnstone had two adult, unmarried daughters living with her.  They would protect their 
mother by pulling their father away, hiding her, or escaping with her to a neighbouring 
house.  Isabella never sustained an injury from her husband thanks to her daughters and the 
intervention of others.
172
   
Many women would go to their parents’ home after they left their husbands.  Every wife 
who left her husband and who went to her parents’ home appeared to be welcomed and 
sheltered there.  Catherine Smith’s father, for example, sent her to hide in their country 
home when he heard John Smith was coming to take Catherine and her new born son 
away.
173
  There were also reports of other relatives helping to physically prevent an attack.  
Catherine Pringle was being choked by her husband when his brother and his brother’s 
wife entered the room and pulled him off of her.  Elizabeth McCorquodale’s nephew saved 
her from being struck by stepping between her and her husband, and when John 
McCorquodale still had not calmed down and attempted to strike her with a poker, the 
nephew stopped him again by taking away the poker.  Elizabeth’s sister testified that she 
went to visit in Edinburgh and during that time John was constantly abusive.  She claimed 
that he was civil at first, ‘but when I began to remonstrate about his appearance, he was 
very saucy and impertinent to me—so much so that he struck me on the eye.’  He did not 
attack that night, but threatened he would ‘do them both.’  The next night when he began 
to strangle Elizabeth because she would not give him money, her sister did what she could 
to pull him off.  After that incident he did not physically abuse Elizabeth again while her 
sister was in town.
174
 
There were some indications of poor treatment of the wife by her husband’s family.  Janet 
Taws was arrested when her mother-in-law called the police for breach of peace, despite 
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the claim that it was Robert Taws who was drunk.  Elizabeth Peters was saved on one 
occasion from her husband pulling her hair till she bled, when a servant went for his uncle 
and upon the uncle’s arrival being announced Alexander Peters stopped, despite servants 
attempting to pull him away in the interim.  After that attack Elizabeth went to her parents’ 
home, but one week later was brought back to her husband’s by the same uncle.  Another 
example is Robina Findlay.  She was struck in the face by her step-daughter after asking 
her to leave their home for being too loud.  The Findlay’s home was full of witnesses, 
including Robina’s sons and their friends.  Still, after the step-daughter hit her, Robert 
Findlay also struck his wife. 
It seems in the nineteenth century that assaults were more common in the presence of 
witnesses than in private spaces.  Again this may be due to the intimate settings many 
families lived in.  Testimonies from neighbours describe close range spaces making fights, 
screams or other sounds of violence impossible to ignore.  Evidence of intervention from 
the early modern era differed greatly from the modern, as Leneman found when she 
contrasted her study to the Dobashes statement, ‘most neighbours are not thought of as 
sympathetic’.175  Likewise, the abused wives from the fourteen separation cases tell stories 
of neighbours saving them on several occasions.  It appears common that a wife would run 
away to a neighbour’s home and spend the night (sometimes neighbours were family 
members, such as sisters or adult children).  Furthermore, if a third party was present and 
witnessing an assault they were more likely to intervene in some way than not at all.  Mrs. 
Russell and her husband were the centre of attention when fighting outside their home in 
the summer of 1859.  She was heard ‘crying shame on her husband for he had been beating 
her.  She had blood on her face.’  He then grabbed and shook her violently when she tried 
to get back into their house.  Workmen from a neighbouring business cried out ‘shame—
shame to strike a woman’, causing Robert to turn his attention towards them.  The boss 
sent a worker to find a police man, but none could be found.  Soon afterwards Mrs. Russell 
stuck her head out of her window and shouted ‘murder’, as her husband was beating her 
again.  Neighbours tried to get in the front door, but found Robert had blocked it from the 
inside.  A stranger then climbed into the building through a window and found Robert 
                                                          
175
 Leneman, ‘“A tyrant and tormentor”’, p. 44 and Dobash and Dobash, Violence Against Wives, p. 175.  
See also Bailey’s article on violence against wives in eighteenth-century England; Joanne Bailey, “I dye [sic] 
by Inches”: locating wife beating in the concept of a privatization of marriage and violence in eighteenth-




lying in front of the door holding it shut with his feet.  The stranger assisted a policeman 
through the same window and Robert was arrested.
176
   
This was far from the first time Robert roused the neighbours by beating his wife.  A 
couple from across the street testified on behalf of Mrs. Russell; the wife claimed she 
could see into the Russells’ home through the window and had seen Robert chasing his 
wife with something in his hand, which she suspected was a poker.  Mrs. Russell had 
shown up at her door in just a shift after midnight with ‘marks of violence’ on her body.  
When they would try to intervene they would find the door blocked from the inside.  The 
husband of this woman was the only neighbour who appeared unsympathetic, testifying 
that ‘her coming annoyed me, and I discouraged her coming before this,’ though she was 
always taken in at least for a short time.  If anything is evident from Robert Russell’s 
behaviour, particularly his blocking of the door, it was that the neighbours’ intervention 
was a common occurrence.
177
  
A third party that frequently intervened against an abusive husband was servants.
178
  In the 
fourteen cases, six mention having servants.  Only Elizabeth Cook was maltreated by a 
servant who she once found in bed with her husband.
179
  Otherwise, most wives that called 
for assistance were aided.  This aid predominantly came in the form of physical 
intervention— seemingly as a result of the isolation of the household from neighbours—as 
servants had to act quickly but perhaps were also aware of the fact that they were the only 
people available to help.  Sometimes this was at a risk to themselves, for instance Elizabeth 
Peters’ servants were put in danger several times when they interfered between the Peters.  
On one occasion Alexander Peters chased a servant with a carving knife when she tried to 
rescue Elizabeth from the bedroom she had been locked in.  He had also threatened to 
shoot them during a separate attack.  The last assault before the separation suit, Elizabeth 
was hidden in the servants’ bedroom off of the kitchen.  When the servants tried to block 
Alexander from entering he began to kick them.  They were able to overpower him and 
push him away, but they left his service the same night (Elizabeth left the next day).
180
  
John Mein struck his servant as she attempted to rescue her mistress, the two then escaped 
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by running out into the street together.
181
  It is also evident from these cases that servants 
did not remain in households where the husband was cruel and violent;
182
 many witnesses 
at the trials were ex-servants who had left the couples’ home as a result of the cruelty.  
These same witnesses, predominantly young girls, expressed concern and fear for the 
mistress of the house, and felt their own safety was at risk if they stayed.    
The only group who had official power to stop a husband from assaulting his wife was the 
police.  The call for a police officer in the nineteenth century by an abused wife was 
seemingly used as an immediate relief from an attack rather than a desire for police 
punishment.  An arrest would physically remove the husband creating distance between the 
couple and an opportunity for him to calm down, or in some instances, sober up.  Leneman 
identified that if a neighbour called for the police they were often calling for selfish 
reasons, hoping the police would end the noise caused by the dispute.
183
  In this study, six 
out of the fourteen wives had some form of police intervention to protect against their 
husband’s violence.  Two of the five husbands had been arrested twice each for violent 
crimes against their family.  In the case of Myles or Souter v Souter, the inadequacy of 
fines is illustrated: James Souter was arrested for breach of the peace and paid a fine of 
£3.3s.  Not long after that charge he was arrested again for assaulting his daughter.  
Likewise, Robert Pringle was arrested twice for the same crime of assaulting his wife, 
receiving a punishment of ten days imprisonment.
184
 
Wives also feared the repercussions of following through with charges against their 
husbands.  They logically dreaded that imprisonment might enrage him even more so, 
endangering their lives upon his release.  This is apparent in Mrs. Russell’s plea for a 
separation, which she filed while her husband was in jail for wifebeating.  It stated, ‘the 
pursuer is afraid for her life, and has removed from the house of the defender, it being 
manifest that she cannot safely cohabit with him; and she raised the present action for 
separation from her said husband and for aliment.’185  Sarah Mein, the woman who was 
choked and beaten with her husband’s walking stick, was so fearful of her husband when 
he drank that she petitioned to the sheriff to have him incarcerated in the Crichton Lunatic 
Asylum in Dumfries.  Her application was granted, though she was beaten for it the night 
before he left.  In her complaint she stated: 
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 The defender was in the asylum for a fortnight, when he was liberated on 
his own application.  The pursuer left his house before his return, as after 
what she had suffered from him it is impossible and would be dangerous 
for her to continue to live with him.  She is convinced from experience that 
he will again take to drink 
186
 
Even though John Mein provided defences stating Sarah had no cause to leave his home, 
the separation was granted.  
Lawburrows was another form of legal intervention available to a wife or husband afraid 
of their spouse, but unwilling to ask for a legal separation.
187
  It existed in Scots law as a 
‘caution or security’ granted by both the high and low courts, and was available to anyone 
who felt under threat for themselves or their property by another person.
188
  Only one wife 
from the separation cases took advantage of this legislation.  Elizabeth McCorquodale 
petitioned for law-burrows from the Justices of the Peace in the County of Edinburgh May 
17
th
 1860, who ordained the defender to find caution for ‘one hundred merks scots failing 
which a warrant of incarceration would be granted till the same was found.’189  Despite this 
order of protection, Elizabeth still filed for a separation and aliment shortly after.  The CS 
cases examined in this chapter suggest that a decree of separation and aliment was the most 
effective form of protection (out of a limited range of options) against an abusive husband, 
yet, it was the most difficult to obtain for wives.  
 
Conclusion 
The pressures of marital expectations worked both ways to instigate disappointment, 
tension and conflict for husbands and wives.  The ideal husband was first and foremost a 
provider for his family, a caring companion to his wife, and an educator and moral guide 
for his children.  The ideal wife took care of the home, ensuring comfort and stability for 
her husband and children, obeyed her husband with loyalty and submissiveness, and also 
set an example for her children.  But, as discussed, these expectations were often 
unachievable due to economic restraints and marital discord.   
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When made public through the criminal and (less often) civil courts, marital violence was 
presented as a narrowly defined experience, both in its definition and as an occurrence 
relegated to lower working-class families.  In the criminal courts, marital violence was 
labelled as wifebeating, which evoked specific imagery of drunken or brutal husbands 
physically assaulting their wives sometimes for no justifiable reason, but more often than 
not, under an alleged provocation by the wife.  Non-physical forms of abuse were rarely 
discussed in criminal courts and if they were, they were judged less cruel as it did not 
result in an injury or disablement.  The portrayal of marital abuse in the CS following a 
summons of separation and aliment allowed for a more encompassing definition.  
However, the interpretations of what constituted maltreatment and cruelty were subjective 
depending on the judiciary overseeing the action; hence, the cases where wives could 
prove physical assault or valid threats of future violence were awarded separations.  The 
only cases found where no physical harm was proven and the complaints revolved around 
mental terrorisation and cruelty were the only cases dismissed in favour of the defender 
(husband). 
This narrow view of marital violence as physical assault against a wife greatly impacted 
judiciary and public perceptions.  If a wife was found to have provoked her husband the 
assault against her was deemed justified and the husband was given a light punishment.  
Or, if he did not use physical violence, then the court did not find it life-threatening and 
therefore no reason to intervene in the marriage.  Provocation in particular remained a 
valid defence for many judiciaries in the Scottish criminal courts, as seen through its 
continual use during the mid-nineteenth century, and into the twentieth.  In the CS abuse 
continued to require proof of extreme violence in order to be cruelty until the turn of the 
century, when, there was a precedent set citing mental abuse as grounds for a separation. 
Overall, though English studies suggest a shift in attitudes towards intolerance of male 
violence, in Scotland it seems this shift took longer to establish.  Despite more progressive 
civil legislation by the nineteenth century, regarding the rights of wives, the criminal penal 
code did not compliment these laws, and the few advances enacted after 1850, culminated 
in little more than words written on paper.  Thus, the discourse of ending wifebeating, in 
the media and in the criminal courts, through harsher punishments was not often the 
reality.  Most importantly, however, the increase in reports to the criminal courts and CS 
demonstrate that marital violence was not a declining occurrence.  No accurate figures are 
available for instances of marital violence, and moreover, it is understood that this is a 
form of recurrent violence where the majority of incidents went unreported.  Increased 
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reports suggest a rising level of awareness, but not necessarily an increase or decrease in 
marriages where abuse was used.   
When placed between the work of Leneman and Hughes, this study confirms an 
undeniable pattern: marital violence was and is a continuing issue for families, no matter 
the class, background or location.  The misunderstanding and lack of awareness 
perpetuates public and judicial discourses that often render penalties and legislations 
ineffective.  Thus, the combination of these social and cultural beliefs contributed to the 
low number of separation suits brought to the CS, while criminal courts remained the more 
commonly used legal remedy for marital violence.  
 
 
Conclusion: Continuity and Change in Nineteenth-Century Scottish 
Divorce and Separation 
 
 
As Frederick P. Walton, Scottish advocate, wrote in 1883, ‘husbands without wives, and 
wives without husbands’ was seen as a threat to social stability.1  Thus, he stated, only the 
gravest circumstances should warrant a separation, (and presumably a divorce).  Yet, there 
was another idea present in nineteenth-century Scottish legal texts and that was the idea 
that in order to preserve the sanctity of marriage husbands and wives guilty of adultery and 
desertion should forfeit the rights from their conjugal union.  The understanding of divorce 
as upholding the marital institution also allowed an unhappy couple the opportunity to end 
their union and form a new one, where they could be happy in their conjugal bond and 
more likely to respect it through chastity and adherence.   Rather than forcing people to 
remain unhappily married, causing emotional, economic or physical harm, divorce and 
separation provided an escape for the truly irreparable causes.  What this study has shown, 
however, is that despite the divorce and separation law being relatively liberal for the early 
modern period, in the nineteenth century this legislation was not commonly used.  There 
were outside factors beyond rules and regulations that seemingly kept divorce and 
separation rates in Scotland low.  These additional factors were economic, social and 
cultural. 
This thesis researches and reports on Scotland’s unique experience of divorce and 
separation, and as the only previous work on the same subject covered the dates 1684 to 
1830, it is essentially a study of continuity and change within the nineteenth century.
2
  
Moreover, related work on the twentieth century provides a chance to highlight when 
changes did begin to occur within this earlier period. 
Chapter One considered the legal state in Scotland regarding marriage, divorce and 
separation law.  Scots law was significantly influenced by the country’s conversion to 
Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and consequently its divorce law rejected the 
Catholic belief that marriage was indissoluble.  The ability to file for divorce on the two 
grounds of adultery and desertion for husband and wife before the modern era was unique 
to Scotland.
3
 The civil law in Scotland that granted validity to regular and irregular 
marriages was also unique to the country, and frequently subject of discussion between 
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English and Scottish MPs.
4
  All of this was well established before the nineteenth century, 
but in the second half of the 1800s, significant legislative changes took place that bettered 
the rights of married women.  
The most straightforward changes over this study were found in the legal system.  
Importantly, divorce law was not drastically modified throughout the nineteenth century.  
It was not until 1938 that additions were made to grounds for divorce.
5
  Yet, the rights of 
married women (and consequently husbands) were subject to several rounds of reforms 
between the 1860s to the 1880s in Scotland.  Subsequently, it appears that the reforms 
were more significant at the turn of the century, decades after their enactment.  
Individually the statues were small steps forward.  Although reform may have been born 
from good intentions, the legal changes were not always put into practice. 
More specifically, gender inequality within marriage continued throughout the nineteenth 
century.  Even with reforms, wives remained invisible citizens under their husbands, and 
this invariably contributed to their reliance on their marriage, even if it was an unhappy 
one.  For instance, the property rights statutes specific to married women passed in waves 
from the 1861 Conjugal Rights Act to the Married Women’s Property Act of 1881 
gradually abolishing jus mariti.  Still, legal and economic restraints remained.  Married 
women were given the right to keep their own property; however, this was only an 
advantage for a woman who entered marriage with some personal wealth.  The Acts also 
gave married women the right to protect their personal earnings from their husband.  Yet, 
again, many married women who worked earned insignificant wages and most likely still 
struggled to be self supporting.
6
  The legislative reform advanced women’s rights, but day-
to-day struggles between husband and wife continued.   
This does not contradict Walton’s comment on husbands and wives, nonetheless, as both 
observations suggest marriage was indeed the most important family institution, and its 
preservation was pre-eminent in Scots law.  This is also evident in the feminist campaigns 
of the first wave women’s movement.7  Though the feminist movement championed 
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married women’s rights, it did not call for reform specific to the divorce law.  Historians 
have found that mainstream campaigners were against reform of the divorce laws and 
marginalised radical feminists who promoted alternatives to marriage.  Most feminists 
believed in marriage as the standard family unit, but emphasised the need for legal equality 
between husband and wife.
8
  Accordingly, the wives who brought their husbands to court 
for divorce or judicial separation were not necessarily feminists, but did so for personal 
reasons.   
Nevertheless, marital expectations throughout this time period are difficult to chart.  The 
legal expectations of chastity and adherence did not change from the beginning to the end 
of the nineteenth century.  Historians, however, debate the development of companionship 
values between husband and wife.  Joanne Bailey, Elizabeth Foyster, Eleanor Gordon, 
Gwyneth Nair, and Katie Barclay demonstrate love, partnership and kindness did exist 
within the confines of a patriarchal relationship in the early modern period.
9
  While the 
works of Edward Shorter, Lawrence Stone, John Gillis, and Colin Gibson do not deny love 
existed in the earlier period, they argue that it developed into a commonly held marital 
expectation in the modern period.
10  
 
This study analyses marital breakdown from the perspective of marriage in the nineteenth 
century as existing within a patriarchal framework that still allowed for companionate 
partnerships. The narratives presented to the Court of Session (CS) reflect the marital 
expectations of the judiciary; demonstrating kindness, affection and accord were key 
components for a pursuer to establish the validity of the marriage and how it began to 
break down.  Marriage, regular or irregular, was based on mutual consent and not to be 
taken lightly.  Moreover, the institution of marriage remained just as important to the 
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Scottish contemporaries from the beginning to the end of the nineteenth century.
11
  This 
was evident through the continuing emphasis on preventing divorces based on collusion, 
and the efforts of local authorities to reconcile separated couples, particularly deserting 
husbands with their families, at the expense of the Parochial Board.  
Overall, in Scotland, reforming married women’s rights rather than the divorce law 
bettered accessibility for wives to legally end their marriage.  This in turn led to an 
increase in the number of divorces.  However, it is important to note that this was not the 
intention of the mainstream feminist movement, or those involved in legal changes 




Chapter Two established the general trends of divorce and separation through a 
quantitative discussion.  Using a combination of sources it shows that only a small 
minority of married persons either divorced or legally separated from 1830 to 1890.  The 
reasons for the low numbers are attributed to the factors discussed earlier: legal, economic, 
social and cultural.  Chapter One explained how legislation caused divorce and separation 
figures to remain insignificant, including marriage law and evidence law.  Chapter Two 
highlights how accessibility was another influence on the divorce and separation rates.   
Even with equal access for husbands and wives, economic factors prevented some couples 
from filing legal suits.  The fee of a legal proceeding was estimated to cost from £20 to £30 
if uncontested by the accused spouse.  If it was contested however, that amount would 
increase based on the length of the trial and the number of witnesses called.  The average 
cost found in the CS sample was closer to £60, the equivalent of 66.7 weeks wages for a 
skilled worker who earned 18s. per week.  Moreover, the CS was located in the city of 
Edinburgh.  It can only be speculated that this would have deterred couples from filing a 
suit, as there is no evidence in the CS stories.  Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of 
pursuers were from Edinburgh and Leith suggests physical accessibility was a factor.  
Similarly, historians who studied London’s Divorce Court argue the same for English 
couples.
13
  There is also the consideration that a man or woman would have to take time 
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off of work or family responsibilities to travel to Edinburgh and follow through with a suit, 
and that amount of time would also be dependent on the defender’s response.  
On the other hand, impoverished Scottish individuals had access to support from Parish 
Councils to fund separation and divorce suits, the equivalent of legal aid, since the 
sixteenth century.  The Scottish Poor Law would cover all legal expenses for pauper 
litigants if they could prove genuine hardship.
14
  This study of divorce and separation cases 
found a few examples of pursuers applying to the Roll in order to fund their suit, though 
this amounted to less than five percent of the database sample. 
From the CS database the predominant socioeconomic status of the litigants appeared to be 
upper-working class and middle-working class.  This finding was not surprising for 
Scotland.  Leneman’s assessment of the preceding period divided the social rankings of her 
study into three classifications—aristocracy, gentry and common—and found that from 
1771 to 1830 the majority of pursuers were from the common class.
15
     
Discrepancies between the number of wives and the number of husbands who filed for 
divorce and separation further identifies greater influences at work besides the law.  
Chapter Two demonstrated that more husbands filed for divorce on the ground of adultery 
during this time period.  Wives on the other hand were more likely to file for divorce on 
the ground of desertion or for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty.  Again, this 
suggests diverse factors were influential. 
While Chapters One and Two discuss legal and economic factors, Chapters Three, Four 
and Five evaluated the social and cultural aspects of marital breakdown.  Chapter Three, 
which focused on divorce for adultery, showed that societal expectations on behaviour 
seemingly impacted on the number of wives who divorced their husbands for infidelity.  
Known commonly as the double standard, more leniencies regarding sexual indiscretions 
were granted to men than women.  Women were instead branded by their ‘deviant’ sexual 
behaviour, and received more condemnation for it.  Thus, despite the practice of a single 
standard promoted by the Scottish legal system and religious teachings, the double 
standard prevailed as a discourse, and in practice.
16
 
This is not to say that wives quietly overlooked their husbands’ affairs, and some wives did 
successfully win a divorce on the charge of infidelity, however, it does seem that a wife 
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was more likely to end the marriage if her husband had also broken the marital vows of 
adherence, support and protection, as she had nothing left to lose.  Husbands, on the other 
hand, were more likely to file for divorce if their wives had an affair, especially if she had 
an illegitimate child.  This reflected the general concern that if a woman had an extra-
marital affair it would likely lead to pregnancy and that the child could potentially be 
passed off as a child of the marriage and future heir of the family’s estate.  The degree to 
which married couples tolerated adultery was arguably reflected in the fact that most cases 
of adultery collected demonstrated cohabitating adultery rather than the more standard 
affair where spouses cheated while living together.  Once both elements of marital 
expectations had been broken, it seems couples were willing to deal with the expenses and 
legal process to end their irreparable marriage.  This suggests that adultery did not always 
lead to marital breakdown.  Finally, Parliamentary accounts of divorce showed that after 
the 1880s more wives began to file for divorce, which coincides with the enactments of 
legislative reform for married women’s property and evidence.17  Better protection of a 
wife’s economic independence, as well as the fact that a husband or wife could testify in a 
matrimonial suit, meant more wives filed suits.  
The second social, and undoubtedly economic, factor explored in this thesis is the issue of 
gender inequality within employment and wages.  The decades from 1830 to 1890 saw the 
establishment of the breadwinner wage.
18
  The notion that husbands, fathers, and men 
overall, should earn a higher wage under the assumption that they are the main provider for 
the family, shaped the earning capabilities of women in the nineteenth century.  This was 
especially evident through this study of divorce and separation in Scotland. 
Although all women who divorced or separated at this time most likely struggled 
financially, women who were abandoned by their husbands perhaps experienced more 
prolonged economic deprivation.  If deserted, a wife no longer had the physical presence 
of her husband, but his financial support was also withdrawn.  Based on the testimonies of 
deserted wives in the CS, as well as the applications for poor relief by deserted wives, 
Chapter Four illustrated how many of these women did their best to either track down their 
husband or to find a new source of financial support.  Nevertheless, the ability to sustain a 
female headed-household on low wages and limited employment resulted in many deserted 
women becoming destitute.  Although desertion is often attributed to poverty, this study 
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found that it was the cause of poverty, particularly for women.  Thus more wives filed a 
suit of divorce on the ground of desertion than husbands.  Additionally, however, more 
wives used the Poors’ Roll to deal with desertion than the CS.  Poor relief offered 
immediate financial aid as well as the resources to track down the deserting husband. 
This chapter also found that a comparison of official desertion cases presented to the CS 
and unofficial desertion documented through the Poors’ Roll illustrates desertion as 
potentially the most common, yet largely hidden, form of marital breakdown.  A divorce 
for desertion, on the other hand before the 1861 Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Act was the 
most complicated process of the three as it required repeated efforts by the pursuer to 
prove that he or she had unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile with their spouse for at least 
four years.  This most likely contributed to the low number of desertion divorce actions, 
because a spouse would have been immediately disadvantaged by their desertion, but 
forced to wait years before they could file for divorce. 
The third social influence was the idea of chastisement or correction as acceptable for a 
husband to use on his wife.  This line, precisely because it was so fine, allowed some 
husbands to abuse their wives and go unpunished.  Physical violence could be excused 
through the defence of provocation.  This construction of provocation as it related to wives 
disseminated a discourse on certain female behaviour warranting punishment, in particular, 
drinking, nagging, pawning, and neglecting household duties.  Consequently, separation 
suits on the ground of cruelty were the least commonly filed suit found in this study.  
Instead, as shown through the examination of criminal court reports and historiography, 
more wives used criminal courts than the CS if seeking legal intervention, even though 
effective protection was often wanting.  
Although English historians have proposed that the treatment of women shifted at the end 
of the nineteenth century towards more protection of the ‘fairer’ sex,19 this chapter argues 
that in Scotland this new discourse existed more in theory than practice.  It furthermore 
differentiated between ‘respectable’ and ‘unrespectable’ women.  Combined with a belief 
in provocation, unrespectable women were given less protection from violent husbands as 
it was thought poor people were of a different nature than those in the middle and upper 
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classes.  Working-class husbands accused of wifebeating were also given chances to 
excuse their behaviour because they blamed provocation or drink for their use of 
violence.
20
  This study found evidence of magistrates and judges using tougher penalties to 
punish men accused of assaulting their wives, however, this practice was inconsistent.  
Moreover husbands in the courtroom through the turn of the century were still using the 
defences of provocation and alcohol.
21
  
The first part of Chapter Five discussed the discursive context for cruelty and wifebeating 
in the nineteenth century, concluding that because violence was attributed to working-class 
men and sometimes women, there was lack of understanding within criminal and civil 
policies.  However, wives had a better chance to demonstrate how their husbands abused 
them in civil court than in the criminal courts.  
Part One was followed by a comparison of charges of cruelty in the CS to those in the 
criminal courts revealing less tolerance of husbands’ brutality in the former than the latter.  
However, wives seeking a separation did have to present evidence of ‘grave and weighty’ 
cruelty in their complaint as well as evidence of long-term abuse and the potential for 
future violence.  Whereas, for a husband to end up in criminal court he had to have been 
charged with a violent assault by his wife or a police officer at the time of the attack.  A 
previous conviction was not needed for a husband to be charged in criminal court, although 
he would possibly qualify for a harsher punishment if he had previously been convicted of 
wifebeating or violent assault.   
Patterns of abuse within the sources were also analysed and highlight how non-physical 
cruelty barely featured in the cases presented in criminal courts.  Scottish judges and policy 
makers overall struggled with the concept of non-physical abuse.  In the CS non-physical 
cruelty was frequently cited by petitioning wives, yet it was a difficult offense to prove and 
subsequently not as likely to warrant a separation.  Some forms of non-physical abuse were 
more understandable for courts, such as economic cruelty and verbal threats.  Mental 
abuse, however, was not given a precedent until 1895.
22
  Moreover, certain forms of 
cruelty were associated with specific classes, such as tyrannical abuse from middle-class 
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  In addition, it seems that more working-class couples appeared in the criminal 
court attesting to an incidence of assault, whereas couples with money were more likely to 
end up in the CS where they could elaborate on the various physical and non-physical 
maltreatment they had received over the years.  A lack of quantitative data on marital 
violence besides incidences reported to the authorities means it is problematic to assume an 
increase or decrease in spousal abuse.  However, it is justifiable to argue that the 




While this thesis argues that there were several limitations that dissuaded and impeded 
couples from filing for divorce or separation, it also contributes to the bigger picture of 
female agency; and certainly, the varied experiences of men.  Rather than concluding that 
marriage was a negative relationship for husbands and wives, or as Joanne Bailey would 
say, a pessimistic history,
25
 what was captured within these sources were the efforts to 
improve difficult situations, whether that meant staying together or leaving the marriage.  
Furthermore, the fact that only a minority of the Scottish population filed for divorce or 
separation suggests more couples handled marital conflict without the aid of lawyers and 
court officials.  This gives greater weight to understanding everyday methods of coping 
employed within an unhappy or, indeed, an abusive marriage.  Abuse, as this thesis aims to 
highlight, ranges from emotional cruelty through adultery, to financial cruelty through 
desertion or neglect, and maltreatment through physical, verbal and mental violence.  As a 
gender history of marital breakdown, this study suggests more than how some marriages 
ended, but also the self-made autonomy of wives in nineteenth-century Scotland.  
Combined, these findings suggest that social and cultural factors contributed to the low 
divorce rates of Scottish couples in the nineteenth century.  These, along with legal 
restrictions on the rights of wives and economic deterrents, were all arguably influences on 
the fact that divorce and judicial separation were not common in nineteenth-century 
Scotland.  Marital breakdown, on the other hand, was more common, but largely 
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immeasurable.  Therefore, it seems likely that divorce and judicial separation were last 
resorts for couples whose marriages broke down.  Contrary to the fears of the politicians 
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